The following documents relate to the Japanese indemnity: H. Ex. Docs. As to the neutrality of the foreign powers in the war between the Tycoon As to the case of the Pembroke, see Reprisals, infra, § 1093. As to the Monitor claim, and the refusal of the United States further to press it, see For. Rel. 1888, II. 1068, 1069. As to claims against Japan, see S. Mis. Doc. 52, 40 Cong. 2 sess. As to recent events in Japan, 1868, see S. Ex. Doc. 65, 40 Cong. 2 sess. The diplomatic representative of the United States in Japan was instructed to confer with the representatives of the other powers, and, while treating the Japanese government with perfect respect and conciliation, to press upon it, with the concurrence of his colleagues, an application for the abrogation of the law which prohibited Christianity throughout the empire. Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Van Valkenburgh, No. 32, Oct. 7, 1867, See, also, same to same, No. 83, Oct. 5, 1868, Dip. Cor. 1868, I. 827. See, further, For Rel. 1870, 453-486, as to persecution of native 6. CONVENTION OF 1866, AND TREATY REVISION. § 850. On June 25, 1866, the representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Holland signed with the Japanese government a convention for the modification of the tariff of import and export duties contained in the trade regulations annexed to the treaties of 1858. The new convention, which went into operation July 1, 1866, substituted specific for ad valorem duties. The plenipotentiaries acted on the assumption that the treaty, before going into effect, need not be ratified by their respective governments, but it was afterwards laid before the United States Senate, which advised its ratification June 17, 1868. On February 29, 1872, an embassy from Japan arrived in Washington. Arrangements were made for its reception by the President at noon on Monday the 4th of March. The embassy afterwards visited Europe. Its principal object was to secure the revision of existing treaties. In this it was unsuccessful. September 2, 1874, Mr. Fish wrote: "The President is impressed with the importance of continued concert between the treaty powers in Japan, at least until after the revision of the treaties, and until the government of Japan shall have exhibited a degree of power and capacity to adopt and to enforce a system of jurisprudence, and of judicial administration, in harmony with that of the Christian powers, equal to their evident desire to be relieved from the enforced duties of exterritoriality." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Nicholas Fish, chargé at Berlin, No. 703, A similar instruction was sent to the American minister at St. Peters- As to the reception of the Japanese embassy by the President in 1872, see Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mori, March 2, 1872, MS. Notes to Japan, I. 13. The efforts of Japan to secure the revision of the treaties continued. According to the despatches of Mr. Bingham, American minister at Tokio, the chief desire of Japan from 1874 to 1878 was to regain control of her revenues. To that end Mr. Bingham always urged independent action on the part of the United States, and in proof of his contention that the United States should not deem itself precluded by the joint agreement of 1866 from so acting, he transmitted to the Department of State, in his No. 276 of October 8, 1875, a copy of a protocol entered into by the British and German governments with that of Japan in 1874 to settle the meaning of the term "iron, manufactured," in the agreement of 1866. Mr. Fish, who was then Secretary of State, took, however, a different view of the matter. In an instruction to Mr. Bingham, of March 9, 1876, he said: "It has been the inviolable policy of the United States to act in all oriental affairs in concert with the European powers. Nothing in the present case appears to call for an abandonment of that policy. On the contrary, in a matter so grave and important as the revision of all existing treaties with Japan, it would seem to be of the utmost importance that there should be earnest and hearty cooperation of all the treaty powers." He also thought that the English-German protocol did not alter the meaning of the agreement of 1866, and consequently was not relevant to the pending question. Mr. Evarts, Mr. Fish's successor, took a somewhat different view, both of the effect of the protocol and of the question of cooperation, and suggested independent negotiations with the Japanese minister at Washington. Subsequently, under instructions of the Department of State, Mr. Bingham signed on July 25, 1878, a commercial convention with Japan. By this convention, the ratifications of which were duly exchanged, the convention of June 25, 1866, was to be annulled and the stipulations of the treaty of 1858 pertaining to customs and trade were to cease to operate. It was provided, however, that the new convention should take effect only when Japan had concluded with all the other treaty powers new agreements of similar purport. As such agreements were not concluded, the convention of July 25, 1878, though designed to secure the recognition of Japan's autonomy in matters of trade and commerce, remained inoperative. Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bingham, min. to Japan, No. 228, May 15, See the following despatches from Mr. Bingham: No. 276, Oct. 8, 1875; In his No. 973, Sept. 20, 1879, Mr. Bingham transmitted a confidential As to the exchange of the ratifications of the convention of May 17, 1880, A conference for the revision of the treaties met at Tokio in March, 1882. It was called to order by Sir Harry S. Parkes, British minister, who, in his opening speech, said that he begged to "welcome the minister of the United States and to assure him of the pleasure it afforded them to see him join their meeting, not only on account of the high regard they entertain for him personally, but also because his presence denoted, as they believed, the friendly desire of his government to act in concert with the powers." Mr. Bingham replied that he had been authorized to “participate in the deliberations of the conference, but in no wise to thereby commit the government of the United States to any action that may be taken." The Japanese government proposed to the conference not only the subject of tariff autonomy, but also that of judicial autonomy. The proposals on the latter subject embraced the idea of a probationary period. The conference reached no decisive result. One of its most striking aspects was the change in the situation that had occurred since the formation of the joint tariff convention of 1866. As has been seen, the signatories of that convention were the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Since that time, H. Doc. 551-vol 5-18 Russia had assumed an influential position in Japan; and Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland had also established relations with that country. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bingham, min. to Japan, tel., See despatches of Mr. Bingham, No. 1461, March 30, 1882; No. 1485, May 20, 1881, Mr. Bingham was instructed, with reference to a report "I do not see that I need at present repeat or add to the previous in- See, also, Mr. Frelinghuysen, to Mr. Bingham, No. 649, Feb. 28, 1882, Mr. Hubbard, minister to Japan, in his No. 100, Jan. 21, 1886, stated, As to the absorption of the Loochoo (Lew Chew) Islands by Japan, see 5 Moore, Int. Arbitrations, 5046-5048; Mr. F. W. Seward, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Bingham, min. to Japan, No. 380, Oct. 9, 1878, II. 455. See, as to American interests in Japan, S. Ex. Docs. 52 and 58, 41 Cong. 2 sess. After the final adjournment in September, 1882, of the treaty conference of that year, Mr. Bingham suggested that the United States forthwith conclude a separate revised treaty with Japan on a basis proposed by that government. In view of the fact that the convention of July 25, 1878, still remained inoperative, owing to the refusal of the other powers to conclude similar arrangements, Mr. Bingham's suggestion was not adopted; but the President in his annual message of 1883 announced that the United States was disposed to concede the requests of Japan to determine her own tariff rates, to provide such judicial tribunals as might commend themselves to the Western powers for the trial of causes to which foreigners were parties, and to assimilate the terms and duration of her treaties to those of other civilized states. The United States, as Mr. Frelinghuysen afterwards explained, was "not yet prepared to accept unreservedly the Japanese claim to exclusive jurisdiction," but preferred "an intermediate period of mixed jurisdiction," although it was considered possible that Japan might offer such positive and effective guarantees of impartial judicial administration as to overcome this preference. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bingham, min. to Japan, No. 707, Jan. 16, 1883, MS. Inst. Japan, III. 153; Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. von Eisendecher, Jan. 10, 1884, MS. Notes to Germany, X. 269; Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Bingham, No. 808 (confid.), March 5, 1884, MS. Inst. Japan, III. 238; same to same, tel., May 10, 1884, id. 247; same to same, No. 859, Sept 16, 1884, id. 283. October 31, 1885, Mr. Hubbard, then American minister at Tokio, was instructed to attend another conference for the revision of the treaties. He was to support Japan's claim to make separate terminable treaties covering both the tariff and judicial administration, but was to accept an equitable compromise, so as not to obstruct Japan's agreeing with the other powers. In instructions to Mr. Hubbard of July 14, 1886, Mr. Bayard said: "The chief object of the United States is to secure to Japan, as far as practicable, complete autonomy. The speediest and most effectual way of accomplishing this end appears to be by cooperating with the other treaty powers, at the same time taking care not to depart from our settled policy of avoiding entangling alliances. The object, as understood by this government, of the past and present conferences of revision is to seek and frame a common basis for independent treaties. . . The most important and essential object to Japan is to obtain control of her own revenues. The arrangement of 1866 has the disadvantage of being made jointly with other powers and of not being terminable on notice given. The United States are indisposed to accept any result of the pending revision which does not embrace the terminability of the treaties within a reasonable period. The objective point to be kept in view in the discussion is the recognition of Japan's autonomy. This being established and conceded on all sides, the regulation by Japan of her foreign commerce and of her domestic affairs follows as an attribute of sovereignty, to be restrained only so far as she may deem it expedient by independent treaties. Every |