[1901 30th the actual strength of the American troops in the Philippines was only 47,742 officers and men,192 as against 74,094 in the preceding November,193 and by the end of November, 1901, it was further reduced to 43,239.194 The suppression of the Philippine insurrection was achieved with a loss among the American forces during the period from February 4, 1899, to June 30, 1901, amounting to 330 officers and 6,746 enlisted men, killed, wounded or died.195 In the Philippine War the United States was compelled to use 76,416 Regular troops 196 and 50,052 volunteers 197 against native insurgents whose numbers cannot be estimated even approximately. This war cost $170,326,586.11,198 and the pensions, taken in conjunction with those paid for the Spanish-American War, amounted on June 30, 1914, to no less than $46,092,740.47.199 CHAPTER XIX THE LESSONS OF THE PHILIPPINE WAR NONSIDERING the magnitude of the task involved in CON the suppression of an insurrection in an archipelago like that of the Philippines, the inhabitants of which numbered some 7,000,000 persons, the Secretary of War had abundant reason to declare that he could not 1 "speak too highly of the work of the army in the Philippines. The officers and men have been equal to the best requirements, not only of military service, but of civil administration with which they were charged in all its details from the date of our occupancy in August, 1898, until the inauguration of a civil governor on the 4th of July, 1901.” 2 The reason for the efficiency of the American forces is not far to seek. In this war the United States employed a larger percentage of Regular troops than in any other war in its history. Apart from this important fact, the Volunteer force created by the Act of March 2, 1899, was by all odds the best of its sort ever raised. The factors which made it so extraordinarily effective have already been set forth on pages 227-228, and need not, accordingly, be reiterated here. In no sense was it composed of raw troops matter of fact it was mainly officered by regulars or those who had acquitted themselves with credit during the Spanish-American War; the enlisted personnel was as near physically perfect as elimination could make it, and the majority of the men had had exceptional training previously. This force may therefore be taken as a model of its kind, and can under no circumstances be put in the category with the class of raw troops who usually comprise the volunteers. as a Sufficient allusion has already been made to the dearth of trained soldiers at the outbreak of the insurrection, resulting from the customary procrastination of Congress until the eleventh hour; and it has been seen that, in consequence, the first of the newly-created volunteer regiments did not reach the Philippines until more than eight months after the war began,3 and the last did not arrive until January 25, 1900 — almost one year after the commencement of the insurrection. War, properly conducted, is the most drastic and brutal of human undertakings, but so obsessed was our Government with the idea of "benevolent assimilation" and so loath to use the "mailed fist" that it was not until December 20, 1900, that really drastic measures were inaugurated. As a result of the relentless operations of the American forces in the field, " by April 1, 1901, it became apparent that the insurrection was rapidly approaching complete collapse," and it is undoubtedly fortunate that this desideratum was on the eve of accomplishment since the War Department, as early as December 11, 1900, ordered General MacArthur to "start home volunteer regiments," and sixteen days later cabled him, “We must push this movement, otherwise [there] will be trouble getting volunteers home." 7 It is not difficult to read between the lines that the War Department, influenced possibly by having been compelled, nolens volens, to retain the volunteers raised in 1898 in service long after their terms of enlistment had legally expired, was resolved that there should be no repetition of such a course with respect to the Philippine volunteers, who were to be mustered out on July 1, 1901, according to the express provision of the Act of March 2, 1899, creating them. conformity with his instructions, General MacArthur sent off the 37th Volunteer Infantry in the transport Sheridan on January 10th, the 36th Volunteers in the Pennsylvania on January 28th, and the 11th Volunteer Cavalry in the Meade on February 1, 1901.8 About every fortnight thereafter a volunteer regiment was despatched to San Francisco, so that In the last regiment left Manila on May 5th.10 As early as January 9th General MacArthur warned the War Department that after May 1st it would only be safe to send away the volunteers if replaced by Regulars," and the straits to which the military authorities were put to find the necessary number of Regulars is attested by the following cable sent by Adjutant-General Corbin on January 29, 1901, to General Leonard Wood at Havana: 66 Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can give your consent to the immediate withdrawal of the Tenth Infantry from Cuba. The long delay in passage of the army bill makes it imperative that we have immediate use of every available company we can lay our hands on for service in the Philippines. Secretary [of] War very much desires if possible that you can see your way clear to recommend the withdrawal of this regiment at once." "12 Thus was afforded a fresh instance of Congressional folly in limiting the term of enlistment instead of making it “for the war." Had the Philippine insurrection in the bulk of the archipelago not been crushed at the time when it was, and had it been prolonged until 1902, as was the resistance in Batangas and Samar, the Government would have found itself in the same unenviable predicament as in 1899, and very hard put to find an adequate number of trained soldiers to respond to the demands, not only in the Philippines, but in Cuba and various insular possessions. The inadequacy of our Army was again made manifest, and such was the difficulty of obtaining a sufficiency of recruits for the Regulars in the Philippines that General MacArthur recommended a bounty of $250 as an inducement to volunteers to join the Army in those islands.13 The conduct of the Philippine War was marked by more than one mistake on the part of the War Department. Among them was the failure to notify the commanding officers far enough ahead of the departure of their troops with |