November session preceding, the court had delivered its opinion adverse to the claim of the petitioner, and had continued the case until the fourth Monday of December, in order that the witness, who was leading counsel, should be present when the record was made up, and the final decree regularly entered, on the fourth Monday of December. The final decree was accordingly entered ; an appeal prayed and granted; an appeal bond approved, and the case then removed from Judge Peck's jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court of the United States, where it now is under consideration. The witness heard no more of Judge Peck's proceedings or opinions in the matter, until the 8th March, 1826; when the witness, for the first time, saw in the Missouri Republican, a newspaper printed at St. Louis, an article headed "Peck Judge," purporting to be an Opinion of the Court, or argument of Judge Peck, in support and justification of the final decree, pronounced by him, as before stated, and entered on the record against the petitioners in the case of James G. Soulard and others vs. the United States. On reading the argument or Opinion, the witness thought that he discovered in it several erroneous positions, in fact and in doctrine, which were calculated to produce an injurious effect on public opinion, not only as respected the claim in question, but all the other claims depending or founded on incomplete French or Spanish titles. The witness found that this Opinion had produced a great sensation amongst those of his clients and others interested in the unconfirmed land claims, and had much diminished their hope of having them confirmed. The Opinion seemed calculated to effect a depreciation of the value of unconfirmed land, and to expose the proprietors of those claims to the danger of becoming the prey of speculators, who might then avail themselves of their alarm. The witness, too, when he examined the argument, found, that in the very outset of it, the Judge by no means advanced his propositions with confidence, but, on the contrary, treated the subject under discussion as new to him-full of doubt and difficulty, and as a labyrinth through which he wandered without a light or a clue to guide him: that on the conclusion of the Opinion the Judge seemed to invite further discussion. The witness, considering all this-and further, believing that not only in his character of counsel, but also in that of a private citizen, he had an undoubted right to point out, through the medium of a public journal, the errors which he saw, or believed that he saw, in the argument of Judge Peck, took up his pen and wrote the article signed "A Citizen," which was, at his request, published in the St. Louis Enquirer, of the 8th of April, 1826.

Some days after the article signed "A Citizen was published, Judge Peck held a court under the Act of 1824. The witness appeared in his place as counsel at the sitting of the court. The Judge, soon after the court was opened, pulled a newspaper out of his pocket, and with some emotion, as it appeared to the witness, stated that it was the Missouri Advocate and St. Louis Enquirerand, addressing himself either to the District Attorney, or generally to the persons present, (the witness was not certain to which,) demanded if anybody could inform him who was the editor of that paper? The witness supposed, from Judge Peck's manner, that the article signed "A Citizen," in that paper, was the object he had in view, and therefore, wishing to facilitate as much as possible any proceeding with reference to it, he stated that he knew who was the editor that one Stephen W. Foreman, to the best of his belief, edited the Missouri Advocate and St. Louis Enquirer. Judge Peck then proposed that the witness should make an affidavit of the fact, which he accordingly did, and the Judge thereupon instantly dictated to his clerk a rule on Foreman, to show cause, on the next morning, why he should not be attached for publishing the article signed "A Citizen."

The order was served on Foreman, who appeared on the next morning before Judge Peck, attended by the witness as his counsel. The witness, as author of the article, felt it his duty to act voluntarily as counsel for the editor, whom he strenuously urged to avail himself of the occasion to vindicate the liberty of the

press, and rather to submit to any punishment that Judge Peck should inflict upon him, than surrender his right to what the witness deemed the exercise of usurped power.

The witness defended the editor on all the grounds, and by all the arguments and authorities, that suggested themselves. He contended that the article signed "A Citizen was true intrinsically and in substance-was decorous and respectful in form, and indicated no intention whatever, such as the rule attributed to it. The witness also declared that no contempt was ever intended to be committed by it. In demonstrating the truth of the article, the witness compared it with the Opinion published in the Republican; and, so far as the humble abilities of the witness enabled him, vindicated the article on the same grounds (with one or two obvious exceptions) taken by the honorable manager who opened the impeachment. The witness then contended that, admitting the article to be as charged in the rule, a false statement tending to bring odium on the court -admitting it to be a malicious libel from beginning to end-the court had no jurisdiction of it as a contempt; that it was punishable only as an ordinary offence, for which the editor should be indicted and tried by a jury of his fellow citizens. The witness sustained these positions by all the arguments and authorities that occurred to him, and was followed by Mr. Geyer, who also volunteered his services in favor of the editor. After the witness had concluded his argument, he retired from the court; and when he returned he found Judge Peck about to make the rule absolute against the editor. The witness then assented to the editor's naming to the court the author of the article, which was done by the editor, who, after answering certain interrogatories put to him by Judge Peck, was discharged. The witness was induced to assent to his being delivered up as the author by the consideration that Judge Peck manifestly pointed to the witness, during his defence of the editor, as the author of the article, and seemed to address to him as author, and not as counsel, the acrimonious and impassioned observations which he thought proper from time to time to make use of. The witness also was of opinion that not only the liberty of the press, but divers other rights not much less precious and important, would be violated by this judicial proceeding, directed against the witness; and therefore the more willingly presented himself to perform what he deemed a sacred duty to himself and his fellow citizens.

The rule against the editor having been discharged, a rule was then made upon the witness, ordering him to show cause, forthwith, why an attachment should not issue against him for the false and malicious statements contained in the article, and also why he should not be suspended from practice in Judge Peck's court, as an attorney and counsellor therein. For the terms and tone of this rule, the witness begged leave to refer the court to the rule itself, as already given in evidence. On this rule the witness appeared by his counsel, who, proceeding to defend him upon the truth and intrinsic merits of the article, was stopped by Judge Peck, who intimated that no argument or observation would be permitted by him on that part of the subject, inasmuch as he, Judge Peck, on the arguments of the rule against the editor, had already decided that the article was untrue and malicious. The counsel for the witness then argued against the rule on the following legal grounds, to wit :-First, that supposing the article false and malicious, and everything that it was by the rule described to be in a moral point of view, it was not legally a contempt of court, to be punished by the summary exercise of Judge Peck's judicial power; but was, at most, a libel, to be prosecuted and punished in the ordinary way. 2d. That, supposing the article to be a contempt, the Judge had no right or legal authority to punish the witness by suspending him from his practice and function as attorney and counsellor of his court. Those grounds of defence were argued elaborately, and sustained by all the reason and authorities which suggested themselves to witness's counsel-they were, however, urged in vain. Judge Peck overruled them all, and made the rule for the attachment absolute against

the witness. On making the rule absolute, Judge Peck thought proper to enter into an examination or argument on the merits of the article, and for that purpose had it read to him paragraph by paragraph, and commented at large on each of them. In the course of his remarks, Judge Peck, in an impassioned tone, and with much vehemence of manner, indulged in the use of various epithets which the witness understood as directed against him personally, and which he felt to be insulting and offensive to him as a man and a gentleman. The witness listened for about half an hour to this harangue, which seemed to increase in virulence as it proceeded. At length, fearing that he might, if he remained any longer under the excitement of Judge Peck's language, be betrayed into some expression or even gesture, that might be seized upon as a new pretext for punishing him for contempt, the witness rose and left the court. Before he did so, he asked a gentleman of the bar, who was seated on his right, (Henry S. Geyer) whether he considered the act of the witness in leaving the court while the Judge was so speaking, could be deemed contemptuous or improper; to which Mr. Geyer replied that he saw nothing improper in his leaving the court under such circumstances, and that he did not think that he was under any obligation to remain there to hear himself abused.

From Judge Peck's court the witness went to the Circuit Court of the county of St. Louis, which was then in session, and before which a cause was on trial of considerable importance, (some twenty negro slaves depending on the final decision of it,) and in which the witness was leading counsel for the defendant, Mr. Peter Chouteau, sen. of St. Louis.

The witness remained in the Circuit Court for about two hours, and until he was notified by the Marshal that an attachment had been issued against him by Judge Peck, and that his presence was forthwith required in the District Court of the United States.

The witness, on presenting himself to Judge Peck, was informed that as he was now in custody under the attachment, he, the witness, had a right to require that interrogatories should be put to him for the purpose, as witness understood, of enabling him, the witness, to purge himself of a contempt. To which intimation the witness replied that he did not require any interrogatories to be propounded to him, and that if they were so propounded, he would not answer them. The Judge then dictated an order for the commitment of the witness to prison for the space of twenty four hours, and that he should be suspended from practising as an attorney or counsellor at law in his court for eighteen calendar months from that day. The witness, for the precise terms of this, as well as all the other rules and orders made by Judge Peck, begged leave to refer the court to the rules themselves, as given in evidence. A copy of the order of commitment having been handed to the Marshal, the witness was forthwith conducted to the common jail of the county of St. Louis, and there locked up in a grated and empty room, in which felons and malefactors are frequently incarcerated. Two gentlemen of St. Louis, actuated by a friendly feeling, accompanied the witness to the jail, and were locked up along with him. The witness after some time requested the deputy jailer to show him the order of commitment, and having examined it, determined on addressing himself to the Circuit Court of the county of St. Louis, then in session, for a writ of habeas corpus. The witness accordingly forthwith prepared a petition, and had it presented to the Judge, who granted the writ, requiring the sheriff and jailer of the county to bring the witness before him with the cause of his detention. The witness was accordingly brought before the Circuit Court about three or four hours after he was committed, and was, after a short discussion on the character of the committal and the cause of detention, discharged by the Judge from further confinement, on the ground that the paper purporting to be a commitment was not authenticated. The witness then returned to his family, and did not afterwards hear from Judge Peck on the subject.

The witness here declared that he had detailed all that he recollected touch

ing the conduct of Judge Peck towards him, and which seemed to relate to the charge before the court.

The examination of the witness was then taken up for some time longer by Mr. Buchanan, with the view of further elucidating parts of the foregoing evidence; this done, Mr. Meredith, on the part of Judge Peck, commenced the cross-examination.

[N. B. During the first day, the reporter of this trial (not having then the purpose of preparing a report of it for publication,) took no notes of the proceedings; and the above is supplied from a sketch in the National Journal, which, it is believed, was revised by Mr. Lawless, and which that gentleman assured the reporter might be relied upon as correct.]

The Court then adjourned to 12 o'clock to-morrow.

HIGH COURT OF IMPEACHMENT.

THE UNITED STATES vs. JAMES H. PECK.

Thursday, Dec. 23, 1830.

The managers, accompanied by the House of Representatives, attended.
The cross-examination of LUKE E. LAWLESS was resumed.

Question by Mr. Meredith. In your answers, yesterday, you stated to the court that you assented to your name's being given up, by Mr. Foreman the printer, as the author of the publication signed "A Citizen" in the Missouri Republican Was this done at your own suggestion, or at the request of the editor?

A. I think it was done at my suggestion. I am not quite certain. I certainly assented to its being done.

Q. Do you recollect having advised Mr. Foreman to submit to.the sentence of the court;-to bear the brunt of the proceeding;-to go to jail, even, should that be necessary; and engaging that, if any fine were imposed upon him, you would pay it?

A. I do not recollect promising that I would pay the fine, should any be incurred but I think I did advise him to abide the consequences;-to "bear the brunt," as you say.

Q. Do you not recollect representing to Mr. Foreman, that this was a case which afforded a favorable opportunity to him to increase his own popularity, as well as the circulation of his paper, by presenting himself to the public as the victim of persecution and oppression?

A. I may have represented to the editor that his taking a stand, on such an occasion, was calculated to recommend him to the favor of his fellow citi

zens.

Q. What was Mr. Foreman's reply?

A. I do not recollect, precisely. I remember that he appeared to be vacillating but he assented to my view of the matter generally.

Q. Do you recollect having requested a friend to call upon the printer, and urge him not to give you up as the author of the piece?

A. I do not recollect. It may be that I did.

Q. Do you remember that Mr. Foreman replied to such representations of your friend, that "he was not inclined to suffer martyrdom on your ac

count?"

A. He made no such reply, to my knowledge.

Q. Will you state to the court what was the motive which afterwards induced you to change your determination; and to consent that be given up?

your name should

A. As I stated, on my examination yesterday, my motives were, 1st, that Judge Peck, in the course of his argument on the alleged contempt, seemed, all along, to point to me as the author of the offensive publication; and it is

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very possible that, in the warmth of argument, I might, though unwittingly, have spoken of myself as the author: 2dly, that in my person would be violated, not merely the liberty of the press, but many other rights, equally precious. Q. To what other rights do you allude?

A. To the liberty of speech; to my privileges as counsel; and to my rights as a private citizen; as also to the rights of all those on whose behalf I had been employed as counsel.

Q. Were not the rights of Mr. Foreman likely to be as deeply affected as yours, by any sentence of the Judge ?

A. That is a matter of opinion, and I decline answering the question.

[Mr. Spencer, on behalf of the managers of the impeachment, objected to having this question put. Mr. Wirt waived discussion, and the question was withdrawn.]

Q. You stated, yesterday, that after the argument on the rule of court against Foreman, the court overruled both your arguments and your authorities. Pray what were the authorities you produced on that occasion?

A. Without referring to my brief, I cannot, on oath, state the authorities. I must decline answering the question, until I have my brief to refer to. I cannot draw on my memory for these details.

Q. You have, I suppose, to draw on your memory for all your testimony. Were any books produced by you?

f. I am not certain. Authorities, I am sure, were cited.

Q. Do you mean that they were cited from a brief?

A. Yes. I am not certain whether I read any authorities before the court, but I cited a number.

Q. Were you present in court when Mr. Foreman was discharged from the rule against him?

A. I was not. I was not there when interrogatories were propounded to

him.

Q. You do not know on what terms he was discharged?

A. Not of my own knowledge. I heard something of it.

Q. You said, I think, that in the course of your argument on the rule against Was this the printer, you disclaimed all intention of disrespect to the court. on the part of Foreman, as his counsel, or on the part of the author of the piece signed "A Citizen "?

A. On the part of Foreman, as his counsel; and also, on that of the author. I argued, from the face of the article, that no disrespect could have been intended by the author of it, and I made the disclaimer, indirectly, with reference to myself.

Q. I understand you, then, to say, that you made a personal disclaimer of disrespect to the court in that publication?

A. I made it on the part of the printer, and of the author; and, as I said before, it is possible that, in the warmth of argument, I may unwittingly have spoken of myself in the character of the author;-knowing as I did, that I was the author of the publication; and with that feeling, I did, on the part of myself, disclaim all intention of disrespect to the court. The Judge, throughout, pointed to me, as if I were the author.

Q. Do you now speak from distinct recollection; or is this an inference from the circumstances?

A. I speak from distinct recollection.

Q. You say, then, that you recollect, distinctly, that on the argument of the rule against the printer, you acknowledged yourself to be the author of the publication called "A Citizen "?

A. I acknowledged no such thing. I may, under the feelings of the moment, have unwittingly spoken as if I had been the author, and in this manner have spoken of the absence of any disrespect on my own part; but I never ex