I have already taken notice of Clarke's defence of moral liberty in opposition to Leibnitz; but soon after this controversy was brought to a conclusion by the death of his antagonist, he had to resume the same argument, in reply to his countryman, Anthony Collins; who, following the footsteps of Hobbes, with logical talents not inferior to those of his master, and with a weight of personal character in his favor, to which his master had no pretensions,* gave to the cause which he so warmly espoused, a degree of credit among sober and serious inquirers, which it had never before possessed in England. I have reserved, therefore, for this place, the few general reflections which I have to offer on this endless subject of controversy. In stating these, I shall be the less anxious to condense my thoughts, as I do not mean to return to the discussion in the sequel of this historical sketch. Indeed, I do not know of any thing that has been advanced by later writers, in support of the scheme of necessity, of which the germ is not to be found in the inquiry of Collins.

In order to enter completely into the motives which induced Clarke to take so zealous and so prominent a part in the dispute about Free Will, it is necessary to look back to the system of Spinoza; an author, with whose peculiar opinions I have hitherto avoided to distract my readers' attention. At the time when he wrote, he does not appear to have made many proselytes; the extrava

cience of God. As to this theological difficulty, I have nothing to say at present. The only question which I consider as of any consequence, is the matter of fact; and, on this point, nothing can be more explicit and satisfactory than the words of Locke. In examining these, the attentive reader will be satisfied, that Locke's declaration is not (as Priestley asserts) in favor of the Liberty of Spontaneity, but in favor of the Liberty of Indifference, for, as to the former, there seems to be no difficulty in reconciling it with the prescience of God. "I own," says Mr. Locke, "freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, and though I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am free; yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth I most firmly assent to; and therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question; resolving all into this short conclusion, that, if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it."

In speaking disrespectfully of the personal character of Hobbes, I allude to the base servility of his political principles, and to the suppleness with which he adapted them to the opposite interests of the three successive governments under which has literary life was spent. To his private virtues the most honorable testimony his been borne, both by his friends and by his enemies.

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gant and alarming consequences in which his system terminated, serving with most persons as a sufficient antidote against it. Clarke was probably the first who perceived distinctly the logical accuracy of his reasoning; and that, if the principles were admitted, it was impossible to resist the conclusions deduced from them.* It seems to have been the object both of Leibnitz and of Collins, to obviate the force of this indirect argument against the scheme of necessity, by attempting to reconcile it with the moral agency of man; a task which, I think it must be allowed, was much less ably and plausibly executed by the former than by the latter. Convinced, on the other hand, that Spinoza had reasoned from his premises much more rigorously than either Collins or Leibnitz, Clarke bent the whole force of his mind to demonstrate that these premises were false; aud, at the same time, to put incautious reasoners on their guard against the seducing sophistry of his antagonists, by showing, that there was no medium between admitting the free-agency of man, and of acquiescing in all the monstrous absurdities which the creed of Spinoza involves.

Spinoza, it may be proper to mention, was an Amsterdam Jew of Portuguese extraction, who (with a view probably to gain a more favorable reception to his philosophical dogmas) withdrew himself from the sect in which he had been educated, and afterwards appears to have lived chiefly in the society of Christians; without,

* Dr. Reid's opinion on this point coincides exactly with that of Clarke. See his Essays on the Active Powers of Man, (p. 289, 4to. Edition,) where he pronounces the system of Spinoza to be "the genuine, and the most tenable system of necessity."

Born 1632, died 1677. It is observed by Bayle, that "although Spinoza was the first who reduced Atheism to a system, and formed it into a body of doctrine, connected according to the method of geometricians, yet, in other respects, his opinion is not new, the substance of it being the same with that of several other philosophers, both ancient and modern, European and Eastern." See his Dict. art. Spinoza, and the authorities in Note (A.)

It is asserted by a late German writer, that "Spinoza has been little heard of in England, and not at all in France, and that he has been zealously defended and attacked by Germans alone." The same writer informs us, that " the philosophy of Leibnitz has been little studied in France, and not at all in England." (Lectures on the History of Literature, by Fred. Schlegel. English trans. published at Edin. 1818. Vol. II. p. 243.)

Is it possible that an author who pronounces so dogmatically upon the philosophy of England, should never have heard the name of Dr. Clarke ?

The Synagogue were so indignant at his apostacy, that they pronounced against him their highest sentence of excommunication called Schammata. The form of

however, making any public profession of the Christian faith, or even submitting to the ceremony of baptism. In his philosophical creed, he at first embraced the system of Descartes, and began his literary career with a work entitled, Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophia, Pars Prima et Secunda, More Geometrico Demonstratæ, 1663. It was, however, in little else than his physical principles that he agreed with Descartes; for no two philosophers ever differed more widely in their metaphysical and theological tenets. Fontenelle characterizes his system as a "Cartesianism pushed to extravagance "(une Cartesianisme outrée ;) an expression which, although far from conveying a just or adequate idea of the whole spirit of his doctrines, applies very happily to his boldness and pertinacity in following out his avowed principles to the most paradoxical consequences which he conceived them to involve. The reputation of his writings, accordingly, has fallen entirely (excepting perhaps in Germany and in Holland) with the philosophy on which they were grafted; although some of the most obnoxious opinions contained in them are still, from time to time, obtruded on the world, under the disguise of a new form, and of a phraseology less revolting to modern taste.

same.

In no part of Spinoza's works has he avowed himself an atheist; but it will not be disputed, by those who comprehend the drift of his reasonings, that, in point of practical tendency, Atheism and Spinozism are one and the In this respect, we may apply to Spinoza (and I may add to Vanini also) what Cicero has said of Epicurus; Verbis reliquit Deos, re sustulit;—a remark which coincides exactly with an expression of Newton's in the Scholium at the end of the Principia: "DEUS sine dominio, providentiâ, et causis finalibus, nihil aliud est quam FATUM et NATURA." *

the sentence may be found in the Treatise of Selden, De Jure Naturæ et Gentium, Lib. IV. c. 7. It is a document of some curiosity, and will scarcely suffer by a comparison with the Popish form of excommunication recorded by Sterne. For some farther particulars with respect to Spinoza see Note (H h.)

*One of the most elaborate and acute refutations of Spinozism which has yet appeared is to be found in Bayle's Dictionary, where it is described as "the most moustrous scheme imaginable, and the most diametrically opposite to the clearest notions of the mind." The same author affirms, that "it has been fully overthrown even by the weakest of its adversaries."-"It does not, indeed, appear possible," as Mr. Mac

Among other doctrines of natural and revealed religion, which Spinoza affected to embrace, was that of the Divine Omnipresence; a doctrine which, combined with the Plenum of Descartes, led him, by a short and plausible process of reasoning, to the revival of the old theory which represented God as the soul of the world; or rather to that identification of God and of the material universe, which I take to be still more agreeable to the idea of Spinoza.* I am particularly anxious to direct the

Jaurin has observed, "to invent another system equally absurd: amounting (as it does in fact) to this proposition, that there is but one substance in the universe, endowed with infinite attributes (particularly infinite extension and cogitation,) which produces all other things necessarily as its own modifications, and which alone is, in all events, both physical and moral, at once cause and effect, agent and patient."- View of Newton's Discoveries, Book. I. Chap. 4.

Spinoza supposes that there are in God two eternal properties, thought and extension; and as he held, with Descartes, that extension is the essence of matter, he must necessarily have conceived materiality to be an essential attribute of God. "Per Corpus intelligo modum, qui Dei essentiam quatenus ut res extensa consideratur, certo et determinato modo exprimit." (Ethica ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. Fars 2. Defin. 1. See also Ethic. Pars 1. Prop. 14.) With respect to the other attributes of God, he held, that God is the cause of all things; but that he acts, not from choice, but from necessity; and, of consequence, that he is the involuntary author of all the good and evil, virtue and vice, which are exhibited in human life. "Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt.” (Ibid. Pars 1. Prop. 33.) In one of his letters to Mr. Oldenburgh (Letter 21), he acknowledges, that his ideas of God and of nature were very different from those entertained by modern Christians; adding by way of explanation, "Deum rerum omnium causam immanentem, non vero transeuntem statuo; "an expression to which I can annex no other meaning but this, that God is inseparably and essentially united with his works, and that they form together but one being.

The diversity of opinions entertained concerning the nature of Spinozism has been chiefly owing to this, that some have formed their notions of it from the books which Spinoza published during his life, and others from his posthumous remains. It is in the last alone (particularly in his Ethics) that his system is to be seen completely unveiled and undisguised. In the former, and also in the letters addressed to his friends, he occasionally accommodates himself, with a very temporiizng spirit, to what he considered as the prejudices of the world. In proof of this, see his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and his epistolary correspondence, passim; above all, his letter to a young friend who had apostatized from Protestantism to the Catholic Church. The letter is addressed, "Nobilissimo Juveni, Alberto Burgh." (Spin. op. T. II. p. 695.)

The edition of Spinoza's works, to which my references are made, is the complete and very accurate one published at Jena in 1802, by Henr. Eberh. Gottlob Paulus, who styles himself Doctor and Professor of Theology.

This learned divine is at no pains to conceal his admiration of the character as well as talents of his author; nor does he seem to have much to object to the system of Spinozism, as explained in his posthumous work upon Ethics; a work which, the editor admits, contains the only genuine exposition of Spinoza's creed. "Sedes systematis quod sibi condidit in ethicâ est." (Præf. Iterate Editionis, p. ix.) In what manner all this was reconciled in his theological lectures with the doctrines either of natural or of revealed religion, it is not very easy to imagine. Perhaps he only affords a new example of what Dr. Clarke long ago remarked, that " Believing too much and too little have commonly the luck to meet together, like two things moving contrary ways in the same circle." (Third Letter to Dodwell.)

A late German writer, who, in his own opinions, has certainly no leaning towards Spinozism, has yet spoken of the moral tendency of Spinoza's writings, in termus of the warmest praise. The morality of Spinoza," says M. Fred. Schlegel, "is

attention of my readers to this part of his system, as I conceive it to be at present very generally misrepresented, or, at least, very generally misunderstood; a thing

not indeed that of the Bible, for he himself was no Christian, but it is still a pure and noble morality, resembling that of the ancient Stoics, perhaps possessing considerable advantages over that system. That which makes him strong when opposed to adversaries, who do not understand or feel his depth, or who unconsciously have fallen into errors not much different from his, is not merely the scientific clearness and decision of his intellect, but, in a much higher degree, the open-heartedness, strong feeling, and conviction, with which all that he says seems to gush from his heart and soul." (Lect. of Fred. Schlegel, Eng. Trans. Vol. II. p. 244.) The rest of the pasage, which contains a sort of apology for the system of Spinoza, is still more curious.

Although it is with the metaphysical tenets of Spinoza alone that we are immediately concerned at present, it is not altogether foreign to my purpose to observe, that he had also speculated much about the principles of government; and that the coincidence of his opinions with those of Hobbes, on this last subject, was not less remarkable than the similarity of their views on the most important questions of metaphysics and ethics. Unconnected as these different branches of knowledge may at first appear, the theories of Spinoza and of Hobbes concerning all of them, formed parts of one and the same system; the whole terminating ultimately in the maxim with which (according to Plutarch) Anaxarchus consoled Alexander after the murder of Clytus: Πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος δίκαιον εἶναι. Even in discussing the question about Liberty and Necessity, Hobbes cannot help glancing at this political corollary. "The power of God alone is a sufficient justification of any action he doth."... "That which he doth is made just by his doing it."... "Power irresistible justifies all actions really and properly, in whomsoever it be found." (Of Liberty and Necessity, addressed to the Lord Marquis of Newcastle.) Spinoza has expressed himself exactly to the same purpose. (See his Tractatus Politicus, Cap. 2. §§ 3, 4.) So steadily, indeed, is this practical application of their abstract principles kept in view by both these writers, that not one generous feeling is ever suffered to escape the pen of either in favor of the rights, the liberties, or the improvement of their species.

The close affinity between those abstract theories which tend to degrade human nature, and that accommodating morality which prepares the minds of men for receiving passively the yoke of slavery, although too little attended to by the writers of literary history, has not been overlooked by those deeper politicians who are disposed (as has been alleged of the first of the Cæsars) to consider their fellow-creatures" but as rubbish in the way of their ambition, or tools to be employed in removing it." This practical tendency of the Epicurean philosophy is remarked by one of the wisest of the Roman statesmen: and we learn from the same high authority, how fashionable this philosophy was in the higher circles of his countrymen, at that disastrous period which immediately preceded the ruin of the Republic. Nunquam audivi in Epicuri scholâ, Lycurgum, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epaminondam nominari; qui in ore sunt cæterorum omnium philosophorum." (De Fin. Lib. ii. c. 21.) "Nec tamen Epicuri licet oblivisci, si cupiam; cujus imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares, sed etiam in poculis et annulis, habent." (Ibid. Lib. v. c. 1.)

The prevalence of Hobbism at the court of Charles II. (a fact acknowledged by Clarendon himself), is but one of the many instances which might be quoted from modern times in confirmation of these remarks.

The practical tendency of such doctrines as would pave the way to universal scepticism, by holding up to ridicule the extravagancies and inconsistencies of the learned, is precisely similar. We are told by Tacitus (Annal. Lib. 14,) that Nero was accustomed, at the close of a banquet, to summon a party of philosophers, that he might amuse himself with listening to the endless diversity and discordancy of their respective systems; nor were there wanting philosophers at Rome, the same historian adds, who were flattered to be thus exhibited as a spectacle at the table of the Emperor. What a deep and instructive moral is conveyed by this anecdote,