facts and explanations. If the Council is unsuccessful, it must, a majority concurring, publish a report containing its recommendations and explanations. If the Council does not so vote, any state represented on the Council may issue a statement of the facts of the dispute and its conclusions regarding them. In case the members of the Council with the exception of the representatives of one or more parties to the dispute are unanimous as to the report, the members of the League agree "that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report." If agreement by the Council as above cannot be had, "the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." It is not clear whether this provision refers to the "members of the League" collectively or individually. In the first case, the Council could even at this stage refer the dispute to the Assembly in order to obtain a further delay. In the second case, either the parties to the dispute could alone go to war, or the other members take sides with them, thus precipitating a general

war.

The Council will make no recommendations concerning matters solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The Council may in any case refer the dispute to the Assembly, and it must so refer it at the request of either party if the request is made within fourteen days of its submission to the Council. When referred to the Assembly, its powers are identical with those of the Council except that the report must be concurred in by the representatives of those members of the League represented on the Council, and of a majority of the other members of the League, exclusive in each case of parties to the dispute. The above provisions relate to disputes between members of the League. Disputes between two states outside of the League, or between one such state and a member of the League, are provided for by Article 17. In the event of a dispute, the state or states outside of the League "shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership" upon such conditions as the Council may deem just, and for this purpose the Council may modify the provisions of Articles 12 to 16. The Council appears

to be given no discretion as to whether it shall or shall not invite non-members temporarily to accept the obligations of the League; but it is conceivable that there may be a difference of opinion within the Council as to whether a dispute likely to lead to a rupture exists. Moreover, there may be disagreement as to the conditions under which the invitation should be extended. Thus, it is possible that one or more members, under the unanimity rule, might prevent the Council from taking any action until an open rupture had occurred. The Council begins its investigation as soon as it has extended the invitation to states outside the League, not waiting for acceptance.

The penalty for failure to comply with the above provisions of the Covenant is set forth in Article 16 and the concluding paragraphs of Article 17. Should a member of the League, or a state invited to accept the obligations of membership in regard to a dispute with a member state, resort to war in violation of the Covenant, "it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other members of the League," and it will be subjected to severance of all trade and financial relations, prohibition of all intercourse between it and any other state, and military and naval coercion on the recommendation of the Council. When two states outside the League refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League in order to deal with a dispute between them, the measures to be taken and recommendations to be made. will be decided upon by the Council. Any member of the League which violates one of its covenants may be expelled from membership "by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the League represented thereon" (Art. 16). It should be noted that the above provisions relate to disputes which the parties consider cannot be settled by arbitration, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy. Deferring the discussion of these two means of settlement to later chapters, let us examine more in detail the method of settlement or recommendation by means of reference to the Council or to the Assembly. Three classes of disputes are provided for, (1) those between members of the League, as A and B, (2) those between a member and a

non-member, as A and X, and (3) those between non-members, as X and Y. In disputes belonging to the first class, A and B have by signature to the Covenant contracted to accept the assistance of the Council or of the Assembly; but neither A nor B is bound to accept the recommendation made in the report, and if both reject it, they may go to war three months after the submission of the report. As six months are allowed in which to make the report, the League may therefore delay hostilities in such a case for nine months. If, however, the report is unanimously adopted by the Council, with the exception of the representatives of A and B (who according to Article 4 will be present as members even though not permanently there), or by the Council and a majority of the other members of the League, with the exception of A and B, and if A, for instance, complies with the recommendation, then B and all other members agree not to go to war with A. If, however, B begins hostilities, the whole League will be arrayed against it, and it will be subject in the discretion of the Council to expulsion from membership (Art. 16). If the Council or Assembly cannot reach an agreement as above indicated, for instance if the report is approved only by a majority of the Council, then A and B, at the expiration of three months from the issuance of the report, may (1) try to settle their dispute by diplomacy, or (2) submit it to arbitration which, however, is hardly likely, or (3) go to war. If the last method were chosen then the other members of the League could individually tender good offices or offer to mediate, or intimate that they would take sides in order to bring hostilities to a close. The contrary result would be produced if the preponderance of power were not on one side, for the threat would only bring more parties into the contest. The Council might also, even at this stage, by unanimous vote, refer the dispute to the Assembly in the hope that by publicity, open debate, and personal influence, a report acceptable to one disputant might be agreed upon with a sufficient number of votes to make it effective.1

'It is scarcely possible that a unanimous vote of the Council for submission to the Assembly could be obtained; yet unanimity would be required because this is not named as an instance in which the unanimity rule does not apply.

If, when the dispute first came up in the Council, either A or B claimed that it arose out of a matter solely within domestic jurisdiction, the Council would pass upon this claim, and if it proved to be well-founded, no report would be made. This might not, however, settle the dispute; it might even aggravate it, if A still pressed its claim. A and B would be left to their own resources, and might resort to non-hostile means of redress, to diplomacy, or to arbitration. War has, therefore, not been prohibited between A and B, except under very definite circumstances. The restraints do not infringe sovereign rights because A and B agree to a limitation of the exercise of their right to declare war when they join the League. The regulations are self-imposed.

A difficult question, doubtless now of academic interest only, might be raised if a dispute should arise between Great Britain and one of her dominions, a member of the League. Suppose Australia should become seriously at variance with the mother country. Could Great Britain claim that the dispute was solely within her domestic jurisdiction? That perhaps would depend on the matter out of which the dispute arose; for Australia could with justice claim that to some extent her status was changed when she was admitted to full League membership. Civil war is not within the purview of the League; yet Australia is a full-fledged member, and she could assert the right to have her disputes, even with Great Britain, considered by the League.

In disputes of the second and third classes a new situation is created. If a dispute arises between A and X, X will be invited to act in the matter as if she were a member of the League. She may do this voluntarily and thus preserve the theory of her sovereignty. By this means a small non-member state might get the protection of the League against the overpowering might of a member state. But if X rejects the invitation of the League, and makes war on A regardless of the provisions of the Covenant, X will be subjected to economic boycott and military and naval pressure. She will have imposed on her a set of rules to which she has not given assent. This seems to be a violation of her sovereignty. On the other hand, war is still a legal remedy under international law, and it is open to the

League as rightfully as to non-members. For the purpose of bringing to a speedy end war begun by non-members, or as a deterrent to such wars, it may and indeed must still be used. The League, in order to prevent as far as possible the formation of powerful alliances outside the League, was forced to announce in advance what it would consider a casus belli.

Again, if X and Y are at odds, and both reject the League's invitation, "the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute." In order, therefore, to prevent war between X and Y, non-members of the League, the League may itself go to war with both X and Y. If X accepted the invitation of the League and Y rejected it, the same rules would apply as between A and X, when X refused to accept temporary membership. The cases where X, or X and Y, refuse to accept the obligations of the League may be few in number; or it may be that all sovereign states will become members of the League, thus removing the difficulty as to sovereignty, but if any powerful state should remain or become a non-member, the success of the League might be jeopardized by this provision. If the penalty clause did not apply to nonmembers refusing temporary membership, the arrangement would be strictly in conformity with rules of international law regarding amicable settlement of international disputes.

As regards members of the League, admirable provision is made for publicity and for delay in taking up arms, both of which make for peace. And the penalty clause, by agreement, properly applies to them as a guarantee of adherence to the Covenant. We may learn something of the probable operation of the plan as regards members of the League by surveying former attempts of a like character.

The normal way of settling international disputes is by diplomatic negotiation. It is dependent for its success on a spirit of coöperation and conciliation and on the skill of the negotiators. Its weakness arises from the pressure of uninformed public sentiment when calmness is required, and it is evident that at times a dispute gets beyond the point where it can directly be discussed by the parties