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profitable discussions about the nature of Mind, he decidedly states his conviction, that the faculties of Man differ not merely in degree, but in kind, from the instincts of the brutes. "I do not, therefore," he observes on one occasion, "approve of that confused and promiscuous method in which philosophers are accustomed to treat of pneumatology; as if the human Soul ranked above those of brutes, merely like the sun above the stars, or like gold above other metals."

Among the various topics started by Bacon for the consideration of future logicians, he did not overlook (what may be justly regarded in a practical view, as the most interesting of all logical problems) the question concerning the mutual influence of thought and of language on each other. "Men believe," says he, "that their reason governs their words; but, it often happens, that words have power enough to react upon reason." This aphorism may be considered as the text of by far the most valuable part of Locke's Essay,-that which relates to the imperfections and abuse of words; but it was not till within the last twenty years, that its depth and importance were perceived in all their extent. I need scarcely say, that I allude to the excellent memoirs of M. Prévost and of M. Dégérando, on "Signs considered in their connexion with the Intellectual Operations." The anticipations formed by Bacon, of that branch of modern logic which relates to Universal Grammar, do no less honor to his sagacity. "Grammar," he observes, "is of two kinds; the one literary, the other philosophical. The former has for its objects to trace the analogies running through the structure of a peculiar tongue so as to facilitate its acquisition to a foreigner, or to enable him to speak it with correctness and purity. The latter directs the attention, not to the analogies which words bear to words, but to the analogies which words bear to things;' or, as he afterwards explains himself more clearly, "to language considered as the sensible portraiture or image of the mental

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ratio intellectus; alius verò, volitio, sive operatio voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intelligere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipiendi; ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi." Princ. Phil. Pars I. § 32. De Aug. Scient. Lib. vi. cap. i.

processes." In farther illustration of these hints, he takes notice of the lights which the different geniuses of the different languages reflect on the characters and habits of those by whom they were respectively spoken. "Thus," says he, "it is easy to perceive, that the Greeks were addicted to the culture of the arts, the Romans engrossed with the conduct of affairs; inasmuch, as the technical distinctions introduced in the progress of refinement require the aid of compounded words; while the real business of life stands in no need of so artificial a phraseology." Ideas of this sort have, in the course of a very few years, already become common, and almost trivial; but how different was the case two centuries ago!

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With these sound and enlarged views concerning the Philosophy of the mind, it will not appear surprising to those who have attended to the slow and irregular advances of human reason, that Bacon should occasionally blend incidental remarks savouring of the habits of thinking prevalent in his time. A curious example of this occcurs in the same chapter which contains his excellent definition or description of universal grammar. "This too," he observes, "is worthy of notice, that the ancient languages were full of declensions, of cases, of conjugations, of tenses, and of other similar inflections; while the modern, almost entirely destitute of these, indolently accomplish the same purpose by the help of prepositions, and of auxiliary verbs.-Whence," he continues, "may be inferred (however we may flatter ourselves with the idea of our own superiority), that the human intellect was much more acute and subtile in ancient than it now is in modern times."+ How very unlike is this last reflection to the usual strain of Bacon's writings! It seems, indeed, much more congenial to the philosophy of Mr. Harris and of Lord Monboddo; and it has accordingly been sanctioned with the approbation of both these learned authors. If my memory does not deceive me, it is the only passage in Bacon's works, which Lord Monboddo has any where condescended to quote.

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These observations afford me a convenient opportunity for remarking the progress and diffusion of the philosophical spirit, since the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the short passage just cited from Bacon, there are involved no less than two capital errors, which are now almost universally ranked by men of education, among the grossest prejudices of the multitude. The one, that the declensions and conjugations of the ancient languages, and the modern substitution in their place, of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, are, both of them, the deliberate and systematical contrivances of speculative grammarians; the other (still less analogous to Bacon's general style of reasoning), that the faculties of man have declined as the world has grown older. Both of these errors may be now said to have disappeared entirely. The latter, more particularly, must, to the rising generation, seem so absurd, that it almost requires an apology to have mentioned it. That the capacities of the human mind have been in all ages the same; and that the diversity of phenomena exhibited by our species, is the result merely of the different circumstances in which men are placed, has been long received as an incontrovertible logical maxim; or rather, such is the influence of early instruction, that we are apt to regard it as one of the most obvious suggestions of common sense. And yet, till about the time of Montesquieu, it was by no means so generally recognised by the learned, as to have a sensible influence on the fashionable tone of thinking over Europe. The application of this fundamental and leading idea to the natural or theoretical history of society in all its various aspects to the history of languages, of the arts, of the sciences, of laws, of government, of manners, and of religion,-is the peculiar glory of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and forms a characteristical feature in its philosophy, which even the imagination of Bacon was unable to foresee.

It would be endless to particularize the original suggestions thrown out by Bacon on topics connected with the science of Mind. The few passages of this sort already quoted, are produced merely as a specimen of the rest. They are by no means selected as the most im

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portant in his writings; but, as they happened to be those which had left the strongest impression on my memory, I thought them as likely as any other, to invite the curiosity of my readers to a careful examination of the rich mine from which they are extracted.

The Ethical disquisitions of Bacon are almost entirely of a practical nature. Of the two theoretical questions, so much agitated, in both parts of this Island, during the eighteenth century, concerning the principle and the object of moral approbation, he has said nothing; but he has opened some new and interesting views with respect to the influence of custom and the formation of habits;a most important article of moral philosophy, on which he has enlarged more ably and more usefully than any writer since Aristotle.* Under the same head of Ethics may be mentioned the small volume to which he has given the title of Essays; the best known and the most popular of all his works. It is also one of those where the superiority of his genius appears to the greatest advantage; the novelty and depth of his reflections often receiving a strong relief from the triteness of his subject. It may be read from beginning to end in a few hours,— and yet, after the twentieth perusal, one seldom fails to remark in it something overlooked before. This, indeed, is a characteristic of all Bacon's writings, and is only to be accounted for by the inexhaustible aliment they furnish to our own thoughts, and the sympathetic activity they impart to our torpid faculties.

The suggestions of Bacon for the improvement of Political Philosphy, exhibit as strong a contrast to the narrow systems of contemporary statesmen, as the Inductive Logic to that of the Schools. How profound and comprehensive are the views opened in the following passages, when compared with the scope of the celebrated treatise De Jure Belli et Pacis; a work which was first published about a year before Bacon's death, and which continued, for a hundred and fifty years afterwards, to be regarded in all Protestant universities of Europe, as an inexhaustible treasure of moral and jurisprudential

wisdom!

* De Aug. Scient. Lib. vii. cap. 3.

"The ultimate object which legislators ought to have in view, and to which all their enactments and sanctions ought to be subservient, is, that the citizens may live happily. For this purpose, it is necessary that they should receive a religious and pious education; that they should be trained to good morals; that they should be secured from foreign enemies by proper military arrangements; that they should be guarded by an effectual police against seditious and private injuries; that they should be loyal to government, and obedient to magistrates; and finally, that they should abound in wealth, and in other national resources." * "The science of such matters certainly belongs more particularly to the province of men who, by habits of public business, have been led to take a comprehensive survey of the social order; of the interests of the community at large; of the rules of natural equity; of the manners of nations; of the different forms of government; and who are thus prepared to reason concerning the wisdom of laws, both from considerations of justice and of policy. The great desideratum, accordingly, is, by investigating the principles of natural justice, and those of political expediency, to exhibit a theoretical model of legislation, which, while it serves as a standard for estimating the comparative excellence of municipal codes, may suggest hints for their correction and improvement, to such as have at heart the welfare of mankind." †

How precise the notion was that Bacon had formed of a philosophical system of jurisprudence (with which, as a standard, the municipal laws of different nations might be compared), appears from a remarkable expression, in which he mentions it as the proper business of those who might attempt to carry his plan into execution, to investigate those "LEGES LEGUM, ex quibus informatio

* Exemplum Tractatûs de Fontibus Juris, Aphor. 5. This enumeration of the different objects of law approaches very nearly to Mr Smith's ideas on the same subject, as expressed by himself in the concluding sentence of his Theory of Moral Sentiments. "In another Discourse, I shall endeavour to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society; not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law."

De Aug. Scient. Lib. viii. cap. 3.

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