In Article 10 we find expression of the rule that every state is entitled to security for its territory from external aggression. This is declaratory of the rule which lays down the obligation of nonintervention, a rule, however, which has not been fully recognized in theory or acquiesced in in practice. In fact, as we have seen, the principle of intervention for certain purposes was during the Holy Alliance expressly recognized as legitimate. We now find, however, agreement on a rule that security of territory from external aggression is a matter of public concern.1

The third rule, not new in theory but new in practice, is contained in Articles 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 17. The rule may be briefly stated as follows: No state, whether a member of the League or not, may go to war without first attempting to settle the dispute either by diplomacy, by submission to a commission of inquiry, or by arbitration. It may be considered that such a moral rule already existed, but unquestionably there was no such rule of law. The Covenant now states specifically that "any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League." (Art. 11.) Certain processes which must precede the beginning of hostilities are laid down in Articles 12, 13, 14, and 15, and by Article 17 the application of the rule is extended to nonmembers. Perhaps the whole purport of this rule might be summed up in the words, the world is entitled to peace; war in the future is to be the exception and peace the rule.

In interpreting Article 10, it may be helpful to compare it with the corresponding Article (3) of the American draft covenant submitted by President Wilson to the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference. "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity against external aggression; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judg ment of three-fourths of the delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the people concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those people and to the States from which the territory is separated or to which it is added and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." (The Independent, July 5, 1919, p. 15.)

But war under certain circumstances is still justified. In fact, we now find suggested a new rule contrary to the legal development of the last three centuries but reminiscent of Grotius. Just wars are legal and unjust wars are illegal; states as well as persons may commit crimes; state crimes must be punished by the only means available among sovereign states, namely, war. The history and vicissitudes of a similar rule stated by Grotius in 1604 are followed in a recent book by Vollenhoven.1 In 1603 and 1604 the Portuguese took the law into their own hands when they came into contact with Dutch navigators and traders, carrying off as booty whatever they could. In protest against this, Grotius wrote a book entitled On the Right of Capture. A part of it, Mare Liberum, was published in 1609, but the rest of it was unknown until 1864. In it he contended that, in the interest of society, state crime must be punished not only by the offended state, but by all others not directly concerned. The world at large was not affected by this unpublished book; but when De Jure Belli ac Pacis was issued in 1625, it contained a long list of crimes of which a state may be guilty, with the manner in which punishment should be inflicted. "The right of making war, not the right to conclude peace, is first mentioned in the title of his book," says Vollenhoven (p. 13), "and this right of making war (he is never weary of repeating it) stands or falls with the right and the duty to grapple with state crime and state injustice as much as with crime and injustice of citizens. The lawful war, according to Grotius, is that which is meant for punishment and with namby-pamby wars he will have nothing to do (although war should always be conducted on principles of humanity); in such a war literally everything ought to be allowed that may be required to get the upper hand of the criminal nation." In order to judge of the conduct of states, Grotius conceived of a complete, comprehensive set of state duties, and while recognizing the independence and equality of states, limited their right to declare and conduct war except for punishment of crime. It was a fatality to the world that the great writers who followed Grotius, among whom the most prominent was Vattel, did not carry forward and 'The Three Stages in the Evolution of the Law of Nations.

develop the limitation on the right to declare war along with the right of states in every other respect, to conduct themselves as sovereign. The contrary doctrine was developed as an attribute of sovereignty, legally though not morally justified, that a state has unbridled liberty to wage war for the sake of paramount power. It was the chief purpose of the Hague Conferences to put a check on the exercise of this right; but the effort failed. It took such a catastrophe as the European war to bring us back to the complete doctrine of Grotius, and to impel the states to set up by a binding agreement a means of determining when war may and when it may not be legally waged.

It has always been considered a legal rule that either when war is threatened or during its progress one nation may tender its "good offices" to the states at war, in order to prevent a conflict or bring it to an end. In Article 11 we find an expansion of this rule. It is declared "to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." It is therefore a rule of law here recognized that it is not an unfriendly act to take up with third parties the affairs of two contending states. Under the rule of good offices the offer had to be made to the belligerents or disputants themselves.

In Article 13 we find a new rule foreshadowed, if it is not actually stated. It has always been a question to be solved only by states themselves whether a particular dispute is suitable for decision by arbitration. States have always been particularly sensitive on this point. Full discussion of it will be found in Chapter XI. Here we may merely state that in Article 13 an attempt is made to define in general terms those disputes which are suitable for arbitration. A rule of law might read something like the following. According to the law of nations the following disputes are in general suitable for submission to arbitration: 1st, those concerning the interpretation of a treaty; 2nd, concerning any question of international law; 3rd, concerning the existence of any fact which if established would

constitute a breach of an international obligation; 4th, concerning the existence and nature of the reparation to be made for a breach of an international obligation.

In Article 16 we find formal recognition of international ostracism and joint boycott as legitimate means of dealing with recalcitrant states. Whether or not these are intended as means of carrying on war or whether they should be classed in the group known as "measures short of war" is not clear. At any rate, the agreement not to have intercourse with a state under the ban of the League whether it be a member of the League or not will probably vitally affect the rules of warfare according to which it is legitimate to carry on trade even in munitions with a belligerent, subject to the penalties to be enforced by the belligerents themselves.

Article 16 contains also the implication of another rule, namely, that in case of just wars conducted by the League the financial and economic losses of the participants must be equitably distributed among the members of the League, so that the burdens will not fall heaviest upon nations least able to bear them.

Articles 18, 19, and 20 lay down new rules concerning treaties. These rules perhaps might read as follows: Secret treaties hereafter made are not binding. All treaties must be published. Every treaty must be registered in a public place under the auspices of the League where it may be examined by the accredited representatives of all sovereign states. In the latter provision we find a sort of Torrens system established for treaties. Their authenticity, binding force, and content are no longer a matter of concern merely to the parties. These matters are now of public concern. This idea is enforced in a rule contained in Article 20 to the effect that all treaties must be consistent with the principles upon which the League is founded. Treaties inconsistent with these principles must be abrogated. In fact, signature to the Covenant by the agreement in Article 20 automatically abrogates such treaties and provision is made in Article 19 for occasional revision of the treaties at the suggestion of the Assembly of the League in order that consistency may be maintained. For clarity's sake Article 21 explains that treaties of arbitration are not in any case inconsistent

with the League Covenant. Whether or not this same article when it says "Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of... regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace" is a formal recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as a rule of international law, or whether it merely defines this doctrine as a "regional understanding" "for securing the maintenance of peace" is a matter of controversy. It may be well contended historically that the primary purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was not to maintain peace, and this section has been the object of very searching and pertinent attack by the opponents of the League. It is contended by many that no protection whatsoever to the Monroe Doctrine is given. We will have occasion later in this chapter to recur to this point. If, however, the Monroe Doctrine is itself now recognized as a rule of law, the original wording of the document should be quoted here:1

At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the Euro

Richardson: A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, p. 778, 786-788.