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[Plato and Aristotle.-Group from Raffaelle's School of Athens.]

I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great connexion between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent; ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled.

Natural Science or Theory is divided into Physique and Metaphysique; wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysique in a differing sense from that that is received; and, in like manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do propound; I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel at the

philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity, undertaking, not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom; insomuch, as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he took the right course. For certainly there cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: "Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; si quis venerit in nomine suo, eum recipietis." But in this divine aphorism (considering to whom it was applied, namely, to Antichrist, the highest deceiver) we may discern well that the coming in a man's own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an "Eum recipietis."2 But for this excellent person, Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth, he did

ניי

1 "I came in the name of my Father, and will ye not receive me: if any one comes in his own name ye will receive him."

2 "Ye will receive him."

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But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity, usque ad aras; and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions according to the moderate proceeding in civil government; where, although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, "eadem magistratuum vocabula." 4

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To return, therefore, to the use and acceptation of the term metaphysique, as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been already said, that I intend, philosophia prima," Summary Philosophy and Metaphysique, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge, and the other I have now brought in as a branch or descendant of natural science. It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to summary philosophy the commcn principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences: I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the relative and adventitious characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the rest, with this distinction and provision, that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been handled confusedly with Metaphysique, I have enclosed and bounded by itself. It is, therefore, now a question what is left remaining for Meta

1 A lucky plunderer of mankind; his name And vile example now are doomed to shame.

2 A lucky plunderer of learning.

3 To the altars, i. e., to the extreme.

4 The judicial forms remain the same.

physique; wherein I may, without prejudice, preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory and Metaphysique that which is abstracted and fixed. And, again, that Physique should handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and Metaphysique should handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But the difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes and productions of effects, so that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide, according to the received and sound division of causes; the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final causes.

For

the

Physique, taking it according to derivation, and not according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle term or distance between natural history and Metaphysique. For natural history describeth the variety of things; Physique, the causes, but variable or respective causes, and Metaphysique, the fixed and constant causes.

"Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit, Uno eodemque igni:"5

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation: so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. Physique hath three parts; whereof two respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of things, as "de mundo, de universitate rerum." The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals of things. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety and

5 The clay is harden'd and the wax dissolv'd By the same changeless fire.

6 Concerning the world and the universe.

particularity of things; whether it be of the differing substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss, or paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of natural history. Of these three I cannot

report any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment: but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.

For Metaphysique, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem to be nugatory and void; because of the received and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences: of which opinion we will take this hold, that the invention of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry, "That forms were the true object of knowledge;" but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man. For as to the forms of substances, man only except, of whom it is said, "Formavit hominem de limo terræ, et spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ," and not as of all other creatures, "Producant aquæ, producat terra ;' the forms of substances, I say, as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make

1 He formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.

2 Let the waters bring forth; let the earth bring forth.

words, which by composition and transposition of letters, are infinite. But, on the other side, to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters, is easily comprehensible, and being known, induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of them. In the same manner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to inquire, say, the true forms of these, is that part of Metaphysique which we now define of. Not but that physic doth make inquiry, and take consideration of the same natures: but how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of them, and not as to the forms. For example; if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but "vehiculum formæ."3 This part of Metaphysique I do not find laboured and performed: whereat I marvel not: because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been used; in regard that men, which is the root of all error, have made too untimely a departure and too remote a recess from particulars.

But the use of this part of Metaphysique, which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of "vita brevis, ars longa ;"4 which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences: for knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of Natural Philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is Physique; the stage

3 The vehicle or supporter of its form.

4 Life is short, art is long.

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next the vertical point is Metaphysique. As for the vertical point, "Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem," the summary law of nature, we know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than the giants' hills:

"Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,

Scilicet, atque Ossæ frondosum involvere
Olympum."2

But to those which refer all things to the
glory of God, they are as the three acclama-
tions, "Sancte, sancte, sancte; holy in the
description or dilatation of his works; holy
in the connexion or concatination of them;
and holy in the union of them in a perpetual
and uniform law. And therefore the specula-
tion was excellent in Parmenides and Plato,
although but a speculation in them, that all
things by scale did ascend to unity.
always that knowledge is worthiest which is
charged with least multiplicity; which ap-
peareth to be Metaphysique; as that which
considereth the simple forms or differences of
things, which are few in number, and the
degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all
this variety.

So then

The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of Metaphysique, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For Physique carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature; but "late undique sunt sapientibus viæ:"4 to sapience, which was anciently defined to be " rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia,' 5 there is ever choice of means: for physical causes give light to new invention "in simili materia."6 But whosoever knoweth any form,

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knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient: which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more divine sort, elegantly describeth: "Non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum."7 The ways of sapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance.

The second part of Metaphysique is the inquiry of final causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it: for order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. For to say that the hairs of the eye-lids are for a quickset and fence about the sight; or that the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold; or that the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are built; or that the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit; or that the clouds are for watering of the earth; or that the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living creatures, and the like, is well inquired and collected in Metaphysique; but in Physique they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but remoras and hinderances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of the physical causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence. And therefore the natural philosophy of Democri

7 Thy ways shall not be straightened, and thou shalt not have a stumbling-block in thy course.

tus and some others, (who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself, to infinite essays or proofs of nature, which they term fortune,) seemeth to me, as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us, in particularities of physical causes, more real and better inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those persons. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track.

For otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause rendered, that the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture; "Muscosi fontes,' "1 &c. Nor the cause rendered, that the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies; and so of the rest: both causes being true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a consequence only.

Neither doth this call in question, or derogate from divine providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper politician that can make other men the instruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more admirable when nature intendeth one thing, and providence draweth forth another, than if he had communicated to particular creatures and motions the characters and impressions of his providence. And thus much for Metaphysique: the latter

1 Mossy fountains.

part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined to its proper place.

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Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part of natural philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth rank with physique special and metaphysique, which is Mathematique; but I think it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, to place it as a branch of metaphysique; for the subject of it being quantity, (not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth to "philosophia prima,' as hath been said, but quantity determined or proportionable), it appeareth to be one of the essential forms of things; as that that is causative in nature of a number of effects; insomuch as we see, in the schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras, that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the principles and originals of things; and it is true also that of all other forms, as we understand forms, it is the most abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most proper to metaphysique; which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured and inquired than any of the other forms, which are more immersed in matter.

For it being the nature of the mind of man, to the extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champain region, and not in the inclosures of particularity; the mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite.

But for the placing of this science, it is not much material: only we have endeavoured, in these our partitions, to observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon

another.

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