many permanent Commissions of Inquiry, a cumbersome system, surely; but according to experience up to that time, easier to accomplish than joint agreement to a universal treaty.

In what situation then does a state bound by the Hague Convention, a Bryan treaty, and the League Covenant find itself in relation to International Commissions of Inquiry? The Convention adopted at the Second Hague Conference and many of the Bryan treaties are still in force. "Nothing in this Covenant," says Article 21, "shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration . . . for securing the maintenance of peace." In case of a dispute with a state not bound by the Bryan treaty, the first state would be free to submit the dispute for investigation to a specially instituted Commission. Where a treaty exists, the dispute might be submitted to the permanent Commission, under the obligation not to resort to war prior to the submission of the report. But in either case, after investigation and report, the state would not now be free to go to war. Here the League Covenant would exert its influence. If the dispute was with a member of the League, and the Council with the exception of the representatives of the two states was unanimous in its report, and the other state accepted the recommendations, the first state could not then go to war without thereby being at war with the League itself. If the dispute was with a non-member of the League which temporarily accepted the obligations of the League, the situation would be the same. If, by any chance, the first state should cease to be a member of the League it would then be subject to coercion by the League, whether its dispute was with a member or a nonmember.

The Bryan treaties could voluntarily be denounced as unnecessary, as could also the Hague Convention, and it is possible that the Assembly may by virtue of Article 19 recommend this.

Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, relating to an International Labor Organization, contains provisions for the investigation of disputes by Commissions of Inquiry. They are described in Chapter XIX, where the whole Labor Organization is discussed.

If, when the dispute first came up in the Council, either A or B claimed that it arose out of a matter solely within domestic jurisdiction, the Council would pass upon this claim, and if it proved to be well-founded, no report would be made. This might not, however, settle the dispute; it might even aggravate it, if A still pressed its claim. A and B would be left to their own resources, and might resort to non-hostile means of redress, to diplomacy, or to arbitration. War has, therefore, not been prohibited between A and B, except under very definite circumstances. The restraints do not infringe sovereign rights because A and B agree to a limitation of the exercise of their right to declare war when they join the League. The regulations are self-imposed.

A difficult question, doubtless now of academic interest only, might be raised if a dispute should arise between Great Britain and one of her dominions, a member of the League. Suppose Australia should become seriously at variance with the mother country. Could Great Britain claim that the dispute was solely within her domestic jurisdiction? That perhaps would depend on the matter out of which the dispute arose; for Australia could with justice claim that to some extent her status was changed when she was admitted to full League membership. Civil war is not within the purview of the League; yet Australia is a full-fledged member, and she could assert the right to have her disputes, even with Great Britain, considered by the League.

In disputes of the second and third classes a new situation is created. If a dispute arises between A and X, X will be invited to act in the matter as if she were a member of the League. She may do this voluntarily and thus preserve the theory of her sovereignty. By this means a small non-member state might get the protection of the League against the overpowering might of a member state. But if X rejects the invitation of the League, and makes war on A regardless of the provisions of the Covenant, X will be subjected to economic boycott and military and naval pressure. She will have imposed on her a set of rules to which she has not given assent. This seems to be a violation of her sovereignty. On the other hand, war is still a legal remedy under international law, and it is open to the

League as rightfully as to non-members. For the purpose of bring ing to a speedy end war began by non-members, or as a deterrent to such wars, it may and indeed must still be used. The League, in order to prevent as far as possible the formation of powerful alhances outside the League, was forced to announce in advance what it would consider a casus belli.

Again, if X and Y are at odds, and both reject the League's invitation, "the Council may take such measures and make such rec ommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute." In order, therefore, to prevent war be tween X and Y, non-members of the League, the League may itself go to war with both X and Y. If X accepted the invitation of the League and Y rejected it, the same rules would apply as between A and X, when X refused to accept temporary membership. The cases where X, or X and Y, refuse to accept the obligations of the League may be few in number; or it may be that all sovereign states will become members of the League, thus removing the difficulty as to sovereignty, but if any powerful state should remain or become a non-member, the success of the League might be jeopardized by this provision. If the penalty clause did not apply to nonmembers refusing temporary membership, the arrangement would be strictly in conformity with rules of international law regarding amicable settlement of international disputes.

As regards members of the League, admirable provision is made. for publicity and for delay in taking up arms, both of which make for peace. And the penalty clause, by agreement, properly applies to them as a guarantee of adherence to the Covenant. We may learn something of the probable operation of the plan as regards members of the League by surveying former attempts of a like character.

The normal way of settling international disputes is by diplomatic negotiation. It is dependent for its success on a spirit of cooperation and conciliation and on the skill of the negotiators. Its weakness arises from the pressure of uninformed public sentiment when calmness is required, and it is evident that at times a dispute gets beyond the point where it can directly be discussed by the parties

to it. Therefore international law has long recognized as lawful the interposition of third parties for certain limited purposes. Thus a third state may tender its good offices to two disputing states for the purpose of beginning or renewing negotiations, or it may serve as mediator between the states, taking active part in the negotiations. Good offices and mediation may be tendered either before hostilities, or for the purpose of ending them. For example, the Russo-Japanese war was brought to an end through the good offices of President Roosevelt. Except where treaties so stipulate, a state is not bound to accept a tender of good offices or of mediation; but the tender is not considered an unfriendly act. The revised Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes provides for Good Offices and Mediation, but recourse to them is not required.1

The Hague Convention contains a second method of preventing recourse to war; namely, International Commissions of Inquiry, the purpose of which is the elucidation of the facts involved in a dispute. These commissions were to be created by voluntary act of the states after a dispute had arisen, and therefore have no permanent character; and it was assumed that states would be unwilling to resort to them in cases involving national honor or vital interests. There is, however, no reason why a state may not, if it desires, submit such cases to inquiry. It may do so with perfect safety, since the Hague Convention provides that "the report of the commission is limited to a statement of facts, and has in no way the character of an award. It leaves to the parties entire freedom as to the effect to be given to the statement" (Art. 35).

The efficacy of the kind of Commission of Inquiry provided for by the Hague Convention of 1899 was put to the test in 1904 in the course of the Russo-Japanese war. On the night of October 21, the Russian fleet was passing through the Dogger Bank fishing grounds in the North Sea on its way to the Far East, and under the impression that Japanese torpedo boats were about to attack it, fired on some trawlers of the Hull fishing fleet. One trawler was 1See Appendix 6 (a).

sunk, five were damaged, two men were killed and six wounded. The Russian fleet continued on its way without rendering assistance to the injured trawlers, and made no report until it reached Vigo, Spain, on the 26th. When the surviving fishermen reached England, and the facts became known, indignation ran high. On account of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, there was danger that Great Britain might enter the war, and the situation was tense, preliminary orders being issued to the British fleet. Diplomatic representations were made by both parties, but the testimony of the fishermen and of the Russian officers who made the attack were totally at variance. The Russian Admiral Rozhdestvensky insisted that two Japanese torpedo boats had been seen and that the trawlers had been unavoidably injured in repelling an attack. The fishermen denied that any except Russian war-ships had been present. Under these circumstances, on the suggestion of France, which tendered good offices, agreement was reached within a week to institute an inquiry into the facts. A formal agreement was signed at St. Petersburg on November 25, to proceed in accordance with Articles 9 to 14 of the Hague Convention. Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States each chose one commissioner, and the four jointly chose a fifth, an Austrian admiral. The Commission sat intermittently in Paris from December 22, 1904, to February 25, 1905. Its first task was to formulate rules of procedure, none having been included in the Hague Convention of 1899. It concluded its labor, after hearing testimony, by publishing a report concurred in by a majority of the Commission. The report, finding that no Japanese ships had been on the Dogger Bank on the night of October 21, declared the attack unjustifiable and placed the responsibility on the Russian Admiral. Although this was not an arbitral award, and was binding on neither party, Russia accepted the finding and paid an indemnity of £65,000. The experience showed that even the brief and timid recommendation of the First Hague Conference provided a real means of preventing war, and that the idea was worthy of further development.1

'For report of the Commission, see Scott: Hague Court Reports p. 403-412, 609-615.