The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational ContractingFree Press, 1987 - Počet stran: 450 This sequel to Markets and Hierarchies develops and extends Williamson's innovative use of transaction cost economics as an approach to studying economic organization by applying it to work and labour as well as to the corporation itself. In addition, Williamson explores its growing implications for public policy, including its potential influence on antitrust and merger guidelines, labour policy, and SEC and public utility regulations. |
Obsah
PROLOGUE | 1 |
Efficient Governance | 2 |
Uncertainty | 3 |
Autorská práva | |
Další části 72 nejsou zobrazeny.
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting Oliver E. Williamson Zobrazení fragmentů - 1985 |
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting Oliver E. Williamson Zobrazení fragmentů - 1985 |
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