1847-1848]

with the loss suffered, 96 and Scott was obliged to transfer his operations to the western side of the city. On September 12th the formidable heights of Chapultepec were subjected to a vigorous bombardment and on the following morning they were stormed, but the Mexicans fought like fiends and it was not until noon that success crowned the American efforts 97 after heavy losses.98 The troops, now thoroughly aroused, determined to capture the city in spite of General Scott, who sought to restrain them,99 and by 2 P. M. General Quitman's division had effected a lodgment within the walls, hoisted the American colours over the national palace and sturdily held its ground until nightfall put an end to the fighting. On the morning of September 14th a deputation announced the evacuation of the city by Santa Anna and the American Army made its triumphal entry, but twenty-four hours of desperate house-to-house fighting were still necessary before General Scott was left in undisputed possession of the place. 100

The resourceful Santa Anna made determined efforts to cut the American line of communications with Vera Cruz and to arouse further resistance to the invaders, 101 but the re-enforcements sent to Scott,102 small and tardy as they were,103 rendered his attempts abortive. On February 2, 1848, was concluded the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,1o1 and on June 12th the last of the American troops evacuated the City of Mexico.105

The maximum number of Mexican troops was only about 46,000.107 The cost of the war to the United States

[1846-1848

amounted to $88,500,208.38,108 and up to June 30, 1914, no less than $48,693,102.18 had been paid in pensions on its account. 109

This war is principally notable for the marked change in the military policy as evinced by the abandonment of the militia as the "great bulwark of national defense" and the increased use of regulars and volunteers, especially the latter. 110 When it is remembered that the military organization and operations were conducted under laws almost identical with those prevailing in the War of 1812,111 it is the more surprising that such remarkable successes should have characterised the later war in contrast to the ignominious failures of the earlier struggle.112 The solution is to be found in the different quality of the troops as a whole, in the better discipline and training, and in the employment of a larger number of professional officers. Indeed General Scott himself attributed the shortness of the war to the last cause.

113

On the other hand, it must be distinctly borne in mind that the failure of Congress and the President to fix the term of enlistment "for the war" narrowly escaped being fatal to Scott's ultimate success, 114 and it involved the totally unnecessary death and wounding of nearly 2,000 men,115 for both of which the Government was alone to blame. Moreover, for lack of an organization which could be expanded at the beginning of war, General Taylor was forced to fight his first battles with only 2,300 regular troops, whereas under an expansive system he could have had 8,000. Scott's army at Vera Cruz could have been augmented to 15,000 and, had it not been for the expiring enlistments, he could have entered the enemy's capital immediately after the battle of Cerro Gordo.116 At no time did his maximum strength exceed 13,500 117 and, when he did actually fight his way into the city, his army was reduced to about 6,000 men.118 In view of his isolation in the midst of a hostile country, the slowness with which re-enforcements were sent him 119 was little short of criminal. Viewed from any angle, the success of the war

1846-1848]

was in nowise attributable to the legislative or executive wisdom of the Government, and what business man would venture to claim that the manager of a company or corporation could, or ought to, be retained, who was unable to keep more than 21,000 men at work at any given time in spite of his having over 91,000 at his disposal? Yet such was the way that our Government managed the Mexican War.120

CHAPTER VIII

MILITARY POLICY FROM THE MEXICAN WAR TO THE WAR OF THE REBELLION

THE

4

HE American troops had scarcely evacuated Mexico before Congress reduced the Regular Army from 30,890 to 10,317,1 thus removing virtually all influence which the war had exercised over the military establishment 2- just as was done after the Florida War - and leaving the organization both defective and unprovided for future emergencies.3 The last imperfection was remedied by the Act of June 17, 1850, in which the principle of expansion was wisely embodied. It was not until the trouble with the Indians became very grave in 1853 and 1854 that President Pierce availed himself of the power thus vested in him and, by augmenting the 123 companies west of the Mississippi to their full authorized strength, increased the Army to 13,821. However, as this feeble increment of 3,489 men was palpably insufficient to guard the vast extent of territory in which the Indian tribes were none too friendly, a further increase of two règiments of cavalry and two of infantry was made by the Act of March 3, 1855.5

In the six ensuing years the only military legislation meriting particular attention was the Act of April 7, 1858, which authorized the President to receive into the United States service a regiment of mounted Texas volunteers for the purpose of defending the frontier of that State, as well as to call out and accept volunteers to the extent of two regiments to be organized, if he saw fit, as mounted infantry and used to quell "disturbances in the Territory of Utah, for the protection of supply and emigrant trains, and the suppression of Indian hostilities on the frontier." Eighteen months were

1859-1861]

fixed as their term of service, and, reverting to the vicious principle enunciated in 1792,7 the men were required to furnish their own horses and equipment, at a compensation of forty cents per diem; and the officers to be appointed by their respective States and Territories, with the exception of the commissaries and quartermasters who were to be assigned from the Regular Army. As General Upton pertinently remarks: 8

"This effort to secure economy was undoubtedly a wise step in the right direction, but like so much of our hasty and illdigested military legislation it began at the wrong end. Had the President been allowed to call for the volunteers by companies, with authority to select the field officers, adjutants, and quartermasters from the Regular Army, not only the economy but the discipline and instruction of the regiments could have been controlled by trusted officers of the Government."

The military operations between 1848 and 1861 were confined to Indian wars and the Utah expedition which took place in 1858. The latter, although free from bloodshed, resulted in transferring almost all of the Army to stations west of the Mississippi.