[1781

their plans had miscarried. 229 On September 5th, Admiral Graves entered the Chesapeake, but de Grasse, slipping out, drew him off to the southward and manoeuvered with such skill that for five days the English were unable to bring on a decisive action. De Grasse then put back into the bay and found the squadron under de Barras safely at anchor.230 He was followed by Graves but that Admiral, finding himself completely outnumbered, renounced his attempts and set sail for New York.231

On the 14th Washington and Rochambeau reached Lafayette's headquarters at Williamsburg, where the entire Allied armies were concentrated eleven days later,232 their march in nowise slackened by Clinton's counterstroke in the shape of an invasion of Connecticut conducted by Benedict Arnold,233 which accomplished nothing except the destruction of New London.234 On September 28th the Allied armies advanced to a position within two miles of Yorktown and on the following day began the investment of the place. A week later the siege guns began their work with such effect that on October 17th Cornwallis offered to capitulate, and on the 19th his 8,000 men 235 defiled between the French and American armies to the tune of "The World Turned Upside Down," 236 surrendered their colours and laid down their arms. This crowning success came none too soon, for on that memorable day Clinton sailed from New York with a powerful fleet and 7,000 of his best troops to relieve Cornwallis, arriving at the mouth of the Chesapeake five days later, only to have to turn back from his fruitless mission.238

237

Without the timely assistance of Rochambeau, de Grasse and de Barras, it is doubtful that the struggling colonies would ever have achieved their independence. As the war progressed the response to the military necessities diminished,239 and in 1781 not 30,000 troops were furnished by the States,240 whereas at the most critical moment the British had over 38,000 effective men.241 The service thus rendered by France was incalculable.242

1781-1783]

Although the war was virtually terminated with the surrender of Cornwallis, the cessation of arms did not officially occur until fourteen months later,243 so that Washington wisely prepared for further operations 244 but without the necessary troops being forthcoming.245 On April 19, 1783, Washington, following in the footsteps of Congress,246 proclaimed the cessation of hostilities,247 on September 3rd the definitive treaty of peace was signed at Paris,248 on November 2nd, he delivered his farewell address to the army 249 which was disbanded next day,250 and on December 23rd he resigned his commission.251

A

CHAPTER III

LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION

S a result of the blundering military policy pursued, the maximum number of troops raised in any year 1 was 89,661, of whom 42,700 were militia.2 Owing to the principal dependence being placed upon untrained men, the largest force that Washington was able to assemble for battle was less than 17,000; at Trenton and Princeton, when the fate of the cause trembled in the balance, his effective strength was less than 4,000. A careful study of the conduct of the regular or Continental troops throughout the Revolution will abundantly demonstrate that a standing army is one of the least dangers to which American freedom can be exposed. The fear of "militarism" caused the wise plan suggested by Greene 5 and the reiterated recommendations of Washington to go unheeded and, as a logical consequence, our first war was attended by an extravagance in men and money utterly unjustifiable. Of regulars or Continental troops 231,771 and no less than 164,087 militia 7 saw service, a total of 395,858, whereas the entire British force from first to last was only about 150,605 — in other words the Americans used nearly three men to their enemy's one. The war cost the United States $370,000,000, and pensions to the amount of $70,000,000 have been paid in consequence of it.10

6

Unflattering though it be to American pride, it is none the less true that, notwithstanding our employment of over 395,000 men, only two military events had a direct bearing upon the ultimate expulsion of the British. The first was the capture of Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777, the second the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781- and the

latter was only rendered possible by the timely assistance of a French army and a French fleet.11

From a military standpoint the errors in the policy followed during the Revolution may be summarized under twelve headings, namely:

(1) The total inability to comprehend that the military resources can only be utilized to best advantage by a central government to which the entire nation owes paramount allegiance, and that any delegation of that power to the States must obviously weaken the national military strength and correspondingly increase the national expenditures;

(2) the failure to realize that, in a military system which combines the use of regulars and volunteers or militia, men in the absence of compulsion or strong inducement will invariably enlist in the organization most lax in discipline;

(3) the enlisting of troops for too short periods of service;

(4) entirely too great dependence placed upon militia, instead of

(5) maintaining an adequate force of trained officers and soldiers; the substituting for the armies in the field, and the increasing of them by new and untrained organizations in place of keeping the former up to their full strength at all times;

(6) the pernicious use of bounties, both State and National -the logical result of short enlistments, the dearth of proper provisions for recruiting, and the failure to recruit "for the war" only;

(7) the depriving of organizations of their officers by de-
tailing them on detached duty, owing to the failure to
provide the requisite number of officers for staff duty,
recruiting, etc.;

(8) the neglect to make full use of drafting when all other
methods had failed to obtain the men needed;
(9) the enormously increased expense caused by the un-
necessarily large number of troops under pay, the wan-
ton waste resulting from lack of discipline and the
heavy losses from sickness which is inevitable among
raw troops;

(10) the needless protraction of the war owing to the inefficiency of the troops employed;

(11) the absolute lack of a definite military policy by Congress at any time during the war-the consequent inability of the commander-in-chief to formulate any sound plan of campaign and the necessity of resorting to inadequate and costly makeshifts;

(12) unnecessary increase in the pension list." 12