The earl of Lucan seconded the motion, and said that the very able manner in which the duke had expatiated upon it, would more powerfully impress the propriety of adopting it than any thing which he could urge. Earl Fitzwilliam lamented that the course of events had made so momentous a change in the aspect of Europe: he lamented that he could not join in a unanimous vote of thanks on the union of Ireland; a subject on which his sentiments were sufficiently known: but, as the measure was past, he would suppress them now, and sincerely wished that the very sanguine expectations of the duke might be accomplished. But he could not withhold his astonishment, that on a crisis so awful, when we were about to be plunged in a new war, our ministers, instead of giving information to the house, had called upon them for additional confidence and additional supplies. It was the duty of that house to pause, and to inquire why we were to go to war, before it pledged itself to support the measure. An investigation ought to be made into the causes of this dangerous and calamitous predicament. He had urged the house, perhaps more than any other individual in it, to the maintenance of the principles upon which the war against the French revolution had been founded; he had deeply felt the consequences of that spirit which had broken out in France, and the destruction to which it led; no one had gone further than himself in opposing the anarchy and confusion of the new doctrines; the nations of Europe had seen the policy of reinstating the ancient family of their kings in France; but he must confess his hopes were now disappointed, and the cause was a lost one. The anarchy however had in a great degree subsided; France was con verted into a monarchy under republican forms, and under a new ruler: it did not depend on the opinion of an individual, and he feared it no longer depended on the power of the nation, to withstand the establishment of the new order of things: the die was cast. But it was not consistent with the duty which that house owed to its king and country to omit an investigation into the causes of our failure, when such large and unlimited powers had been entrusted to ministers, when all Europe was in friendship with them, and united in one common interest. Surely it was a matter of importance to inquire by what means, instead of accomplishing this great object, they had plunged us into a contest with our own allies. The war, as far as Sweden and Denmark were concerned, was intirely of our own seeking; we had it in our power to suspend the discussion of the neutral code, and by entering into a subject leading to litigation we had consolidated the powers of Sweden and Denmark with that of Russia. Nothing could be more distinct than the aggression of Paul and the northern confederacy, and it would have been political to have kept them so. If it was unjust in the emperor to detain our ships and property, it was equally unjust in us to seize and detain the ships and property of Sweden and Denmark. It had not been deemed necessary to go to war with them for the neutral code in the year 1780, and we had suffered nothing from our moderation. It surely then was incumbent on the house to examine the conduct of ministers, and to ascertain precisely in what manner they had used the extraordinary powers powers with which they had been entrusted before they obtained more. The encroachments made on the property and freedom of the subject had been unexan.pled-yet what had been achieved by it? Every expedition they had undertaken had been attended with discomfiture; that to Holland had been marked by imbecility in the contrivance as well as criminal delay in the execution. If it had been asked where 50,000 men could be placed most for the advantage of the enemy, it would have been answered, Send them to Holland, and instead of attacking France in her own territory (which she dreads) place them in an unhealthy climate, at a season unfavourable to military operations. Just so had they acted, and yet the same persons called for confidence. It was melancholy to reflect that our brave troops were now sent on an expedition which might have been unnecessary, if a treaty most wisely concluded had been honourably fulfilled. After declaring that to men so unfit for their situations his lordship could not give his support, he moved the following amendment: "That the house should proceed with all possible dispatch to make such inquiries into the state of the nation, into the conduct of the war, and into our relations with foreign powers, as shall enable them to offer to his majesty such advice as may be conducive to the honour of his crown and the general interests of his people. "And, if, owing to any unreasonable pretensions of the enemy, peace cannot be obtained with security; if the representations made to the court of Petersburg, of the outrages committed against our ships and property, have not re ceived reparation; and if the dissensions which have unhappily arisen between his majesty and the northern powers are of a nature to require immediate decision, and the impossibility of equitable adjustment renders new wars inevi table, they then would give his majesty every support which the means of the country could afford, in the confidence that his paternal care for the welfare of his people would induce him to take such measures as should prevent henceforward a calamitous waste of the remaining strength and resources, either by ineffectual projects or g neral profusion, and ensure a vigorous administration under the unexampled difficulties in which we were involved." The earl of Suffolk, after seconding the amendment, desired to know of the secretary of state why the papers of the return of killed and wounded in the expedition to Holland had not been produced, agree. ably to the order of the house two months ago. Lord Grenville complained of the irregular conduct of the noble earl, in having put any question personally to him, and observed this unparliamentary proceeding had not been uncommon lately; whereas it was quite contrary to order to address an individual peer and call for an answer peremptorily. In the present case, it had no reference to the subject before the house; and if it had, the returns did not fall within his department. Any order made in a former parliament, now no longer existing, could have no efficacy, unless revived by a new motion for an address to his majesty. The earl of Suffolk said, a gross inattention had been shewn, and he was intitled to demand of the ministers ministers the reason. The London Gazette had stated, that between 12 and 13,000 British and Russians had been actually killed and wounded in Holland, instead of 800 men mentioned by Mr. Dundas. As this matter remained without explanation, random censures might be cast on military officers, and even the illustrious chief might fall under slanderous insinuations. His lordship took a view of all our late expeditions, and arraigned them severally, as deficient in wisdom, vigour, and promp titude; by which the courage of our troops had been wasted, and our arms disgraced. He accused administration of artfully resolving not to employ lord Moira, for the same reason that Thugut had not employed the archduke Charles, because they were afraid his eminent talents should have given peace to the nation. There were other important points on which it was a duty to impeach ministers; as, where the army was cooped up in transports, no man knew where; the sending 30,000 men to Egypt and else where, and leaving this country without adequate defence; the refusal to negotiate, and the unfortunate letter of a noble secretary, which would have disgraced a school-boy. The violation of the treaty for the evacuation of Egypt was also one strong ground of impeachment; and our series of military expeditions was another. The duke of Athol supported the original motion, aud doubted not it would produce the benefits so well illustrated. He objected to the amendment, because it tended to repress the energies and enervate the strength of the nation, at a moment when unanimity was absolutely necessary. . Lord Romney was of opinion that administration deserved all the assistance it required. The court of Denmark had very lately attempted to treat us in the same manner as the other northern courts had treated us. Respecting Sweden there was a distinction in certain. particulars; but when three powers united in a negotiation evidently hostile to British interests, we must consider them as embarked in the same cause. Since he had last spoken on the subject, he had carefully read over the papers between the secretary of state and M. Otto, and he thought they did great credit to ministers. To him it appeared that Bonaparte was not sincere in his offers, and that our ministers had acted wisely and vigorously in the course they had taken. We ought to maintain an independence; and our maritime power depended on the principle which the northern confederacy threatened to overturn. Lord Clifton (earl of Darnley) rose to remind their lordships that he had in the last parliament expressed his dissatisfaction at the conduct of the war; he should, therefore, on that ground support the amendment. The war, in its origin, he had considered as just and necessary; but this was no reason for continuing a blind confidence, which had been, in more instances than one, disappointed. Yet, critical as was the moment, he did not despair of the ability of the country. He was convinced it was still able to resist the world in arms; but to give full effect to its energies, an inquiry into some recent transactions was necessary. The ministers had obtained a confidence, on the part of 'parliament and the people, unex ampled ampled in history; and how had they used it? Were we to look for their justification towards Holland and Ferrol? at their conduct in the treaty of El-Arish? or at their treatment of our allies, and the neutral powers? Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos, was the maxim of the Romans; our ministers had inverted it : Parcere superbis, debellare subjectos, had been theirs. Russia, in the first instance, had been permitted to insult us with impunity; but when a weaker power advanced a pretension, an ambassador had been sent to negotiate at the cannon's mouth; and yet the negotiation terminated without any adjustment of the point in question. Ministers asserted that the Northern confederacy was established on the basis of the neutral treaty of 1780. This, however, did not appear to be the fact, from count Bernstorf's official note to our ambassador: and they themselves did not think so, otherwise they could not, without betraying the greatest pusillanimity, avoid declaring war against the king of Prussia, who was a party in that treaty, and had acceded to the negotiation entered into by the Northern powers against us. Earl Spencer strenuously contended, that an inquiry, during the present war, would infallibly cripple our exertions and impede our success; not that he meant to imply any doubt but that, whenever an inquiry should be made, it would redound to the honour of the ministers, as well as of the troops and officers employed. But this was not a period for investigation, but action. As to the new contest, it was not possible to avoid it; and we retained strength and ability enough to conduct it to a happy issue. The earl of Carnarvon said, that the present discussion had unfolded sentiments which ought not to be passed over in silence, tenets the most unconstitutional and dangerous at all times, but in this critical juncture destructive even of hope. When the speech from the throne announces the desertion of friends and allies, and their sudden change into enemies, was it our duty to hear it with ignorant astonishment, to exhaust ourselves in terms of rash indignation, and prepare for blind vengeance? At this moment he did not consider that the house was called upon to pledge their confidence to ministers, or precipitately to declare them to be unworthy of it; but surely it was not a just statement of parliamentary duty to represent these things as not affording ground for inquiry; and, above all, to represent inquiry under these circumstances as dangerous. Were we to be informed, that under the administration of the same men, the nation might fall from the highest situation in which we stood last year, to the lowest state of despondency under which we now met; and yet owed nothing but astonishment and regret to our country, and an unlimited con fidence in the ministers? That at their desire we were to plunge into a war with our old friends and allies, without even examining the cause, or its justice? We had lately seen our nation in amity with them all, successfully pursuing one common object against one common enemy, with the prospect of an honourable peace almost at our command; and now, we are just informed, we were placed at the eve of an alarming war war with all the world, without one ally, without the most distant hope of peace, and with only the assurances of government on which to deliver up the remaining resources of an exhausted country! He meant not to impute blame to ministers, but to promote inquiry: possibly all our surrounding calamities might have been inevitable; and this inquiry might lead us to expect, from the wisdom of administration, a termination of our evils and surely this converted a strict examination into a peremptory duty. A series of disastrous events was little calculated to inspire confidence in the abilities of ministers; and if we were precluded from all sources of information, the view of our public situation, and this sudden reverse of our prosperous estate, must necessarily excite mistrust and dissatisfaction. It had been rumoured that the claims of the Russians, Swedes, and Danes, as neutral nations, were so unreasonable, so obviously grounded in the hostile design to destroy the naval importance of this country, that it required no investigation to prove it. His lordship acknowledged he had great doubts upon this head. The little regular information laid before the house; public rumours, newspapers and private conversation, were all the materials which could be obtained; and these inclined him to think, that our quarrel was not so indubitably just as to preclude the necessity of inquiry before we plunged into a war. If it were true, that we had by treaty, for certain commercial advantages, relinquished to one nation the right of searching the ships of such contracting nations during our warfare with France, and thereby authorised such nations to supply France without our interruption with warlike ammunition, this exception by treaty destroyed our right to search the ships of that nation, or of any nation included in a treaty of the same kind; and the refusal of Russia to permit her ships to be searched for contraband goods in times of war was justified by it. Lord Grenville expressed his astonishment that it should be asserted the house was not fully apprised of the grounds of the quarrel, though it was so unequivocally known that an embargo had been laid upon our vessels in Russia in direct violation of her treaty with us. The house, however, was not called upon for its opinion, but support. In 1780, Sweden and Denmark had insisted on principles contrary, in some respects, to the law of nations, and in others to the express letter of our treaties. These pretensions had never been acknowledged by England, as was falsely affirmed; on the contrary, we returned an answer, that the different states engaged in the treaty of 1780 were bound by their prior treaties with us to a different line of conduct; nor could they have the power of altering them without the consent of England. With regard to a convention made with a sovereign state, agreeing to depart from the right of nations in certain specified particulars in its favour for a limited time, this was an exception to the general rule, and tended to prove those rights rather than deny their existence. His lordship reprobated the idea of free ships from neutral states supplying military stores to our enemy. He contended that, for ages past, the belligerent powers were intitled to seize them; and this doctrine was established immemorially by the practice |