INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION AND THE LEAGUE XIV. INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION DURING THE WAR XV. DIPLOMACY AS A MEANS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION XVI. TREATIES AND COÖPERATION XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. COÖPERATION IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND AS SOCIATIONS CHAPTER XIV INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION DURING THE WAR THE Connotations of international law and international cooperation are entirely different. The first implies an obligation to act as agreed upon beforehand in the form of a set of general rules. When an event occurs, the rule of law automatically applies and a state finds itself, according to the dictates of the rule, obligated to proceed or refrain from proceeding in a given way. There may be disputes over the existence of a rule, or as to its interpretation, but if the rule and its meaning are admitted, questions of policy have no influence, unless the state is willing to become a law-breaker. In international coöperation, on the contrary, there is no legal obligation and no rule which must be followed when a contingency arises. The relationship is entirely voluntary and may be severed at will. Questions of policy enter in and profoundly affect a state's attitude. Policy may therefore counsel coöperation or its opposite, competition; and urgent necessity may compel coöperation quite as effectively as if a rule of law existed. In the normal relations of states, when they are not affected by a rule of law, we find both coöperation and competition. In earlier times, the latter was almost always in evidence. In the last century great progress has been made toward coöperation. What Macaulay said in 18571 is no longer unqualifiedly true. "No undertaking," said he, “which requires the hearty and long-continued coöperation of many independent states is likely to prosper. Jealousies inevitably spring up. Disputes engender disputes. Every confederate is tempted to throw on others some part of the burden which he ought himself to 'History of England, 5th ed., 4: 1980. bear. Scarcely one honestly furnishes the promised contingent. Scarcely one exactly observes the appointed day." There are in existence to-day many evidences of hearty and long-continued coöperation which detract from the force of his dictum. To cooperate is to operate together for a common object or the accomplishment of a common result. It implies and is based upon a realization (1) that the end sought is of mutual benefit, and (2) that it may best be attained by concerted action. It may be expected, therefore, only between nations which have reached approximately the same stage of civilization, and even then it will be automatically applied only to two classes of objects. The first of these includes international services the absence of which has been a source of inconvenience and economic loss to several states, such as the international postal service. The second is the necessity for repelling a common danger threatening the life of several states. Between these two or commingled with them are all the other interstate relations which are not thought of as coöperation but which from time to time are consciously brought within its field. It will be the purpose in the subsequent chapters to illustrate some of the methods of coöperation already employed by states, and to show some of the influences which are at work to extend the scope of coöperation. The importance of the subject will appear if one recalls that the states are sovereign, knowing no law except that which they have agreed to, and being bound only by the logic of facts to work together. If the facts are not convincing or if they are not understood by enough states, the failure to coöperate may even overthrow the structure so recently reared in the League of Nations. No better illustration both of the need and the efficacy of international coöperation can be found than the concerted action that was forced on the nations lately at war. Unfortunately the example was set by the Teutonic allies, who from the outset took advantage not only of unified military command, but of their geographical position, and of their combined economic resources. It was as though they had become cne state, for the time, bending every ef fort to one end. And that end was not the destruction at one stroke of one similar huge organization, but to crush, seriatim, a number of states each of which was waging a separate war. Not until the close of the year 1917 did the Allies begin really to coöperate. Up to that time they were merely working for a common end, each choosing its own method. When they added to this concert of action based on an adequate interchange of information, which brought out facts from which there was no escape, the tide of battle began to turn. In this war, as has often been pointed out, victory depended not alone on military prowess and organization, but on the employment of the entire strength of the combatant states, mental, moral, spiritual, economic, agricultural, financial, commercial, industrial, as well as naval and military. And all of these could be put to nought by a failure in distribution by means of shipping and transport. Nor would the agreement of each of the Allies not to make a separate peace have been effective. As all know, events in Russia automatically cancelled her side of that compact. How much of that failure was due to a lack of coöperation cannot now be assessed; but an analysis of the figures of Allied forces in connection with Allied losses would undoubtedly have produced an argument for coöperation earlier in the war. Strangely enough, in spite of final unity of command under Field Marshal Foch, the military and naval forces of the Allies do not furnish the best example of the efficacy of coöperation. Under the stress of immediate and pressing danger the different army units found it difficult to think of the others. But their ultimate success was made possible by a system of coöperation back of the line, and stretching in its effects to the ends of the earth. Coöperation through the ordinary diplomatic channels had not been wanting, but the process was too slow and the issues too vital. The crisis called for more intimate touch between men upon whom the weight of responsibility rested. First of all, a general plan was required, and then detailed processes of continued coöperation. It was initiated by the Inter-Allied Conference which met in Paris from November 29 to December 3, 1917, attended by representatives of seventeen states, viz., France, Great Britain, United States, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Greece, Portugal, Montenegro, Brazil, Cuba, Russia, Siam, China, and Liberia. The significance of |