[1775-1776

combat every single mistake in the military policy of that time. No other person was in a better position than he to pass judgment upon this all-important subject, and his comments are to-day quite as worthy of legislative consideration as when they were originally written.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1776

Up to January 14, 1776, out of the 20,370 troops authorized by Congress three months before, only 10,500 had been enlisted and many of these had not joined.28 Washington, despairing of raising the army by voluntary enlistments, wrote to the General Court of Massachusetts on January 16th suggesting the employment of "coercive measures" to maintain the regiments at their proper strength. On the same day he proposed to the council of war an attack on the British at Boston before they could be re-enforced and, upon the council of war's agreeing, it was recommended that 13 regiments of militia be called into service until April first.29 On February 9th, he wrote a remarkable letter to Congress on the subject of the evils, dangers and extravagance of short enlistments, in which he said:

"The disadvantages attending the limited enlistment of troops are too apparent to those who are eyewitnesses of them to render any animadversions necessary, but to gentlemen at a distance whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects the case may be otherwise. That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt, for, had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued to blockade Quebec, a capitulation, from the best accounts I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed.

"The instance of General Montgomery (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced) proves that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration

"To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a

Reproduced by permission of Rand, McNally and Company from E. G. Foster's Illustrative Historical Maps.

1776]

soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination not only requires time, but it is a work of great difficulty, and in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To EXPECT, then, THE SAME SERVICE FROM

RAW AND UNDISCIPLINED RECRUITS AS FROM VETERAN SOLDIERS IS TO EXPECT WHAT NEVER DID AND PERHAPS NEVER WILL HAPPEN

.

"30

Washington, re-enforced by certain militia, occupied Dorchester Heights on March 4th, threw up two redoubts and took steps which brought about the evacuation of Boston by the British on the 17th.31 Appreciating that New York would be the next objective point, he hastened to send five regiments to its defence and on April 13th arrived there himself with nearly all his army. Congress immediately required him to send four, and later six, additional regiments

- 3,000 men to Canada to re-enforce the troops near Quebec. His army, thus scattered and divided, was reduced to 5,300 Continentals,32 leaving him no alternative except to depend upon militia enlisted for short periods only. Such was the force with which he was expected to confront a disciplined British army numbering from 20,000 to 30,000.

35

Congress at last awoke to the gravity of the situation in June, called out 6,000 militia to re-enforce the troops in Canada,33 authorized 13,800 to strengthen Washington,31 and created a “flying camp" to be located in New Jersey; but in spite of Washington's reiterated recommendations, the enlistments of all these troops was to expire on December first. As General Upton aptly remarks, 36

"The slow increase of the Continental Army shows that Congress was committed to a dual military establishment, one class of troops being Continental or regular, the other militia. In the former the gradual extension of enlistments to two and three years enabled the men to acquire the discipline which ultimately proved the salvation of our cause. The natural disposition of men to seek the easiest and shortest service prompted them to enlist in the militia in preference to the Continental regiments,

[1776

and thus the only force which could be depended upon to cope with the British, both offensively and defensively, was always from one-third to one-half below its prescribed strength."

On July 4th 37 the Declaration of Independence was adopted and the time for speedy action in expelling the British had come, but the lesson that raw troops cannot prevail against disciplined regulars had apparently not been learned. On August 27th was fought the battle of Long Island between Lord Howe's force of fully 20,000 men 38 and about 8,000 under Washington, all that he could muster out of an army whose paper strength was 27,000.39 The logical result followed; the Americans were badly beaten and on the 30th retreated to New York,40 where Washington wrote on September 2nd to the President of Congress that

"no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which when effected are not attended with any good consequences." 41

On September 15th the British occupied New York, after a spirited engagement ending in the retreat of the Americans to Harlem Heights, the brigades of Parsons and Fellows running away in the most disgraceful fashion.42 On the 24th Washington wrote some plain truths to the President of Congress, declaring that

To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowl