after a recovery in ejectment, and before the action for mesne profits, the defendant became a bankrupt, and on judgment by default in the latter action, the jury omitted to include the taxed costs of the ejectment in the damages, the court refused to set aside the inquisition. (a) The declaration, as in the usual form of trespass quare clausum Declaration. fregit, must state the premises into which the defendant entered, and unless they are described with sufficient particularity, the defendant, if he has other lands in the same parish, may plead liberum tenementum. The declaration should also state the day on which the defendant broke and entered the close, and the length of time during which he continued in possession, but the omission of these matters is cured after judgment by default, by statute 4 Anne, c. 16. (b) fence. The general issue in this action is not guilty: and if the plain- Plea and detiff seeks to recover the mesne profits for a longer period than six years, the defendant may plead the statute of limitations. (c) The bankruptcy of the defendant cannot be pleaded in this action, the demand being for unliquidated damages (d), nor is a plea of a discharge under the insolvent act (53 Geo. 3, c. 102,) a bar. (e) Under not guilty it is no defence that the plaintiff accepted the rent of the premises for the time in dispute, and agreed to waive the costs of the ejectment, for such defence is in substance that a part of the damages had been accepted in satisfaction of the whole, whereas the plea is, that no trespass has been committed. (ƒ) Unless the defendant is estopped by the record in the action of ejectment, he may controvert the plaintiff's title. (g) The defendant cannot pay money into court in this action. (h) The judgment in ejectment is sufficient proof of title for the plaintiff in this action, whether it be brought by the lessor of the plaintiff, or by the nominal plaintiff, against all who are par (a) Gulliver v. Drinkwater, 2 T. R. 261. (b) Higgins v. Highfield, 13 East, 407. (c) Bull. N. P. 88. (d) Goodtitle v. North, Dougl. 584. (h) Holdfast v. Morris, 2 Wils. 115. Evidence. ties to such judgment (a), but such judgment is only evidence of title from the time of the demise laid in the declaration in ejectment, and therefore if the plaintiff seeks to recover damages anterior to that time, it will be necessary for him to give further evidence of his title. (b) The judgment is not evidence against a stranger, and therefore it has been held that a judgment in ejectment against the wife cannot be given in evidence against the husband in an action for mesne profits. (c) And where after a judgment by default against the casual ejector, an action of trespass was brought for the mesne profits against the landlord, who had been in the receipt of the rents and profits from the day of the demise, Lord Ellenborough ruled that the judgment in ejectment was not evidence of title against the defendant without notice of the ejectment; but that a subsequent promise by him to pay the rent and costs amounted to an admission that he was a trespasser, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession.(d) So where the action is brouhgt against a former occupier, the judgment in ejectment will be no evidence of the plaintiff's title. (e) The judgment in an action of ejectment, on the several demises of two or more persons, is evidence for them in an action of trespass brought by them jointly. (ƒ) As the plaintiff's title to recover the mesne profits depends upon his re-entry into the premises, which has the effect of vesting the possession in him by relation for the whole period, during which he has been out of possession, it is incumbent upon him to give evidence of such re-entry. Where the action is brought against a person who was a party to the ejectment, and entered into the consent rule, proof of the judgment in ejectment is said to be sufficient, without proving the writ of possession executed, because by entering into the rule to confess, the defendant is estopped, both as to the lessor and the lessee, so that either may maintain trespass without proving an actual entry (g); but where the judgment in ejectment is against the casual ejector, and so no rule has been entered into, the lessor cannot maintain trespass without an actual entry, and therefore ought to prove the writ of possession executed (a), which is usually done by producing an examined copy of the writ, and of the sheriff's return. (b) The plaintiff may also prove a re-entry by other means than by shewing the writ of possession executed, thus it is sufficient, if he proves that he has been let into possession with the consent of the defendant. (c) The plaintiff must be prepared to prove the amount of his damages, by showing how long the defendant has been in possession of the premises, the value of the mesne profits (d), and the costs in the ejectment, if they are to be recovered in this action. If the plaintiff recovers less than forty shillings damages, and the judge does not certify that the freehold came in question, the plaintiff is entitled to no more costs than damages. (e) (a) Ibid. and the cases cited, 2 Selw. N. P. 722, 4th edit. (b) 2 Phill. Evid. 262, 6th edit. C. 167. (d) Bull. N. P. 87. Damages. Costs. THE END. ADDENDA. P. 62. Since the foregoing sheets were printed, the doctrine of disseisin at election has come incidentally into discussion, and the principles laid down by Lord Mansfield, in the case of Doe d. Atkins v. Horde, have been recognised by the court of King's Bench. (See Doe d. Maddock v. Lynes, 3 B. and C. 388.) Holroyd, J. observing, that the nature of a feoffment and disseisin was materially altered since the time of Littleton. P. 109, note (m).-As to prohibition of waste, and in what cases it will lie to restrain a bishop from committing waste in the possessions of his see, vide Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham, 1 Bos. and Pul. 105. P. 179.-Where a judge made an order to amend a writ of right to enable the demandant, instead of demanding freehold lands, to allege, that he was seised at the will of the lord, the court discharged the order. Tooth v. Boddington, 1 Bing. 208. P. 256. See stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 23, 24. P. 296, note (h) add the following references: Com. Dig. Evid. (A. 5). 1 Phill. Evid. 308. 6th edit. But see Gilb. Evid. 35, 4th edit. Bull. N. P. 232. 1 Stark. Evid. 192. P. 446.-By statute 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 75, it is enacted, "that any bankrupt entitled to any lease, or agreement for a lease, if the assignees accept the same, shall not be liable to pay any rent accruing after the date of the commission, or to be sued in respect of any subsequent non-observance, or non-performance of the conditions, covenants, or agreements therein contained, and if the assignees decline the same, shall not be liable as afore |