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surf was unusually heavy, the troops ashore were twenty-four hours without food. The watchful vigil in the flooded trenches resulted in the destruction of many pairs of shoes, and 300 men of General Merritt's army marched into Manila barefooted. Conceive the remarks of the yellow press had this incident, so common in war, occurred at Santiago instead of at Manila!

"Yet there were no complaints from those sturdy heroes. Every general officer who has written of the battle and the trying period preceding has highly commended their fortitude, their cheerfulness, and their patience under all conditions." 287

On August 16th the news of the signing of the peace protocol reached Manila, and on the 28th General Merritt received orders to relinquish his command to General Otis 288 and to proceed to Paris to confer with the American Commissioners.289 On December 10th there was signed in the French capital the definitive Treaty of Peace, whereby Spain withdrew from Cuba and ceded to the United States Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, receiving $20,000,000 for her Asiatic colonies 290- which were already in the possession of the Americans by right of conquest.

Thus ended the Spanish-American War, in which the United States had employed 58,688 regular troops, 291 and 223,235 volunteers,292 to oppose Spanish forces numbering about 228,160,293 at a cost of $321,833,254.76,294 and the pensions for this war, taken in conjunction with those paid. out for the Philippine insurrection, have already amounted to no less than $46,092,740.47.295

CHAPTER XVII

LESSONS OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

HOW

OW short and decisive a modern war can be is demonstrated by this struggle which lasted only 109 days from the official declaration of hostilities to the signing of the peace protocol. In certain aspects it was well-nigh unique, and the commander of the American land forces had abundant reason to declare 2 that

"It is gratifying to record that during the war not a single defeat has been met, and not a prisoner, color, gun or rifle has been captured by the enemy. In this respect the war has been most remarkable, and, perhaps, unparalleled. . . .

"While but a small portion of the available forces of the United States approximately 52,000 men has been on foreign soil and engaged in fighting a foreign foe, those that have been in the presence of the enemy have fairly demonstrated the character and fortitude of the military forces of the United States."

That a mighty empire in both hemispheres should have been wrested from Spain after four centuries of domination with a loss so infinitesimal on the part of the victorious nation is almost incredible. 3 This was mainly due to the employment by the United States of such a large percentage of Regular troops, to the failure of the Spanish commander at Santiago to concentrate his army, and to the sudden collapse of the war in consequence of the destruction of the Spanish fleets. Credit should also be given to General Garcia and the Cubans who rendered important services.

The principal resistance to our land forces was encountered in Cuba, where the success was achieved by the flower of the American Regular Army. That such a mere handful

of trained soldiers was able within twenty-four days and during the worst season of the year to win three actions,5 to force Admiral Cervera out of the harbour and into certain destruction, to capture Santiago and some 23,000 Spanish troops — a number considerably in excess of their own — and thus in so short a time to end the war, is little less than miraculous. None but an army of highly trained regulars could have accomplished such a result, and the credit belongs rightfully and almost exclusively to them.7

History is replete with inaccuracies and omissions, and the campaign of Santiago affords another instance of this fact. Although the rôle played by General Garcia and the Cuban forces after the landing of the American army scarcely redounded to their credit, the fact none the less remains that, prior to General Shafter's arrival, they rendered invaluable assistance by virtually isolating the Spanish in the vicinity of Santiago from those in the rest of the province. With the suggestions made by General Miles on June 2nd 8 Garcia complied to such an extent that, out of 36,582 Spanish troops in the province of Santiago," General Linares was reduced to 12,096 soldiers and 1,000 sailors 10 with which to oppose Shafter. 11 That he failed to utilize them as a good general would have done was extremely lucky for the Americans. Thus far historians, almost without exception, have neglected to give to Garcia and his Cubans the proper recognition due for the important services which they rendered in the initial stages of the campaign in Cuba.

The Spanish-American War is notable, not only for the greater percentage of regulars in proportion to the number of troops actually used in active operations than in most of our wars, but for the large number of Regular Army officers employed in the volunteers, no less than 387 serving in the various grades of this force.12 With the exception of Miles, Wilson and Merritt, none of the general officers had commanded army corps or independent armies during the War of the Rebellion. The first two of these generals were sent

to Porto Rico, the last to Manila. General Shafter, while not a brilliant soldier, was by no means devoid of ability — an incompetent commander could not have concentrated 83 per cent. of his available forces for the decisive battles as he did on July 1st 13- but he was physically unfitted for campaigning in the tropics and therefore incapable of giving that personal supervision to the operations of his troops which is indispensable to efficient control.1

14

Congress, having neglected to carry out the recommendations of the Endicott Board,15 found itself in the usual dilemma and sought by an appropriation of $50,000,000 to make reparation, but neither money nor the most strenuous efforts could place our fortifications in an effective state during the short time available. Yet, owing to an absurd construction of the law, the money appropriated could be used for very little else, and preparations indispensable to the efficiency of the several supply departments were much delayed. Once the legal difficulty was overcome and expenditures by the various departments began, one of the most glaring evils of our supply system was carried to its utmost limit, and the duplication of purchases resulted in an enormous surplus of supplies for which there existed no demand and which were disposed of for a trifle by condemnation shortly after the close of the war.

Since we have no general supply department for the Army, and as the supplies of the Engineer, Ordnance, Medical and Signal corps are bought by each one independently of the others and of the Quartermaster Department, and, moreover, as many of the supplies are of the same kind in all the departments, this sort of extravagance will no doubt occur again should the United States be suddenly plunged into war. The consolidation of the Quartermaster, Commissary and Pay departments 16 has to some extent mitigated the evil, but it will not be wholly eradicated until all manufactured articles and raw materials in common use in the Army are provided by a general supply department, fully conversant with the

needs of all the branches of the service and how far they can be met by the stores on hand. Until such a change in administration is made, waste and extravagance will inevitably continue to disgrace our absurdly administered Army.

What the supply departments were subjected to as a result of the dilatory action of Congress, waiting as usual until the eleventh hour, and what they achieved in spite of their handicap is admirably set forth in that part of Captain Rhodes' Gold Medal Prize Essay which will be found in the appendix to this chapter on pages 668-671.17

In the Spanish-American War the same piecemeal and hand-to-mouth policy which has marked the military legislation from the beginning of our national career was again apparent. No expansive organization had been instituted in the long years of peace following the close of the War of the Rebellion and, as usual, the increase of the Regular Army occurred after the outbreak of war, with the result that the maximum authorized strength was not attained even at the cessation of hostilities. As this increase came after the creation of the Volunteer Army, the recruits naturally preferred service with the volunteers, just as they have always done 18 and always will do. Moreover, as the governors of the States were empowered to appoint the company and regimental officers, many commissions were obtained in the volunteers by men who were in no respect qualified to lead troops, and the authorities were well-nigh swamped by the applications which poured in upon them.19 The lack of adequate training on the part of the volunteers rendered them of comparatively small value from the standpoint of a military asset, doubly so since Congress expressly forbade that more than one regular officer should be appointed in any one volunteer regiment.20 Even so, nearly one-fifth of the regular officers were given volunteer commissions, in spite of the fact that the Regular Army had been more than doubled in size and that many of these officers were needed for recruiting service.21

The dearth of trained officers, arising out of the neglect of

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