other powers, or by mere adoption in practice, may grow into genuine international law of universal application. The consent necessary for the existence of law would then be expressed as to some states and tacit as to others. The signatory states might in cases where treaties expire by limitation, help to fix the rule by retaining it to guide their conduct after the obligation had ceased. They might do this in the conviction that custom together with the treaty had made new and binding law.

Most treaties are, not, however, in terms either declaratory of international law or evidences of the growth of custom. The rules according to which treaties are made, kept, and denounced are parts of the law of nations, but their subject matter is not necessarily law. When therefore the League Preamble speaks of "a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations," it refers to definite engagements between states somewhat similar to contracts between persons. The analogy is helpful, though not perfect. Both treaties and contracts are voluntary engagements, both are intended to be kept, and both may be broken if the parties, viz., one of the states and one of the contractors respectively, are willing to suffer damages. But in the case of treaties there has been no supreme tribunal to assess these damages as there is in the case of a private contractor. In the case of treaties, it can logically be deduced from the absolute sovereignty of states that a state is at liberty at any time to abrogate its contracts. Here, however, enters the customary rule of law which lays down the general injunction that treaties are binding, and then recognizes exceptions to the rule. It is well understood that a treaty may expire from lapse of time according to its own terms, by which a definite period is set, or on the occurrence of named circumstances; or it may be dissolved by mutual consent; or because another treaty is substituted for it. A perpetual treaty may not be terminated at the mere will of one state; yet even here there is a way out, for a "vital change of circumstances" is said to justify withdrawal even from such a treaty. All treaties are concluded under the tacit reservation rebus sic stantibus; for a state is not presumed to agree to an engagement by which its independence and existence may be endangered. In

general, treaties are terminated by war between the contracting parties, but there are exceptions to this rule.1

It is sometimes said that treaties as well as custom are sources of international law. If we consider the true nature of treaties, we see, that, this can be true only in a special sense. Every rule of international law must be binding on all members of the Family of Nations. Treaties are binding only on the states which are parties to them. Third states can acquire neither rights nor duties under treaties between two other states. They may from policy act as though they were legally bound, or they may under certain conditions accede or adhere to a treaty, but they are under no obligation to do so. They may, according to some authorities, even intervene to prevent the operation of such a treaty if it violates an accepted rule of international law, or when it affects their safety, or when it violates rights previously acquired by treaty. The precepts of international law are the tests of the validity of treaties and not vice versa. In what sense, then can it be said that treaties make law?

At the outset we may eliminate the great majority of treaties which deal with boundaries, mutual guaranty, commerce, communications, extradition, copyright, weights and measures, customs, sanitation, labor, agriculture, industry, and the like. Most of these have no effect on the development of law regarding their subject matter. But there is a class which for want of a better term have been called law-making treaties. These are such as are entered into by large groups of states which agree to general rules of conduct. As above explained these may develop into universal law either by expressed or tacit consent; but even before this happens they are of extremely great importance especially when most of the Great Powers are involved. To this class of rules some publicists' have given the name General International Law, in contradistinction to Universal International Law. The acceptance of this arbitrary terminology will clarify the conception of what international law is, what treaties are, and how one reacts on the 'See Lawrence: Principles of International Law, 6th ed., p. 360-365: See Oppenheim: International Law, 1:23.

other. It retains the fundamental idea of consent as the only basis for both international law and treaties, is in conformity with the doctrines of sovereignty and equality, distinguishes between ordinary and "law-making" treaties, recognizes the force of custom, and provides for the evolution of law through expressed as well as tacit consent. We shall find the concept of General International Law of service in discussing the possible effect of the League of Nations on the growth of international law.

Oppenheim' briefly summarizes the great treaties, declarations, and conventions which he considers to have been law-making in character. Their generality is indicated by the number of states which signed them or later acceded or adhered to them. The most important are: (1) the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, signed by eight states which agreed to the neutralization of Switzerland, freedom of navigation on international rivers, the desirability of abolishing the negro slave-trade, and a classification of diplomatic envoys; (2) the Protocol of the Congress of Aix-laChapelle, November 21, 1818, signed by five states, which recognized a fourth class of diplomatic envoys, viz., Ministers Resident; (3) the Treaties of London, November 15, 1831, and April 19, 1839 (five states), by which Belgium was neutralized; (4) the Declaration of Paris, April 13, 1856 (seven signatory states, with adhesion by eighteen others), which laid down four rules for maritime war; (5) the Geneva Convention, August 22, 1864, revised July 6, 1906 (all except three states), which provided for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded of armies in the field; (6) the Treaty of London, May 11, 1867 (eight states), by which Luxemburg was neutralized; (7) the Declaration of St. Petersburg, November 29, 1868 (sixteen states), which regulated the use of projectiles in war; (8) the Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878 (seven states), which,laccording to Oppenheim, was "law-making with regard to Bulgaria, Montenegro, Rumania, and Servia"; (9) the General Act of the Congo Conference of Berlin, February 26, 1885 (fourteen states), which provided for freedom of navigation in the Congo basin and on the Congo and Niger rivers, the prohibition of slave transport in the International Law, 1: 587-595.

Congo basin, neutralization of the Congo territories, and notification to each other of future occupations by the signatory powers on the coast of Africa; (10) the Treaty of Constantinople, October 29, 1888 (nine states), neutralizing the Suez Canal and giving freedom of navigation in it; (11) the General Act of the Brussels Conference, July 2, 1890, revised November 3, 1906 (seventeen states), which restricted the liquor traffic and suppressed the slave trade in Western Africa; (12) Final Act of the First Hague Conference, July 29, 1899 (twenty-six states); (13) Final Act of the Second Hague Conference, October 18, 1907 (forty-four states); (14) the Declaration of London, February 26, 1909 (ten states). This last Declaration was, however, never ratified.

To this list we must now add the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, of which the part constituting the League Covenant is discussed in the next chapter. The two Hague Conferences and the International Naval Conference of London met under conditions favorable for concluding law-making treaties. They met not as a consequence of any particular war, but to attempt in time of peace to formulate rules for the amicable settlement of disputes, and to draw up regulations for the conduct of war on land and sea. The call for the First Hague Conference was issued by Czar Nicholas II of Russia who was impelled by a desire to rid his country of the burden of armaments. The Conference of 1907 was first proposed by President Roosevelt, but he withdrew so that the Russian Emperor might have the honor of calling both Conferences. The First Conference was attended by delegates of twenty-six states, and the second by delegates of forty-four states. At the Versailles Peace Congress only twenty-eight states were represented, so that the Second Hague Conference remains the largest ever assembled. The two Hague Conferences were organized on identical lines. In each case an unofficial "steering committee" made up of the first delegates of the Great Powers set the machinery in motion. Provision was made for plenary sessions and for commissions to work out the details of the programme and prepare drafts for submission to the plenary sessions. In all meetings a unanimous vote was required for action. Each state had one vote no matter how large

its delegation might be. The Conferences elected their own presidents, and there were secretaries who were not members of the Conferences. The Commissions of the First Conference had to do with (1) armaments, (2) laws and customs of war, (3) arbitration, (4) petitions, and (5) editing. The Second Conference appointed Commissions on (1) arbitration, with a sub-commission on maritime prizes, (2) land warfare, with sub-committees on (a) laws and customs of war, and (b) neutrals and declaration of war, (3) maritime war, with sub-commissions on (a) bombardment of ports, use of submarine mines and torpedoes, and (b) belligerent ships in neutral ports, and the revision of the Geneva Red Cross Convention, (4) maritime law, (5) petitions, (6) editing. The work of the First Conference was embodied in three conventions, on (1) pacific settlement of international disputes, (2) laws and customs of war on land, and (3) adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864. There were three Declarations prohibiting (1) the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, (2) the use of asphyxiating gas, and (3) the use of expanding bullets. Voeux were adopted concerning (1) the revision of the Geneva Convention, 1864, (2) rights and duties of neutrals, (3) limitation of the effectiveness of arms, (4) limitation of armaments, (5) inviolability of private property at sea, and (6) prohibition of bombardment of coast towns and villages. The Second Conference adopted thirteen conventions concerning (1) pacific settlement of international disputes, (2) limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts, (3) opening of hostilities, (4) laws and customs of war on land, (5) rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, (6) status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities, (7) conversion of merchant ships into war-ships, (8) laying of automatic submarine contact mines, (9) bombardment by naval forces, (10) adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, (11) restriction of the exercise of the right to capture in naval war, (12) creation of an International Prize Court, and (13) rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war. There was a new Declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles and explo