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forcement of law and the suppression of rebellion, authorized the employment of militia with the wise provision that it was to continue in service until discharged, on condition that such term was not prolonged more than sixty days after the beginning of the next regular session of Congress.

The Acts of August 3rd and 5th related principally to the staff, although the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of War was provided for,35 certain increases authorised, the dragoons and mounted rifles merged into the cavalry,36 and a retiring board to deal with officers "incapacitated for service" prescribed. 37

On August 6th four acts were approved. Two of these were concerned with the increase of the Engineer and Topographical Engineer Corps, and heed was paid to the popular clamour against the vicious system of permitting the election of volunteer officers 38 by an amendment providing that such vacancies should be filled by the governors of the States, as in the case of original appointments.39 The evil was thus rectified, but not until after 250,000 men had been accepted under this demoralizing scheme. The third act increased the pay of the privates in the Regular Army and volunteers from twelve to thirteen dollars a month and what was most important -sanctioned all of the actions of President Lincoln. 40

At the end of the year a bill was introduced in the Senate "to abolish all distinction between the regular and volunteer forces of the United States," but the Committee on Military Affairs very properly killed it then and there.11

In four weeks and a half Congress had assuredly worked like a Trojan and deserved credit accordingly. In that short space of time it had enacted a military system under which one of the greatest wars of modern times was to be prosecuted, its haste being in marked contrast to the laborious slowness of the Prussians who, after the annihilation of their army by Napoleon at Jena - October 14, 1806 took years to build up the fabric of a system under which they humiliated Austria in a few weeks in 1866, crushed France in 1870 and are

[1861

fighting to-day. "By their fruits ye shall know them," and we shall have occasion to see the consequences of the delusion of Congress that, once it had passed a series of laws-be they good, bad or indifferent creating a military system however defective, almost over-night, its duty had been discharged and that all future mistakes were none of its concern.4 42 We shall see how its virtual rejection of trained troops upon which all other nations depend—and the reliance which it placed in untrained volunteers, 43 most of whose officers were necessarily devoid of military experience, was destined to prolong for four years a struggle which witnessed the repetition of almost every blunder of our past wars and which caused bloodshed and expenditures nothing short of appalling.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1861

44

Although by July first more than 200,000 volunteers had been mustered into service for three years, the Government could not withstand the temptation to repeat anew the folly of short enlistments. Forgetful of the fact that numbers and military strength are by no means synonymous, that the reputation acquired by the militia at Bunker Hill and New Orleans was gained behind formidable entrenchments, the entire country Congress, the Cabinet, the press and peoplebegan to clamour that, before the 75,000 men called out for three months 45 were discharged, they should be led to battle. 46

47

The first real encounter of the war took place on June 10th at Big Bethel, a few miles up the Virginia peninsula from Fortress Monroe, when the Northern volunteers under General Pierce were repulsed, and this fiasco, magnified into a great victory by the South, produced deep mortification on one side of the Potomac and corresponding elation on the other. 48

The victories of Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, West Virginia, on July 11th and 14th, resulted in the capture and

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dispersal of the Confederate troops in that section, and a week later General Patterson's force near Harper's Ferry had so disintegrated as a result of its repulse at Winchester and the expiring enlistments that, notwithstanding his efforts to retain the men, he was reduced to absolute impotency. 49

On July 21st the main armies met "two armed mobs" was the very apt description given them by Count von Moltke. The forces were approximately of equal strength,50 but the elements of weakness were, if anything, more apparent in General McDowell's command than in General Beauregard's. 51 The battle of Bull Run 52 ended in an overwhelming victory for the Confederates,53 the Northern troops being thoroughly routed and with the exception of the regulars 54 ran away in a panic, which could not be checked until they reached the Potomac.55

Although the Confederate "army was more disorganized by victory than the United States was by defeat," 56 there is no gainsaying the fact that "the North richly deserved its punishment." 57 Of the causes of this disaster,

First among them was the popular but mistaken belief that because our citizens individually possess courage, fortitude, and self-reliance, they must necessarily possess the same qualities when aggregated as soldiers. And next to this error was the fatal delusion, that an army animated by patriotism needed neither instruction nor discipline to prepare it for battle." 58

As Swinton aptly declares: 59

"So far as regards the mere physical fact of fighting, which was at the time the all-important question, there was nothing of which the Union soldiers had to be ashamed - they stood up to it with the blood of their race. The fault lay in the inherent vicious organization of the force in the great number of miserable subordinate officers, which in turn was the natural result of the method of raising regiments.

"When the army that so lately had gone forth with such high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discomfited to the banks of the Potomac. wise men saw there was that [which?] had suffered worse defeat than the army-it was the system

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