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mind by talking; and to discourse into hin the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall show in another place.
CH A P. V.
Of Simple Ideas of divers Senses.
HE ideas we get by more than one sense are of
space, or extension, tigure, rest and motion ; for these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch: and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.
CH A P. VI.
Of Simple Ideus of Reflection.
Simple ideas . 1.
"HE mind, receiving the ideas, are the ope.
mentioned in the foregoing rations of the chapters, from without, when it turns its mind about
view inward upon itself, and observes its its other
own actions about those ideas it has, takes ideas.
from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things. The idea of
$. 2. The two great and principal actions perception,
of the mind, which are most frequently conand idea of sidered, and which are so frequent, that willing, we have from re.
every one that pleases may take notice of flection.
them in himself, are these two: Perception or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing.
The power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties. Of some of the modes of these simple ideas of reflection, such as are Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c., I shall have occasion to speak bereafter.
CHA P. VII.
Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.
Pleasure and which convey themselves into
pain. the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. Pleasure or Delight, and its opposite, Pain or Uneasiness, Power, Existence, Unity.
9. 2. Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them; join themselves to almost all our ideas, both of sensation and reflection; and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By pleasure and pain I would be understood to signify whatsoever delights or molests us most; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. For whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c. on the one side; or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c. on the other; they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain, delight or uneasiness : which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.
§. 3. The infinitely wise author of our being having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also, by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which consist all the actions of our
body; having also given a power to our minds in feveral instances, to choose, amongst its ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of; has been pleased to join to several thoughts, and several sensations, a perception of delight. If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention; or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may so call it) run a-drift, without any direction or design ; and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which state man, however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will, would be a very idle Anactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy, lethargick dream. It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, and the ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a crcömitant pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees; that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.
$. 4. Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that, as to pursue this: only this is worth our consideration, that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in
This their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of adıniring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker: who, designing the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he not designing our preservation barely, but the prescrvation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain to those very ideas which
delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it
, proves no ordinary torment; and the most pleasant of all sensible objects, light itself, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes, causes a very painful sensation. Which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature, that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation, whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future. The consideration of those objects that produce it may well persuade us, that this is the end or use of pain. For though great light be insufferable to our eyes, yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them; because that causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious organ unarmed in its natural state. But yet excess of cold as well as heat pains us, because it is equally destructive to that temper which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the several functions of the body, and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth ; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies, confined within certain bounds.
S. 5. Beyond all this we may find another reason, why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain, in all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with ; that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of compleat happiness, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of hin, with whom there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.
$. 6. Though what I have here said may Pleasure and not perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and
pain. pain clearer to us than our own experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas, serving to give
us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the sovereign disposer of all things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries; the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understandings.
5. 7. Existence and unity are two other Existence and unity.
ideas that are suggested to the understand
ing by every object without, and every idea · within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have existence : and whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of unity, Power.
§. 8. Power also is another of those sim
ple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection. For observing in ourselves, that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest; the effects also, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our senses; we both these ways get the idea of power.
1. 9. Besides these there is another idea, Succession.
which, though suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered to us by what passes in our minds; and that is the idea of succession. For if we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going and another coming, without intermission. Simple ideas §. 10. These, if they are not all, are at the materials least (as I think) the most considerable of of all our
those simple ideas which the mind has, and knowledge.
out of which is made all its other knowledge: all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection.
Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takes its fight farther than the stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of