(12) employés of the War Department were permitted to administer oaths for the settlement of officers' accounts with the same force and effect as if administered by magistrates or justices of the peace but without any expense to the officer; 16 and

(13) "acting assistant surgeons, contract surgeons, and surgeons and commissioners on the enrolling boards, while in the military service of the United States, shall hereafter be exempt from all liability to be drafted." 17

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1865

The winter of 1861-1865 was of unusual severity and its effects were obviously felt more by Lee's famished troops,who were in dire want of almost everything and who deserted by the hundreds, than by Grant's better-provided army.18 On February 1st Sherman started north from Savannah for the purpose of effecting his junction with Grant, and on March 7th entered North Carolina between Cheraw and Fayetteville.19 By all the rules of strategy Lee should have united with Johnston who had been restored to his former command 20 to crush Sherman before he could unite with the Union army before Richmond, but so deficient were his means of transport that such an operation was out of the question.21 He resolved however to make a final effort to overwhelm Grant, notwithstanding the strength of the latter's fortified position in his front. On March 25th Fort Stedman on the Union right was assaulted, but in spite of the most strenuous attempts the attacks failed signally.22 Two days later Sheridan joined the Army of the Potomac, having left Winchester just one month before,23 destroyed and captured most of Early's force at Waynesboro' on March 2nd, and permanently crippled both the Virginia Central railway and the James River canal.24 Grant then determined upon a counter-stroke 25 and concentrated a large force against his adversary's right.26 A forward thrust begun on March 29th had to be suspended during the next two days, owing to the flood of rain which rendered the roads impassable, although it did not prevent Lee from springing like a

cornered tiger upon Warren on the 31st or from attacking Sheridan, who had been sent to threaten his right and rear 27 and who had ensconced himself on his flank at Dinwiddie Court House.28 Sheridan was promptly re-enforced as agreed, and on April 1st won the battle of Five Forks, a victory which routed Lee's right, wrenched it from his centre and left him no alternative except to abandon Richmond and Petersburg.29 To prevent his throwing his whole weight against Sheridan, Grant bombarded his adversary's position all night, and at daylight on the 2nd delivered a general assault upon the Confederate entrenchments, which was almost uniformly successful. Petersburg was to be subjected to similar treatment next day but Lee, having but one line of retreat leading anywhere except to destruction, evacuated both places during the night of the 2nd-3rd and took the only road still open to him, which ran westward up the Appomattox River. After occupying both Richmond and Petersburg, Grant immediately started his army in pursuit,30 his object being to anticipate Lee before he could reach Danville.31 Next day Sheridan learned at Jetersville that Lee was at Amelia Court House, 32 but had to entrench and await Meade's infantry which did not overtake him until the following afternoon. The combined pressure of the Union columns forced the Confederates to abandon some guns and several hundred wagons,33 and that afternoon Sheridan, supported by the 6th Corps (Wright), isolated Ewell from Longstreet and Gordon, and captured his entire command with the exception of 250 men at Sailor's Creek,34 while the 2nd Corps (Humphreys) indulged in a running fight with Gordon's corps, from which it took 1,700 prisoners.35 On the 7th the pursuit was continued 36 with relentless vigour, but, although Humphreys, after preventing the destruction of the important High Bridge, suffered a check at Farmville, he was successful in detaining Lee near that point from midday until night,37 and that too at a critical time when the very minutes were equal to days. That evening

Grant sent a flag of truce with a letter to Lee emphasizing "the hopelessness of further resistance." The latter replied by asking for terms, and additional correspondence took place on the 8th,38 while the wretched Confederates continued their retreat,39 unmolested 40 except for rear-guard actions. 41 Late that evening Sheridan drove Lee's advanced guard from Appomattox station, capturing 25 guns, a hospital-train and four railway trains loaded with supplies, but he was having a lively fight on the morning of April 9th with Gordon's corps which was making desperate efforts to cut its way through to escape when Generals Ord and Griffin appeared on the scene. 42 The arrival of these two corps caused the Confederates to desist from their attempts, and Sheridan was about to make a counter-attack when he received news that Lee had surrendered.43 The Confederate commander had in fact sent a flag of truce with a request for a suspension of hostilities and an interview with General Grant.44 This conference took place that afternoon in the McLean house at Appomattox,45 Grant embodying his terms in a letter written by himself 46 and Lee accepting them in his own handwriting.47 By 4 o'clock the interview had terminated 48 and the Army of Northern Virginia had passed into history. The surrender comprised 28,356 officers and men who were duly paroled, 49 while 19,132 in addition to those killed and wounded had been captured in the twelve preceding days.50 In this crowning success is to be found complete vindication of Grant's plan of continuous hammering until his adversary through sheer attrition was reduced to submission,51 and the surrender of General Lee, who had fought seven campaigns, 52 "prolonged the struggle for a thousand days, and put out of action, in the meantime, more than three of the enemy for every man of his own army at its maximum strength" 53-a record scarcely paralleled by Napoleon in twenty years of fighting-marked the virtual close of the War of the Rebellion.

Sherman, after his interview with Grant,54 rejoined his

army at Goldsboro', North Carolina, and resumed his operations against Johnston, who retreated and permitted the former to occupy Raleigh on April 13th. Having learned of Lee's surrender, Johnston on that same day proposed "a temporary suspension of active operations" with a view to surrender and, after an unfortunate contretemps, eventually capitulated on the 26th under substantially the same terms as had been given Lee.55 Mobile was occupied by the Federals on April 12th, and on the 20th Cobb surrendered at Macon to General James Harrison Wilson, who had wrought tremendous destruction to the Southern cause by an extraordinary campaign and capped the climax by capturing Jefferson Davis at Irwinsville, Georgia, on May 10th.56 Six days earlier Taylor and all that remained of the Confederate forces east of the Mississippi had been taken prisoners by General Canby, who repeated his feat on May 26th on the other side of the river by capturing Kirby Smith and his entire command,57 and the curtain descended upon the military operations of the War of the Rebellion.

CHAPTER XIV

LESSONS OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION AND ITS COST IN MEN AND MONEY

TH

Indeed

HE short-sighted military policy pursued by the United States, in failing to maintain in time of peace a Regular Army of sufficient size and expansiveness to furnish an adequate trained force to suppress the rebellion at its inception,1 had its logical outcome in the prolongation of the war for four years and in a most unnecessary loss of life 2. quite apart from that which can justly be charged to the mistakes of the Union generals in the field. it is highly doubtful whether it could have been brought to a successful conclusion even then had it not been for the iron blockade which the Navy drew about the coasts of the Confederacy. The dependence placed upon untrained volunteers and militia, virtually to the exclusion of trained regulars,3 necessitated the improvising of new armies which were obliged to learn the duties of a soldier from the very beginning in the hardest of all schools that of actual war. As might be expected, blunder after blunder was committed by these volunteer officers, whose ignorance was only exceeded by their courage, while the lack of discipline among the troops, coupled with their ignorance of how to take care of themselves, produced a degree of sickness out of all proportion to that which prevails among trained soldiers who have been taught military hygiene.5 Inordinate waste and expense were the natural consequences, and these conditions are in nowise surprising considering that they have inevitably existed among raw troops.

4

The organizations in the field, instead of being maintained at the proper strength, were permitted to waste away until