consistency and concert; the subscribers, that is, all the powers of Europe,entered into the armed confederacy, officially announced its principles, and claimed the rights enumerated in that famous document, as agreeable to the law and practice of nations. Let then the question be examined with attention and impartiality; and if we can discern a leading principle, whereby the claims may be tried and ascertained, such a principle will be found to be that of justice.

As the conduct of states to each other ought to be guided by it, it follows that whatever advantages might accrue to this country by contention ought to be given up if their claims were not just : any temporary acknowledgment of them, dictated by superior force, could never compensate the hatred of other states, the evil of rendering their animosity inveterate, and sowing the seeds of future confederacies, whenever the embarrassments of this country presented the prospect of establishing a disputed claim. Our naval ascendency indeed ought to be carefully preserved, as the source of our glory, and the bulwark of our safety; but he should be sorry that the maintenance of this distinction depended on any claim inconsistent with the interest of other independent nations

or that, to preserve the interests of the British nation, we should abandon the maxims of justice, in which alone true greatness and permanent security consisted.

If it were necessary to prove the claim was just, it was no less ne'cessary to prove it valuable: here he reminded the house of a saying of one of its distinguished member" As you ought not to go to war for a profitable wrong, so

neither ought you to go to war for. an unprofitable right," The maritime superiority of Great Britain was of inestimable value, but was this. claim (so odious to our neighbours) essential to its existence? This ought clearly to be demonstrated before we engaged in an universal war for its defence, and purchased it at the price of blood. But admitting the claim was just and beneficial, circumstances might require a relaxation in the rigour of its exercise: a right in itself valuable might not be equally important at every. period; there might be times when the infringement of it would be productive of no inconvenience, and the assertion be attended with imminent danger: in being exercised with moderation in certain circumstances, the right was secured and confirmed; in being pushed to extremity it might become so grievous as to be shaken off for ever. Suppose, even, that at the present moment our admission of the claims of the northern powers had enabled them to supply France with articles for her fleets, what evils could have resulted from it? France, destitute of seamen, of ships, of every thing constituting a navy, what advantage could she have obtained from the supply of a few naval stores? What importance would have been a numerical addition to her marine, without the nerves and sinews of naval greatness? In 1780, by the principle of the armed neutrality, the right of entering places blockaded is distinctly abandoned, and what is understood as a placeblockaded clearly explained. At the present moment-thanks to the ability with which the blockade of the enemies' ports is conducted by the skill of our naval commanders-the enemy could derive little benefit from an extension

of

of the privileges of neutrals. But granting that all these facilities were permitted to France, could she, without seamen, without skill, and without discipline, establish formidable navies? But what might be the consequence of carrying the dispute with the northern powers to extremities? Should we not, in a moment, double her marine, and supply her with experienced sailors? Would not the hostile navies of Europe (to use,a military phrase) out-flank us on every side, from Archangel to the Tagus? By our driving those powers to make one common cause with France, she would acquire new means of annoying us, and not only increase her opportunities of attack by dividing our means of resistance, but, by pursuing these unconciliatory measures, we should not be able to retain a single port in Europe. Naples even now could not be considered as open to us; Turkey and Portugal, by the growing prepon-, derance of our foes, could not be expected long to be in our favour; and if we talk of the vigilance necessary to guard against the shattered navy of France, how much must our difficulties be increased when we raise up so many enemies against us!

It had been said that our superior navy would destroy the trade of the enemy; but was not trade essential also to England? Commerce was the basis on which our own revenue, strength, and national greatness, were founded; and if this was impeded in every quarter, if every market was shut against us, and whilst successful in destroying the trade of our opponents we destroyed that of our own country, our destruction as a nation was inevitable: nor was it merely in the privation of a market for our com

modities that we should suffer-not only the valuable sources of our splendor and security would be cut off, but the supply of our naval stores; nor could we depend on other countries to furnish them.

But admitting the truth of all this, our honour, we were told, was attacked, and must be vindicated, whatever it might cost. It then comes to be considered whether the dispute might have been avoided by our ministers, or had it been provoked by their misconduct? The suspicion was not without probability:inviolation of the laws of nations, they had attempted to compel the neutrals to declare against France; witness their behaviour to Genoa and the grand duke of Tuscany : the northern powers had been provoked by our vexatious proceedings against them: instead of counte nancing any undue violence or grievous irregularity, the greatest care should have been taken to prevent any abuse, without conceding the right. Instructions to our cruisers on the subject of neatrals would have obviated many complaints. It is evident our naval officers did not conceive themselves entitled to seize and detain neutral vessels under convoy, as appeared from commodore Langford requiring new instructions before he brought in the Swedish convoy. This moderating policy, which secured by tempering the exercise of those rights, was that which the carl of Chatham adopted in that glorious war which he conducted against France: a testimony of high authority in favour of that administration is left on record; it is that of lord Camden, who states, that. the policy of the earl of Chatham in regard to neutrals was to act with caution and good temper, to prevent the enemy from obtaining

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supplies

supplies of naval and military stores, but at the same time to attend to the complaints of neutrals, and give them speedy redress.

Still it might be objected that now theirpretensions appeared in a different view, and that it was impossible ministers should be blind to the northern confederacy: the question however recurs, Was this convention essentially hostile to us? All that we knew at present was, that the late treaty was founded on the armed neutrality of 1780: in consequence of the accession of Sweden and Denmark to that treaty, not only had an embargo been laid on their vessels, but orders had been issued and carried into effect to seize on the open seas the vessels of those powers thus we had committed acts of hostility against them.

The ground of quarrel with Russia was different, consequently no inference could be drawn that the northern powers were actuated by hostile views; nay, the signature of conventions with belligerents, when for other purposes than those for which war is carried on, it is acknowledged affords no just cause for war. The administration of lord North, though in other respects unpopular, was never accused of pusillanimity or bad policy, because the discussion of these claims for which we contend was evaded.

If ministers knew that the confederacy was to be apprehended, why had they refused Bonaparte's overtures? If they did not know, what title had they to confidence? Had there been no symptoms of discontent in the north? Had not the Swedish convoy been seized, and complaints been made? Had not.the Swedish government condemned the officer to death for not making resistance? Every thing therefore had indicated an accumulating pressure in the

prosecution of the war, at the mo ment when ministers were employing all sorts of arts and intrigues to effect its continuance.

But to proceed on the point of national honour-It must be vindicated, we were told, against the attacks of Denmark and Sweden; and why not against those of Prussia? ince Prussia was indisputably a partner in what was termed hostilities? The reason was, because one was strong, and the other weak; Prussia possessed means of retaliation, Denmark and Sweden did not. Behold how sacred was the honour of the nation, when such was the magnanimous conduct of high-spirited ministers!

But what was our situation now, compared to what it was when offers formerly were made? We had refused to treat when supported by Austria, when she was not unexhausted, and when the new government of France was struggling under financial difficulties and the discouragement of an unsuccessful campaign, when it was desirous of establishing its reputation either by peace or victory; and now that she was recovered in her armies, recruited in her finances, and strengthened by her alliances, ministers avowed that they were ready to treat whenever the enemyevinced a favourable disposition. Of the internal situation of the country, Mr. Greybrieflyobserved, that thepower of France and her confederates being at this period so formidable, new measures of internal defence would be requisite. Four years ago, on the alarm of hostile attack, a military force was raised for the public defence. Where was it now? It had been dissipated and destroyed in the disgraceful expeditions in which ministers had embarked; part had been wasted in the fatal

descent

descent upon Holland, part mouldered away in the holds of transports; and the rest, after being driven about from Portsmouth to Belleisle, from Belleisle to Ferrol, and from Ferrol to Cadiz, last of all had perished in the burning sands of Egypt. When we considered in what manner our means had hitherto been squandered, what hope of success could be entertained by arming ministers with any fresh forces? Mr. Grey concluded with remarking, that this real view of things was calculated not to discourage, but to rouse: much might be done under a better system of policy; our resources, though diminished, were still great, and, with economy and uprightness opposed to profusion and corruption, might be employed with effect to any purpose of national defence or national enterprise. He ended with moving an amendment similar to that in the lords.

Mr. Pitt, who still acted as chancellor of the exchequer, said, the honourable gentleman had fallen into the same error which constituted the great fallacy of the arguments for the northern powers; namely, that every exception from the general law, by a particular treaty, proved the law to be as it was stated in that treaty: whereas, the very circumstance of making an exception proved what the law would be, if no such treaty was made to alter it. With every one of the three northern powers in dispute, independent of the law of nations, of our uniform practice, and of the opinion of courts, we had the strict letter of engagements by which they were bound to us; and their present conduct was as much a violation of positive treaties with England as of these laws, In the convention signed

between Great Britain and Russia, the latter bound herself, in the commencement of the war, not merely to observe this principle, but to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the seas, or in the ports of France. Denmark and Sweden had distinctly expressed their readiness to agree in that very point which they now were disposed to contend: in the last autumn, Denmark, with her fleets and arsenals at our mercy, entered into a solemn pledge not again to send vessels with convoy until the principle was settled; notwithstanding which, she had engaged in a new convention to maintain stipulations by force of arms: was this war, or was it not? But it was objected, that as we did not know the precise terms of the present treaty, we ought to take no steps till we were fully apprised of them. It is true, we did not know the precise terms; but if, on demanding to know whether they had made engagements hostile to our interests, they told us that they had, without specifying what exceptions had been made in our favour, we were not bound to give them credit for these, or wait to defend ourselves till we were absolutely attacked. Ought we to give them time to assemble their forces, and thus empower them to produce a substitute for the fallen army in France? The question then was, were we to permit the navy of our enemy to be supplied and recruited; to suffer blockaded forts to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions; and permit neutral nations, by hoisting a flag on a fishing-boat, to convey the treasures of America to the harbours of Spain, and the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest and Toulon? If the

commerce of France had not been destroyed, if the fraudulent system of neutrals had not been prevented, her navy would have been now in a very different situation.

If we had no other guide but the experience of the present war, it was sufficient to prove not only the use, but the necessity, of maintaining a principle so important to the power, nay, to the existence of this country.

Inquiries into the conduct of administration would soon, he heard, be made, and we should then have an opportunity of ample discussion: none of them touched the point before the house; the amendment, as it 'stood, would only be embarrassed by reference to these topics, which are calculated to obstruct the proceedings on which our safety depended. The dispute between us and the confederated powers was of such importance as to claim the undivided attention of the house.

Dr. Lawrence thought the point was not so much, whether the practice of belligerent powers to search neutral vessels was founded in right, as whether it was consistent with sound policy to insist upon the right at this period: he professed himself decidedly against ministers on this occasion, and therefore voted for the amendment. If it appeared necessary, after investigation, to act hostilely against the northern powers, administration would then carry with them the support of the country; if the chancellor of the exchequer discarded this line of policy, and pursued the ruinous system on which he had so long acted, he would fatally evince, that eloquence and wisdom were not always united, and that a state was on the decline when the former arrived to its greatest height. It was the interest

of the military, despot who now wielded the power of France to conciliate the northern allies; he had been distorting his navigation laws to their accommodation, and had succeeded in obtaining their friendship. Should this confederacy be driven by our ministers to unite with him, how dangerous must Bonaparte become to England!

He conjured the house well to consider whether war might be avoided before they recommended it; to abandon their right, at least to relinquish it in this critical moment, and not cut with the sword the knot which united us to other states. Forbearance had been the policy of the magnanimous Elizabeth, who claimed and exercised this right: the matter could be best adjusted by negotiation; force could never satisfactorily decide it: the northern powers had denied that there was any thing in the convention recently signed at Pętersburg contrary to existing treaties with England. We complained of the arrest of our vessels by Russia, and committed an act as violent and unjustifiable towards Sweden and Denmark.. The claim of the northern powers (which was exemption of convoys from search) was just; as vessels of the state, they were protected from examination; no precedent, political, historical, or judicial, had ever sanctioned it: but were it otherwise, would it be prudent, in our existing situation, when France had absorbed all the smaller states, to drive Denmark and Sweden into her arms, by urging these pretensions, and when they were not disposed to go to war with us? What could we gain by it? Some petty islands in the West-Indies, or manufactorics in the East,

scarce