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as it appears. And” therefore, were every action of ours concluded within itself, and drew no consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err in our choice of good; we should always infallibly prefer the best. Were the pains of honest industry, and of starving with hunger and cold, set together before us, nobody would be in doubt which to choose : were the satisfaction of a lust, and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one's present possession, he would not balance, or err in the determination of his choice.

5. 59. But since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them, along with them in their present performance, but are the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are passed and cease to be; our desires look beyond our present enjoyments, and carry the mind out to absent good, according to the necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our happiness. It is our opinion of such a necessity, that gives it its attraction : without that, we are not moved by absent good. For in this narrow scantling of capacity, which we are accustomed to, and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once, which, when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it ļasts, sufficient to make us think ourselves happy; it is not all remote, and even apparent good, that affects us. . Because the indolency and enjoyinent we have, suflicing for our present happiness, we desire not to venture the change; since we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as soon as any new uneasiness comes in, this happiness is disturbed, and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness.

Ø. 60. Their aptness, therefore, to con- From a clude that they can be happy without it, wrong judg. is

ment of what occasion that men often are not

makes a neand raised to the desire of the greatest absent

cessary part good. For, whilst such thoughts possess of their hapthem, the joys of a future statc move them piness. not: they have little concern or uncasiness about them; S2


one great

and the will, free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them. Change but a man's view of these things; let him see, that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness; let him look into the future state of bliss or misery, and see there God, the righteous judge, ready to "render to

every man according to his deeds; to them who by “patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, and " honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto

every soul that doth evil, indignation and wrath,

tribulation and anguish:” to him, I say, who hath a prospect of the different state of perfect happiness, or misery, that attends all men after this life, depending on their behaviour here, the measures of good and evil

, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For since nothing of pleasure and pain in this life can bear any proportion to the endless happiness, or exquisite misery, of an immortal soul hereafter ; actions in his power will have their preference, not according to the transient pleasure or pain that accompanies or follow's them here, but as they serve to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter. A more par.

9. 61. But to account more particularly ticular ac.

for the misery that men often bring on count of themselves, notwithstanding that they do wrong judg. all in earnest pursue happiness, we must ments.

consider how things come to be represented to our desires, under deceitful appearances; and that is by the judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To see how far this reaches, and what are the causes of wrong judgment, we must remember that things are judged good or bad in a double sense.

First, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely pleasure or pain.

Secondly, But because not only present pleasure and pain, but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequences to bring it upon us at a distance, is a proper object of our desires, and apt to move a creature that has foresight; therefore things also that draw after them pleasure and pain, are considered as good and evil.


§. 62. The wrong judgment that misleads us, and makes the will often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these. The wrong judgment I am here speaking of, is not what one man may think of the determination of another, but what every man himself must confess to be wrong. For since I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent being really seeks happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure, without any considerable mixture of uneasiness; it is impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his satisfaction, and the compleating of his happiness, but only by wrong judgment. I shall not here speak of that mistake which is the consequence of invincible error, which scarce deserves the name of wrong judgment; but of that wrong judgment which every man himself must confess to be so.

$. 63. If, therefore, as to present plea. In comparing sure and pain, the mind, as has been said, present and

future. never mistakes that which is really good or evil; that which is the greater pleasure, or the greater pain, is really just as it appears. But though present pleasure and pain show their difference and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake; yet when we compare present pleasure or pain with future, (which is usually the case in the most important determinations of the will) we often make wrong judgments of them, taking our measures of them in different positions of distance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size, that are more remote; and so it is with pleasures and pains; the present is apt to carry it, and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison. Thus most men, like spendthritt heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to coine; and so, for small matters in pofleflion, part with greater ones in seversion. But that this is a wrong judgment, every one must allow, let his pleasure consist in whatever it


will :


will; since that which is future will certainly come to be present; and then having the same advantage of ñearness, will show itself in its full dimensions, and discover his wilful mistake, who judged of it by unequal measures. Were the pleasure of drinking accompanied, the very monrent a man takes off his glass, with that sick stomach and aking head, which, in some men, are sure to follow not many hours after; I think nobody, whatever 'pleasưre he had in his cups, would, on these conditions, ever let winé touch his lips; which yet he daily swallows; and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But if pleasure or pain can be so lessened only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be so by a' farther distance, to a man that will not by a right judgment do what' time will, i. e. bring it home upon himself, and consider it as present, and there take its true dimensions ? This is the way we usually impose on ourselves, in respect of bare pleasure and pain, or the true degrees of happiness or misery; the future doses its just proportion, and what is present obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wroirg judgment; whereby the absent are not only lèssened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when men enjoy what they can in present, and make sure of that, concluding amiss that no evil will thence follow. For that lies not in comparing the greatness of fature good and evil, which is that we are here' speaking of; but in another sort of wrong judgnrent, which is concerning good or : evil; as it is considered to be the cause and procureinent of pleasure or pain, that will follow from it. Causes of

$. 64. The cause of our judging-amiss, when we compare our present pleasure or

pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow constication of our minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once, much less any pleasure almost; whilst pain possesses us. The present pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none át all, fills our narrow' souls, and so takes: up the wote mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things at

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sent: or if among our pleasures, there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures : a little bitter mingled in our cup, leaves no relish of the sweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present evil, which we are apt to think nothing absenț can equal; because, under the present pain, we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happiness. Men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this: the pain that any one actually feels is still of all other the worst; and it is with anguish they cry out, “ Any rather than this : nothing

can be so intolerable as what I now suffer:" . And therefore our whole: endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil before all things, as the first necessary condition to our happiness, let whạt will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that șits so heavy upon us.

And because the abstinence from a present pleasure that offers itself, is a pain, nay oftentimes a very great one, the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object; it is no wonder that that operates after the same manner pain does, and lessens in our thoughts what is future; and so forces, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.

s. 65. Add to this, that absent good, or, which is the same thing, future pleasure, especially if of a sort we are unacquainted with, seldom is able to counterbalance any uneasiness, either of pain or desire, which is present. For its greatness being no more than what shall be really tasted when enjoyed, men are, apt enough to lessen that, to make it give place to any present desire; and conclude with themselves, that when it comes to trial, it may possibly not answer the report, or opinion, that generally passes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnified,

even what they themselves have enjoyed with great pleasure and delight at one time, has proved insipid or nauseous at another; and therefore they see nothing in it for which they should forego a present enjoyment. S4


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