pean powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.1

In Section 22, which relates to the control of colonies and territories by means of the mandatory system, a rule is laid down and a principle stated that the well-being and development of backward peoples constitute a sacred trust of civilization. They may not be

'The successive interpretations and expansions of this Doctrine in the messages of Presidents subsequent to Monroe are collected in A League of Nations (World Peace Foundation), v. 1, no. 5, June, 1918. The story of the formulation, development, and effect of the Doctrine is told in Latané, From Isolation to Leadership, p. 19-53, 131-148.

exploited for the benefit of one state. The backward peoples themselves have rights which must be respected and from this flows another rule, namely, that all such communities not now sovereign have the right, when they are capable of it, to become independent, self-governing states. Rules of far-reaching importance are laid down in Article 23 which may be grouped as follows. Conditions of labor, the prevention of disease, the control of the traffic in women and children, in opium and dangerous drugs, are matters of common interest to all states and all peoples. They are of international concern and are subject to international supervision. It may be considered a rule accepted in Article 24 that the permanent offices or bureaus of public international unions hereafter created must be under international direction. This does not mean that the unions themselves are controlled by the League, but that their administrative commissions and ministerial and secretarial bureaus are to be controlled by the League. Finally we find a specific recognition in Article 25 that the improvement of health, prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world are matters of public concern. Reference is made particularly to voluntary Red Cross organizations, but only to those which devote themselves to the purposes above enumerated. No rule apparently is laid down that Red Cross organizations devoting themselves entirely to work during war time are matters of public concern, although doubtless this would be a justifiable inference.

HAS THE LEAGUE LEGISLATIVE POWER?

We now come to the question whether the League Covenant has erected any organs through which legislative power may be exercised. A legislature in its ordinary meaning is a body of persons in a state invested with the power to make and repeal laws. The word "legislator" comes from two Latin words meaning "law" and "to bear," the whole expression meaning a bearer or proposer of law. Legislation is the enactment of rules for the regulation of future conduct, rights, and controversy. In a state the legislature is one of the three departments of government and is to be distinguished from the executive and the judicial departments. Its

powers are limited by the fundamental law of the state whether it be a written or unwritten constitution. It is part of a system and its efficacy depends not merely on the promulgation of laws but upon the means of interpreting them and enforcing them. Is there any such organization created by the Covenant? Is there, in fact, a world state with departments of government? The answer is in the negative. In the League we do not find a full-fledged system of government to be enforced by international police. There is no power, therefore, to make rules which may be imposed upon the world. Municipal legislation within a state presupposes a sovereign power which lays down rules of conduct, but in international society such rules of conduct can be created only by agreement, since the states are all sovereign and independent. What then has been provided in the League to permit international legislation used in this figurative sense either by proposing rules or by laying them down? Articles 3 and 4 dealing with the Assembly and the Council of the League set up what some writers have called a bi-cameral legislature and they point out that both bodies are representative of the members of the League, the Council being similar to a senate and the Assembly to a house of representatives. What, however, is the function of these two bodies? For both of them we find the same statement: "The Assembly (or Council) may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." The Preamble to the Covenant throws light on what is considered within the sphere of action of the League. We find two main purposes, (1) to promote international coöperation and (2) to achieve international peace and security. These two ends are to be accomplished (a) by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, (b) by the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, (c) by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct between governments, (d) by the maintenance of justice, and (e) by a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations. Anything which has to do with these matters is therefore within the scope of the Assembly and Council and we have already in this chapter considered in detail the specific rules which were laid down

for the accomplishment of these purposes. Now the Council and Assembly are not empowered to produce international legislation by formally enacting it, nor are they specifically authorized to make agreements. If the latter were the case they would be making treaties. Are the representatives of the members of the League qualified and authorized to make treaties? In Article 7 we find the statement that "representatives of the members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities." This does not, however, give these representatives the status of plenipotentiaries, that is to say, persons with full power to conclude treaties binding upon their states when subsequently ratified. Unless such powers are given the representatives by amendments to the League or by separate agreement, they cannot therefore enter into treaties. They might, however, agree upon draft conventions which after submission to the various states could be concluded by a diplomatic congress or by direct state action, and finally ratified by the

states.

There are no articles of the Covenant which directly give to either the Council or Assembly anything like legislative power. In Article 15 it is provided that the Council shall make no report or recommendation in disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within domestic jurisdiction, but the decision whether a matter is by international law solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a party is left to the Council and the Council may reach a decision binding upon the parties if all of its members with the exception of parties to the dispute are unanimous. Suppose, for instance, that a dispute arose as to the admission of Orientals to British Colombia contrary to her immigration laws. Could an Eastern state, for example, raise the question with the League as to whether such exclusion was a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of Canada, and if so, could the Council unanimously, except for the vote of Canada and the Eastern state, declare immigration to be a matter coming under international law? If so, it would perhaps be laying down a special rule which would be applicable to Canada alone, under

specific circumstances; but it would not be making general rules. Its action would be more nearly judicial than legislative in character. Similarly it has been contended that under this power of the Council, Article 21, which mentions the Monroe Doctrine, gives in fact no protection to it. It is contended that in any dispute a difference of opinion may well arise as to whether the Monroe Doctrine applies and if so, the Council would be in a position by successive determinations to redefine the Monroe Doctrine, changing its meaning and its detailed application. Here, again, its function is judicial only.

Attention should be paid also to the method provided for amending the League Covenant. Article 26 provides that amendments "will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly." The League Covenant is itself part of a law-making treaty, and if the Council and Assembly together could amend it, these two organs of the League would have power to make new law. They have, however, power only to propose amendments for ratification by the states in their sovereign capacity. This situation is emphasized by a clause which was added at the request of the Brazilian delegation in order to avoid constitutional difficulties. "No such amendment shall bind any member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the League." Although it is agreed that an amendment, that is a treaty, shall take effect when only a majority of the members have ratified it, a member will tacitly assent to it if it does not avail itself of the privilege of withdrawing. There is, therefore, no hint of legislation in the method of making amendments. These are binding only with the consent of the members.

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VIII

BAKER, ERNEST. The Constitution of the League of Nations: Legislative.

(New Europe, 10: 180-184, March 6, 1919.) OPPENHEIM. The League of Nations, p. 41-55.