Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub
[blocks in formation]

that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know," given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.

No suggestion is made that it is criminal in Alaska to sit at a table where cards are being played or to join in such game unless played for something of value. The relevant statutory provision is § 2032, Compiled Laws of Alaska, 1913, copied in the margin.1

The court below evidently thought neither witness had reasonable cause to apprehend danger to himself from a direct answer to any question propounded and, in the circumstances disclosed, we cannot say he reached an erroneous conclusion.

Separate errors are also assigned to the trial court's action in permitting counsel to introduce two documents in evidence; but we think the points are without substantial merit.

The judgment under review is

Affirmed.

1 "Sec. 2032. That each and every person who shall deal, play, or carry on, open or cause to be opened, or who shall conduct, either as owner, proprietor or employee, whether for hire or not, any game of faro, monte, roulette, rouge-et-noir, lansquenet, rondo, vingt-un, twenty-one, poker, draw poker, brag, bluff, thaw, craps, or any banking or other game played with cards, dice, or any other device, whether the same shall be played for money, checks, credit, or any other representative of value, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail until such fine and costs are paid: Provided, That such person so convicted shall be imprisoned one day for every two dollars of such fine and costs: And provided further, That such imprisonment shall not exceed one year."

[blocks in formation]

ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. McKNIGHT ET AL., RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 183. Argued May 2, 1917.-Decided June 4, 1917.

Where a carrier, by reason of temporary and permanent injunctions against state officials and shippers and travellers as a class, collects rates in excess of those fixed by law, the right of a person, who did not appear, to sue for the excess paid by him during the restraint revives when the final decree is reversed by this court and its mandate is issued to dismiss the bill.

Viewed from the standpoint of equitable jurisdiction, a class bill to restrain all such persons from suing to recover their overpayments is not maintainable as a bill to prevent multiplicity of suits, in the absence of any controverted question of fact or law common to their claims. In a suit to test the validity of rates fixed by the State of Arkansas, the District Court, by injunction pendente lite and later by final decree, enjoined the enforcement of the rates, and prohibited shippers and travellers generally from suing the carrier for its failure to keep them in effect. The decree having been reversed by this court and mandate issued with directions to dismiss the bill, Allen v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 553, Held, that thereafter the District Court was without power to inquire into and assess the damages sustained by shippers or travellers by reason of the temporary and permanent injunctions, for the purpose of fixing liability on the temporary injunction bonds, at least as to persons who did not elect to appear and make claim; and that, therefore, a reference to that end could afford no basis for an ancillary suit to enjoin such persons from suing in the state court (after the dismissal of the original bill) to recover excess rates collected by the carrier under the temporary and permanent injunctions.

Rule 15 of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, quoted in a footnote to the opinion, infra, 373, relates merely to damages recoverable on bonds accompanying restraining orders or temporary injunctions.

[blocks in formation]

Damages arising from the restraints of a permanent injunction, afterwards reversed, are not recoverable on temporary injunction bonds (Houghton v. Meyer, 208 U. S. 149), particularly where the decree of permanent injunction expressly released further liability on the bonds.

220 Fed. Rep. 876, affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. John M. Moore, with whom Mr. Edw. J. White was on the briefs, for appellant.

Mr. Allyn Smith for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court.

On July 18, 1908, the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company filed in the Western Division of the Circuit (now District) Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas a bill, against the Railroad Commissioners of that State to enjoin the enforcement of intrastate freight and passenger rates promulgated by them. Two private citizens, Leigh and McLean, who were alleged to be shippers and travellers on the railroad, were joined as defendants; and the bill prayed that they "and all other persons belonging to the same class, including all patrons" of the railroad, be enjoined from instituting any suits for penalties or double damages under the Arkansas statutes. On September 3, 1908, a temporary restraining order was granted which, besides enjoining the Railroad Commissioners from enforcing rates promulgated by them, ordered that the two private citizens "and all other persons and each of them from and after the time that they shall have knowledge of this order be enjoined from at any time instituting any such suit or action for or on account of any failure of the complainant to keep

Opinion of the Court.

244 U. S.

in effect and observe said inhibited rates or for the recovery of damages by reason of such failure, during the time this order shall continue in effect."

The Railway Company then executed, as ordered, a bond with surety to the United States in the penal sum of $200,000 "conditioned that the said complainant shall keep a correct account, showing, as respects every carriage of passengers or freight, the difference between the tariff actually charged and that which would have been charged had the rate inhibited hereby been applied, showing the particular carriage in question and the stations between which the same occurred, and the name of the person affected as far as may be practicable, which record shall be made and kept subject to the further order of this Court, and further conditioned that if it should eventually be decided that so much of this order as inhibits the enforcement of the existing rates should not have been made, that said complainant, shall, within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the Court, refund in every instance to the party entitled thereto, the excess in charge over what would have been charged had the inhibited rates been applied, together with lawful interest and damages."

On June 23, 1909, an order was made for an additional bond without surety in the sum of $800,000, which provided, among other things, for giving to each passenger or shipper a receipt which would show the amount payable under the enjoined rates.1

1 The condition prescribed was: "that it shall, on and after July 1st, 1909, issue to each person purchasing a ticket or paying cash fare upon the train from one point in the State of Arkansas to another point in the same State, and confined exclusively to intrastate travel, a certificate or coupon showing the amount paid by such passenger for such ticket and the date thereof; and to every shipper or consignee when paying freight on any commodity shipped from one part of the State of Arkansas to another part and which is wholly the subject of intrastate traffic, a receipt or freight bill, showing the amount charged for

[blocks in formation]

On May 11, 1911, a final decree was entered for the Railway Company making permanent the injunction in the terms of the restraining order, and further ordering "that the bond for injunction filed by the complainant here be released and the sureties thereon discharged from liability." The decree was reversed by this court with directions to dismiss the bill without prejudice (Allen v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 553); and upon filing of the mandate in the District Court on July 18, 1913, this was done. But in the decree of dismissal the court "of its own motion, and against the objection of the complainant, refers, under rule 15 of this Court, the matter of damages alleged to have been sustained by the defendants, the Railroad Commission of the State of Arkansas, by reason of the granting of the temporary and permanent injunctions herein, to Jeremiah G. Wallace, Esq., who is hereby appointed a Special Master for the purpose of determining the damages sustained. That in determining these damages, for the recovery of which the said Commissioners are not acting for themselves but for the benefit of all persons, shippers, consignees and passengers, who have sustained any damages by reason of the granting of said injunctions, the Master is hereby authorized, for the purpose of ascertaining these facts, to examine witnesses, administer oaths, and call upon the plaintiff herein for any books or papers, or transcripts thereof, which, in his opinion, are necessary for the purpose of enabling him to determine any facts in issue in connection with any claim filed with him.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

"And the Master is further directed to give notice by publication to the effect that all persons having any claims against the complainant by reason of the the carriage of such freight, and also endorse on the same bill the amount or rate which would have been charged had the inhibited rate continued in force; which receipt or coupon or freight bill shall be prima facie evidence of the amount paid and the date of payment."

« PředchozíPokračovat »