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desire happiness: and whatever we feel of uneasiness, so much it is certain we want of happiness, even in our own opinion, let our state and condition otherwise be what it will. Besides, the present moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and desire goes with our foresight, and that still carries the will with it. So that even in joy itself, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the desire to continue it, and fear io lose it: and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will presently is by that determined to some new action, and the present delight neglected.
Ş. 40. But we being in this world beset The most pressing un. with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with difeasiness na- ferent desires, the next inquiry naturally turally de. will be, which of them has the precedency termines the in determining the will to the next action ? will.
and to that the answer is, that ordinarily, which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable : that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its labour, for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable ; and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they, in that case, put ns not upon endeavours. But these set a part, the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will successively, in that train of volun:ary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest present uneasiness is the spur 10 action, thet is constantly felt, and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else : for we producing nothing by our willing it, but some action in our power, it is there the will termirates, and reaches no farther.
g. 41. If it be farther asked, what it is All desire moves desire ? I answer, Happiness, and happiness. that alone. Happiness and misery are the names of two extreines, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; it is what “eye hath not seen, ear not “ heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to “ conceive.” But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions, made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side, and torinent and sorrow on the other: which for shortness sake I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain, there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body: “ with him is fulness of joy and pleasure for
evermore.” Or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind ; though some have their rise in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain modifications of motion.
§. 42. Ilappiness then in its full extent Happiness, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, what. and misery the utinost pain: and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and in different degrees; therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and ini: sery. Farther,
rther, though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure, be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yo it often happens, that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort ; because when they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference. So that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison : for the cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater
degree of pleasure, has the nature of good, and vice versa.
9. 43. Though this be that which is What good is desired;
called good and evil : and all good be the what not.
proper object of desire in general; yet all
good, even seen, and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular man's desire, but only that part, or so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness., All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's desires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness, wherewith he, in hiş present thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness, under this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it; other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without desire, pass by, and 'be content without. There is no body, I think so senseless as to deny, that there is pleasure in knowledge: and for the pleasures of sense, they have too many followers to let it be questioned, whether men. are taken with them or no. Now let one man place, his satisfaction in sensual pleasures, another in the de. light of knowledge: though each of them cannot but confess, there is great pleasure in what the other pure sues; yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys, and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it. But yet. as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst makes him uneasy, he, whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good chear, poignant sauces, delicious wine, by the pleasant taste he has found in thcm, is, by the, uneasiness of hunger and thirst, presently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great indifferency, what wholesome food comes in his way. And on the other side, the epicure buckles to study, when shame, or the desire to recommend himself to, his mistress, shall make him uneasy in the want of any.sort of knowledge. Thus, how much soever men are in earnest, and constant in pursuit of happiness, yet thcy may have a clear view of good, great and con
fessed good, without being concerned for it
, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happiness without it. Though às to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no uncasiness without being moved.
And therefore being uneasy in the want of whatever is judged necessary to their happiness, as soon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness, they begin to desire it.
§ 41. This, I think, any one may ob- Why the serve in himself and others, that the greater greatest good,
is not always
far from home to be convinced. And indeed in this life there are not many whose happines reaches so far as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean pleasures, without any mixture of uneasiness; and yet they could be content 10 stay here for ever : though they cannot deny, but that it is possible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after this life, far surpassing all the good that is to be found here.
Nay, they cannot but see, that it is more possible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches, or pleasure, which they pursue, and for which they neglect that eternal state; but yet in full view of this difference, satisfied of the possibility of a perfect
, secure, and lasting happiness in a future state, and under a clear conviction, that it is not to be had here, whilst they bound their happiness within some little enjoyinent, or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any necessary part of it; their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment. Why not be. g. 45. The ordinary necessities of our ing desired,
lives till a great part of them with the uns it moves not
easiness of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weathe will.
riness with labour, and sleepiness, in their constant returns, &c. To which, if, besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical uneasiness (as itch after honour, power, or riches, &c.) which acquired habits, by fashion, example, and education, have settled in us, and a thousand other irregular desires, which custom has made natural to us; we shall find, that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent good. We are seldom at case, and frce enough from the solicitation of our natural or adopted desires, but a constant succession of uneasinesses out of that stock, which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns: and no sooner is one action dispatched, which by such a determination of the will we are set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work. For the removing of the pains we feel, and are at present pressed witli
, being the getting out of misery, and consequently the first thing to be done in order to happiness, absent good, though thought on, confessed, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this unhappiness in its absence, is justled out to make way for the removal of those uneasinesses we feel; till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind, given some relish of it, and