Permanent Court of International Justice (Art. 14); (15) may direct the publication of relevant facts and papers relating to a dispute submitted to it (Art. 15); (16) shall prepare and publish statements and reports of disputes settled by it (Art. 15); (17) shall publish a report on disputes submitted to it but not settled (Art. 15); (18) shall decide whether a matter submitted to it is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state (Art. 15); (19) may in any case refer disputes to the Assembly and shall do so on the request of either party made within fourteen days after the submisssion of the dispute to the Council (Art. 15); (20) shall recommend to the several governments what effective military or naval forces shall severally be contributed by them to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League (Art. 16); (21) may, by a vote unanimous except for the offending member, expel members from the League for violation of its covenants (Art. 16); (22) shall determine the conditions under which non-members engaged in disputes may be invited to accept the obligations of membership for the purposes of the dispute (Art. 17); (23) shall institute inquiries. concerning disputes involving non-members who have accepted the invitation (Art. 17); (24) may take measures and make recommendations to prevent hostilities and settle disputes involving two non-members who refuse to accept the obligations of membership (Art. 17); (25) shall, if not previously agreed upon, define the degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by Mandatories (Art. 22); (26) shall receive the annual reports of the Mandatories (Art. 22); (27) may authorize the Secretariat to collect and distribute all relevant information and render other assistance in matters of international interest regulated by general coventions but not placed under the control of international bureaus or commissions (Art. 24); (28)‍may include in the expenses of the Secretariat, those of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League (Art. 24).

The third organ of the League is the Permanent Secretariat. It is the only organ of the League which functions continuously, and its duties are chiefly of a ministerial character. It is the business office of the League; but it has other functions involving the

exercise of discretion. For a detailed description of it in connection with its prototypes, the reader is referred to Chapter XVIII.

Some of the activities of the League depend on an accurate and detailed knowledge of complex facts which can only be collected and digested by experts. Provision is therefore made in two instances for permanent commissions to assist the Council. The first of these is constituted to advise the Council on admissions to the League and withdrawals from it under Article 1, and to advise on reduction of armaments under Article 8, and on military and naval questions generally (Art. 9). The second is created to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories, and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates (Art. 22).

The fifth organ of the League is yet to be created. It is the judicial organ for which plans are to be formulated by the Council to be submitted to the members of the League for adoption. It is to be known as the Permanent Court of International Justice. No details concerning its probable constitution or membership are given; but two of its functions are stated. "The Court shall be competent," says Article 14, "to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly." Since international courts are subsequently discussed in detail,1 no extended notice is needed here. It should be observed, however, that the proposed court will have no jurisdiction over disputes without the consent of the parties. Its institution cannot therefore be used to prove that a world state has been created. On the contrary, it tends to indicate that the independence of states is to be respected.

Already reference has been made to the general purposes which the members of the League agree to promote (Preamble). We may now summarize the specific obligations and duties which are placed on the members by the Covenant, leaving a fuller treatment to subsequent chapters. The members agree (1) to pay their Post, Chapters XI and XII.

proportion of the expenses of the Secretariat (Art. 6). The expenses of representatives in the Council and Assembly are to be paid by the states represented, since neither these nor the means of supporting the two permanent commissions are provided for in the Covenant. They agree (2) not to exceed the limits of armaments to which they have consented, without the concurrence of the Council (Art. 8); (3) "to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes" (Art. 8); (4) "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League" (Art. 10); (5) in case of any war or threat of war to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations" (Art. 11); (6) to submit disputes between them likely to lead to a rupture either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and "in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council" (Art. 12); (7) to submit to arbitration disputes recognized by them as suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be settled by diplomacy (Art. 13); (8) to carry out in good faith any award rendered, and not to "resort to war against a member of the League which complies therewith" (Art. 13); (9) to submit to the Council for investigation all disputes likely to lead to a rupture, which have not been submitted to arbitration, and to communicate to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible statements of their case with all relevant facts and papers. (Art. 15); (10) not to go to war with a party to a dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report of the Council unanimously adopted except by parties to the dispute (Art. 15); (11) to subject a covenant-breaking state to severance of all trade or financial relations, and the prohibition of all intercourse between the nationals of that state and the nationals of all other states, whether members of the League or not (Art. 16); (12) to contribute in a proportion to be recommended by the Council to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League (Art. 16); (13) mutually to support one another in the financial and economic

measures taken, in order to distribute the losses and expenses, and to assist one another in resisting "any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state" (Art. 16); (14) to afford passage through their territory to the forces of a cooperating member (Art. 16); (15) to register with the Secretariat every treaty or international engagement hereafter entered into by them, agreeing that otherwise they will not be binding (Art. 18); (16) to consider as abrogated all obligations or understandings inconsistent with the Covenant, and not hereafter to enter into any such inconsistent engagements (Art. 20); (17) to consider the well-being and development of backward peoples a sacred trust of civilization (Art. 22); (18) to endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children in all countries, and for that purpose to maintain the necessary international organizations (Art. 23); (19) to undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control (Art. 23); (20) to intrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs (Art. 23); (21) to intrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition wherever the control of this trade is a matter of common interest (Art. 23); (22) to make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League (Art. 23); (23) to endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease (Art. 23); (24) to place under the direction of the League all International Bureaus or Commissions hereafter constituted for the regulation of matters of international interest (Art. 23); (25) to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly-authorized voluntary Red Cross organizations having as purposes improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world (Art. 25). The whole list of obligations is summed up by reiterating the two primary functions of the League, namely to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security.

To secure action under most of these obligations it is not necessary that the organs of the League shall first take some step. The obligations either now exist, or will come into force on the happening of a stated contingency. This feature has caused it to be said of the League that it is automatic rather than delegated in form. Mr. Lowell, 'comparing the two forms, says:

The automatic form is more simple, more primitive, but not illadapted to sovereign states whose duties to the League are so few that they can be specifically enumerated in a covenant. It consists in prescribing definitely the obligations which the members assume, or will assume on the happening of a certain event, and giving no authority to any representative body to exercise its discretion in issuing orders binding upon them. Suppose, for example, that a nation declares war on any member of the League; under the delegated form the representative body would meet, discuss the situation, determine the action to be taken by the members of the League, and issue its directions accordingly; while under the automatic form all the members of the League would be under an immediate obligation to perform the acts prescribed in the agreement, such as to cut off all intercourse with the offending state, to come in arms to the defense of the member attacked, or whatever the provision of the agreement for such a case might be, and they would do so without waiting for, without regard to, any action by a representative body of the League. ... The automatic form of league has, therefore, the advantage that it provides a more effective guaranty of peace. Such a compact to combine for armed resistance against an aggressor on any one member would certainly have prevented Germany from making this war; whereas the delegated form of league might not have done so.

Another advantage of the automatic form is that the obligations of the members are specifically stated, so that they know precisely what duties they assume under any conditions that may arise; while the delegated form leaves their obligations uncertain, to be determined at some future time by a representative body which may go further or less far than some of the members desired. Vigorous objection has been made in the United States to partnership in a league that would have authority to order this country what to do in case of an attack against another member of the League. The objection is not without cogency; but it does not apply to the Covenant of Paris, either in its original or its amended 'Duggan: League of Nations, p. 101-104.