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[Lyon et al. v. Dees.]

to eliminate from the account all usurious interest charged and collected. The register held a reference, stated the account, and reported that the debt secured by the mortgages of 1878 had been overpaid by $366.31, and that upon the mortgage of 1882, which included the amount loaned to secure which the judgment was assigned, there was a balance due J. M. Lyon of $9.53. We think there is an error in the statement of the latter account, and upon a proper statement it will be seen that this debt, also, has been overpaid. On this latter statement the register found that on November 1, 1882, there was a balance due J. M. Lyon of $186.40. The interest should have been calculated on this amount to June 15, 1885, to which should have been added court costs paid, $65.41, with interest thereon to June 15, 1885. These sums, with interest included, amount to the sum of $292.27 due J. M. Lyon on the 15th of June, 1885. This amount should be credited of that date with $240, the purchase. price of 160 acres of land sold that day, and which are not sought to be redeemed, and also with $22.30, received from sale of personal property sold January 15, 1885. Adding these together, we have $262.30, to be credited upon the balance, $292.27, due J. M. Lyon, and we have a balance due Lyon June 15th, 1885, of $29.97. Add to this the interest to October 15th, 1885, and there was due Lyon on that day $30.76. On the 18th of October Lyon collected the alternate value of a horse, $40, and damages for detention, $17.50, which overpaid him about $27. As the error was in favor of appellant, it can not avail him on appeal. There were many exceptions reserved to the finding of the register based principally on the testimony of J. M. Lyon. His evidence was in conflict with the testimony introduced by the complainant. We agree with the chancellor that the weight of the evidence sustains the conclusions of the register and the exceptions were properly overruled.

It is contended by appellant that he should not be charged with $240, the purchase price of the 160 acres of land knocked down to one Seale as the purchaser. This contention is based upon two grounds; first, that J. M. Lyon, the mortgagee, never executed a valid deed to Seale; and, second, that Seale has never paid the purchase money, or any part of it. On this question the answer of respondents avers that "Exhibit D is a sub

[Lyon et al v. Dees.]

stantial copy of the deed executed by said Lyon to said Seale that day." A deed "executed" is one signed, sealed and delivered. Exhibit "D" as an instrument of conveyance is defective, but there is no doubt it was intended to operate as a deed. This is apparent from the instrument itself, and from the affidavit of Lyon, filed and recorded with the instrument. There is no doubt that the lands were advertised and sold under the mortgage, and bid off by Seale at the price of $240, on the 15th of June, 1885, and that Lyon as mortgagee was in possession of the same, and has remained in possession ever since. What arrangments, if any, were made between Lyon and Seale does not concern the complainant. He has ratified the sale and charged the mortgagee with the amount of the purchase price. So far as the complainant is concerned, the title to the lands have passed from him, and he is entitled to a credit on the mortgage debt for the amount of the purchase money.

We agree with the chancery court, in the conclusion that the conveyance by J. M. Lyon of the lands in controversy to his sister, Mary J. Lyon, was without consideration. The consideration expressed in the deed was three thousand dollars. The consideration attempted to be proven by respondents was barely admissible under the answer, but waiving that objection and examining it upon its own merits, it is wholly unsatisfactory. Although the consideration expressed in the deed is three thousand dollars, in response to the 6th paragraph of the bill, the answer admits that the propperty conveyed to Mary J. Lyon was worth $5,000. The bill charges that Mary J. Lyon was without means, paid no taxes and no property was ever assessed to her, and that she had lived with her brother for fifteen years, dependent on his bounty. The answer admits that she had lived with him a "series'' of years, and avers that she "claimed" property. There is no proof in the record that she owned any property or had any resources; and in order to show a consideration, J. M. Lyon goes back to the year 1871, fourteen years before the transaction between him and his sister, and testifies that he was indebted to her, on a settlement made with her on that day, in the sum of $1,284. He adds the interest on this amount for fourteen years or more so as to swell it to $2,722.08. This he says was the real consideration for

[Lyon et al v. Dees.]

the conveyance of land to her, which he admits in his answer was worth $5,000. He was "righteous over much." On the same day and at the same time of the execution of the deed to her, she executed back to him a power of attorney which absolutely empowers him to manage, control, sell and dispose of this property, as fully as if it was his own, ratifying all his acts in the premises. More might be stated, but enough has been said, to show that to sustain this transaction, human credulity must be subjected to a severer strain than justice to the rights of other persons will admit.

By the assignment of the judgment and the execution of the several mortgages, the debtor was completely in the power of his creditor. All the resources of the debtor were tied up, and his credit destroyed. The mortgagee used his power oppressively. A court of conscience will require the debtor to pay the last farthing he justly and legally owes. Having done this, it delights to loosen the iron grasp of the creditor and let the unfortunate debtor go free.

The answer of respondents avers a willingness, upon full payment, "to relinquish all claims to any and all property acquired by said J. M. Lyon from them or either of them," and to "surrender all of their claims to said lands." We are of opinion the chancery court has meted out exact justice and equity to the respondents, and its decree is in all respects affirmed.

VOL. 101

INDEX.

ABATEMENT.

1. Description of land in conveyance; no abatement of purchase price
when void for uncertainty.-Where a part of the land in a deed
of conveyance is described as "a portion of the northwest
quarter of the northwest quarter and a part of the southwest
quarter of the northwest quarter of section 28, all in township
7, range 25." the deed is void as to such land, for uncertainty
and indefiniteness in the description; and an abatement of the
purchase price will not be allowed the purchaser for a defi-
ciency in the number of acres in said section 28, since both
parties must be presumed to have known that the deed con-
veyed no part of the lands lying in said section. Dykes v. Bot-
toms, 390.

2. Abatement of the purchase price of land. The defendant in an
action to enforce a vendor's lien is entitled to an abatement of
the purchase price as to a portion of the lands conveyed in a
deed that had not come into his possession, and to which the
vendor had no title at the time of his conveyance to the defend-

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1. Action on a note; proper parties plaintiff.-In an action on a prom-
issory note, when the plaintiffs are the parties to whom pay-
ment may be legally made, and who can legally discharge the
debtor or maker, suit is properly brought in their names, al-
though the money when collected may not be for their use
alone, but for the use of themselves and others, to whose use
they are legally required to apply it. Bibb v. Hall, 79.

". Action on replery bond; plaintiff estopped.-In an action on a re-
plevy bond, if it is shown that the plaintiff, with knowledge
thereof, received property in lieu of that for which he sued in
the detinue suit, and for which defendants gave the replevy
bond, and, after being informed of the substitution, retained
the substituted property, exercising acts of ownership over it,
he is estopped from claiming a forfeiture of the bond for the
non-delivery of the property originally sued for.
Heard v.
Hicks, 102.

3. Action of trover by landlord against tenant for wood cut from rented
premises. While an action of trespass for injuries to land by
the tenant can not be maintained by the landlord, so long as
the tenancy continues, and trover can not be maintained by the
owner of the land against one in adverse possession for the con-
version of timber severed from the freehold, a landlord can
maintain an action of trover against his tenant, pending the
tenancy, for wood wrongfully cut from the demised premises,
and converted by the tenant. Such action involves no inquiry
as to the title of the land from which the severance was made,
and no inquiry as to the possession of said land. Brooks v.
Rogers, 111.

4. Who may maintain action for statutory penalty for cutting trees.-The
right of action to recover the statutory penalty for cutting
trees, (Code, § 3296), is given not to the person in possession,
but to the owner of the land, whether he was in possession or

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