9. Such an appeal has not the effect to revive the injunction, unless that is
so directed by the Chancellor. Ib.
201
10. The purchaser of trust property, at a sheriff's or coroner's sale, when it
is sold as the property of another, cannot be sued in equity on the mere
ground that the property is a trust estate. His title is adverse to that of
the trustee, and is not subject to investigation in a court of equity, unless
he claims under the trustee, or by collusion with him. Colburn, et al. v.
Broughton, et al.
351
11. The mere circumstance that a trust is created on certain property, does
not invest a Court of Chancery with jurisdiction to determine disputes a-
rising with regard to the title. Ib.
351
12. The death of the trustee is not a circumstance to confer jurisdiction, al-
though it might create such an equity as would warrant a bill to prevent a
sale, or removal of the trust estate, until the legal title could be ascertain-
ed by suit. Ib.
351
13. The Chancery Court may take jurisdiction after proceedings have been
commenced in the Orphans' Court, in a proper case, and having jurisdic-
tion for one purpose, retain it for all purposes, and make a final settlement.
Blakey, Am'r, et al. v. The Heirs of Blakey,
14. Where the assets are withheld by the administrator, claiming them as his
own, by a secret gift, the Chancellor may interpose, arrest further pro-
ceedings in the Orphans' Court, compel a discovery of the assets, and pro-
ceed to make final settlement and distribution. Ib.
15. Where the garnishee in an attachment suit was induced to file an answer
prepared by the plaintiff's attorney, under his assurance that she should
receive no injury, and be protected against certain notes outstanding in
the hands of a third person, not a party to the suit, and afterwards the mo-
ney due on those notes was collected from the surety of the garnishee,
who then sued and recovered from the garnishee, the amount so collected,
the plaintiff in the attachment suit is bound by the agreement of his attor-
ney, and will be restrained from enforcing his judgment. Hayes v. O'-
Connel,
16. The contingent interest of a party in slaves, if in danger of being lost,
&c., by their removal, &c., it seems may be protected in equity. James v.
Scott,
17. Mere inadequacy of price, or other inequality in the bargain, will not in-
duce a court of equity to avoid it, unless it be such as to shock the con
science, and amount in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud
Juzan, et al. v. Toulmin,
663
18. Semble; the staleness of the complainant's demand will sometimes induce
a court of equity to deny relief, although the statute of limitations may not
have completed a bar. Ib.
19. Although a contract is entered into under a mistake of law, or fact, yet if
it was made in good faith-each party possessing equal information, or
equal means of acquiring knowledge, neither having practised any unfair-
ness or deception towards the other, a court of equity will not grant re-
lief. Ib.
663
20. Semble, that Chancery will entertain a suit to adjust the pretensions, or
settle the priorities of conflicting claimants, where there is a cloud hang-
ing over the title to lands which would prevent them from selling for a fair
market value. Anderson, et al. v. Hooks, et al.
704
21. Where the vendor of lands, in answer to a bill by the vendee for a rescis-
sion, insists that the sale was fair and bona fide, and an offer made to him
to rescind would have been unavailing, the bill should not be dismissed be-
cause it is not proved, that an offer was in fact made, before it was
filed. Elliott, et al. v. Boaz,
772
See Contract, 10.
See Contribution, 2.
See Estates of Deceased Persons, 5.
See Execution, Writ of, 8.
See Fraud, 4, 6.
See Guardian and Ward, 3.
See Husband and Wife, 6, 7.
See Mortgagor and Mortgagee, 4.
See Practice in Chancery, 13, 14, 15, 22.
See Principal and Surety, 5.
See Vendor and Vendee, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17.
CLERK AND REGISTER OF COURT.
1. Where one who was Clerk of a County Court, and also guardian ad litem
to a minor, received payment, as clerk, of a judgment rendered in favor of
the minor, and gave his receipt as clerk, he cannot by an entry upon his
docket afterwards, change the character of the payment, so as to make it
appear he received it as guardian ad litem. Haynes v. Wheat & Fennell, 239
2. The receipt of a clerk, like that of any other person, is open to explana-
tion by extrinsic proof. Ib.
239
3. The clerk of a court in which a judgment has been rendered, has author-
ity to receive the amount in money, before or after an execution has is-
sued. Ib.
239
CLERK AND REGISTER OF COURT-CONTINUED.
4. Neither a clerk, or sheriff, has authority to receive any thing in payment.
of a judgment, or execution, but money, and a payment in any thing else,
would be no discharge of the defendant in execution, though the sheriff
would be precluded by his return from denying that he had received mo-
ney in its discharge. lb.
239
5. Although the sheriff, by a return of satisfaction, subjects himself to pay
the plaintiff in coin, he has the power to receive in discharge of the writ,
such bank notes as are then passing in the community current as money,
although they may not be convertible into specie at pleasure, at the nomi-
nal amount; and such a receipt, if bona fide, will discharge the defendant
in execution, and fix the liability of the sheriff and his sureties. Ib.
CONSIDERATION.
1. A note given by a purchaser of a subdivison of the public lands, as a com-
pensation to one who, previous to the purchase, had settled upon and im-
proved the same, is not supported by a consideration which will authorize
its recovery. Duncan, use, &c. v. Hall,
2. A reservation of the public lands, which is subject to forfeiture upon the
alienation of the reservee, and its voluntary abandonment, is nevertheless
a sufficient consideration for the contract by which the reservee agrees to
sell it, and receive slaves as an equivalent-the contract being bona fide on
both sides. And the vendor of the slaves cannot maintain an action to
recover them back. James v. Scott,
579
3. It is not necessary, in an action upon the indorsement of a bill single, for
the indorsee to prove the consideration which moved from him to the in-
dorser the statute makes the writing evidence of the debt or duty, and
requires the defendant to deny it by plea, supported by affidavit; and this,
although the paper indorsed was not negotiable at common law, and the
indorsement was made in another State. Miller & Cobb v. McIntyre, 638
See Usury, 1.
CONSTABLE AND HIS SURETIES.
1. A judgment cannot be obtained against the sureties of a constable, by
motion, for his default, after his death. In such a case, resort must be had
to the common law for redress. James v. Auld and Spear,
2. A constable's bond, taken in the penalty of $2,000, and not extorted co-
lore officii, is not void as a statute bond. Bagby v. Chandler & Chandler, 770
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. The city of Mobile, under the provisions of its charter, authorizing the
levy of a tax upon real and personal estate within the city, may lawfully as-
sess a steamboat plying on the waters of the Alabama river, although it is
registered and enrolled as a coasting vessel under the laws of the United
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTINUED.
States, if owned by citizens of the State resident in Mobile. Battle v. The
Corporation of Mobile,
234
2. And the city has the same power if the owner of the boat is a citizen of
another State, yet resident here during the business season, although the
boat may be assessed, and taxes paid in the State of which the owner is a
citizen. Ib.
234
3. The act of January, 1842, entitled an act to prevent the sacrifice of real
estate, is not unconstitutional with respect to creditors then in existence,
whether creditors at large, or having obtained judgment liens. And one
judgment creditor may redeem from another the lands of their common
debtor, purchased by the latter at an execution sale, although the purchas-
ing creditor was a creditor at the passage of the act. Iverson v. Shorter,713
CONTRACT.
1. Two writings, connected by a reference of one to the other, or simulta-
neously made in respect to the same subject matter, and proved to be parts
of an entire transaction, may be considered and construed as constituting
but a single contract, in the same manner as if embodied in one instru-
ment. Sewall v. Henry,
24
2. P agreed with H, to purchase a slave of him, at the price of $600, in Al-
abama bank notes, and paid one hundred down, the slave remaining in the
possession of H. P afterwards tendered the amount in Georgia bank notes
which H declined to receive, but told P to take the money and exchange
it for Alabama bank notes, and if he could not do so, he would pay back
the money. P afterwards sued the representative of H, for the $100. Held,
that this was, in effect, an unconditional rescission of the contract, and the
failure of P afterwards to tender the Alabama notes, and demand the slave,
a proof of his inability to make the exchange. Mobley, Ex'r, v. Pickett, 97
3. An overseer, by his contract, impliedly stipulates that he is qualified to
execute the trust reposed in him, and that he will diligently superintend
the business of his employer, take care of the property confided to his
care, and treat the slaves in his charge with humanity. Roberts v. Brown-
rigg,
106
4. When an overseer enters upon the discharge of his duty, and continues
until he is dismissed by his employer, in an action for his year's wages, he
need not prove that he performed his services faithfully, as a presumption
arises that such is the fact, from his being permitted to remain on the plan-
tation, and it then devolves on the employer, to establish a sufficient cause
for dismissing him. Ib.
107
5. When an act is done, or omitted, which would justify the employer in
dismissing the overseer, he must act promptly, as he will not be justified in
afterwards dismissing him for that cause. Ib.
6. P purchased some slaves of H, for $1400, upon which A and B had mort-
gages, the latter being the eldest, paid down $1000, and executed his note
for $400, H agreeing to satisfy both mortgages. At the time of the sale,
the slaves were in the possession of A, to whom H delivered the note of
$400, and obtained possession of the slaves, which he delivered cver to P.
H did not satisfy the mortgage of B, and P was compelled to pay upon it
a larger sum than the amount of the note. Suit being brought on the note
in the name of H, for the use of A against P-Held, that if P was privy to,
and assented to the agreement between H and A, by which the former ob-
tained possession of the slaves from A, he could not defend himself against
the payment of the note, by proving that he had been compelled to pay a
larger sum for H, but in the absence of such proof, A must be understood
as having delivered up the slaves, on the responsibility of H, and had
therefore no greater rights than H would have, if suing for his own benefit.
Pippin v. Huntington,
228
7. Where one had the pre-emption right to enter certain land, which anoth-
er agreed to advance the money and enter, provided the entry was made
in his own name, and that upon being repaid the purchase money, he
would convey the land-Held, that this contract, if in writing, and signed
by the party to be charged, could be enforced after a payment of the pur-
chase money, either in equity, for a specific performance, or by action at
law, to recover damages for its breach. Kizer v. Lock,
269
8. Where one party stipulates with another to pay him fifty dollars per month
for four months, for his services as clerk in a store, and then refuses to al-
low the services to be performed, without a sufficient cause, the party en-
gaged as a clerk, may immediately commence an action against his em-
ployer, and recover, not only the damages sustained by the breach of con-
tract at the time suit was brought, but such as may be developed up to
the trial. And although the declaration alledges that the four months
had expired, without making any reference to the time when it was filed,
or the issuing of the writ, it cannot prejudice the finding of the jury, where
the proof is ample to show a good cause of action, as stated by the plain-
tiff. Davis v. Ayres,
292
9. A contract may be rescinded in part, and stand as to the residue, by the
consent of the parties to it. Borum v. Garland and Borum,
452
10. A contract made by a man of fair understanding, would not be set aside
merely because it was a rash, improvident or hard bargain; yet if made
with a person of imbecile mind, the inference is, that it was obtained by
circumvention or undue influence, so as to throw upon the other party the
onus of showing its fairness. Juzan, et al. v. Toulmin,
662
11. A resolution by the Directors of a Rail Road Company, that the stock-
holders might relinquish one half of their stock, and the payments previ-
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