THE ROOT OF THE WORLD WAR.

Address by Dr. Paul Rohrbach to the Protestant Union of Hamburg. The present war has three roots. The one we can despatch quickly, that is the French. For more than forty years France has expressed the desire to renew the combat with us. The national Chauvinism has driven her to war. That is truly very foolish, but not dishonorable. We can not properly harbor hostile feelings against France for this.

With regard to Russia and England, we must proceed from two dates, 1890 and 1902. In the year 1890 the transfer of Helgoland from England to Germany took place. At that time England entertained no mistrust regarding Germany's development. The German-English conflict still lay beyond the horizon. In the year 1902 England formed a treaty with Japan, in order to force Russia out of the Far East and to direct its policy again toward the Orient. As Germany in the meantime became politically engaged in the Orient and in Turkey, her interests began to conflict with those of Russia. Germany's interior conditions had during this period undergone radical changes and the development of its foreign trade, which amounted in 1880 to five and one-half billions-in 1913 to a round twenty-two and a half billions, and as a result of the quality of our industrial productions, which brought in a seven-fold, yes, even an eight-fold profit, grew at such a rate, that England began to anticipate the

INTRODUCTION

DOCTOR PAUL ROHRBACH

time when we would equal or even surpass her. This was unbearable to the English. In the year 1898, when the German emperor was in Jerusalem and gave utterance to the dramatic words regarding his friendship with entire Islam, when German diplomacy supported the plan of the Bagdad railway, the chief interest of Germany and England was that the railway cut through Asia Minor, passed over the Taurus, reached Aleppo, made connection with the Syrian and the Mecca railways and extended to a point within 300-400 kilometers of the Suez Canal and of the crossing of the Red Sea. The English believed that the German emperor desired to establish a basis of attack against England in anterior Asia, which was inevitable as a result of the economic development of Germany. This was a misapprehension-Germany planned no attack upon England. But in the two particulars, the exchange of Helgoland and the promotion of advances to Turkey, our emperor proved himself an excellent diplomat. This has been verified by existing conditions.

Now began the policy of encirclement of Edward VII. France was an apt pupil. A treaty was formed with Russia regarding the division of Persia, but the chief feature of which was the liquidation of the Turkish inheritance and thereby the completion of England's dominion in the Indian Ocean. The outbreak of the Young Turkish revolution in 1908 prevented the execution of this plan. The prospect presented itself to English diplomats of leading the Young Turks and

new Turkey into the channels of the English policies. But these expectations met with disappointment as the German-Turkish understanding soon

assumed a firmer character than formerly. In 1909 came Russia's attempt to open the Oriental question, through the Servian-Bosnian trouble. But this was a Russian bluff. As Germany placed herself openly by the side of Austria, the Russians pulled in their horns. In 1910 King Edward died and the leadership of the political concert passed into the hands of Russia. Since then two factions have sprung up in England--one advocated the continuation of the policy of surrounding Germany and aimed at her destruction. The other faction wished for an understanding with Germany. The one party looked upon the attempt at an understanding with Germany as a trick, as a bait-a sleeping potion for the Germans. The others meant it honestly, honorably.

During the Moroccan crisis, the actual acidity of England was induced by a carefully planned French intrigue. It was reported that Germany intended to establish a naval station on the coast of Morocco, in order to have an opportunity of using her fast cruisers for the purpose of interfering with the course of grain ships, on their way from the Argentine, etc., to England, thereby cutting off England from this source of food supplies. After the settlement of the Moroccan crisis, England again made decided advances to Germany on her colonial policy. This tone was employed until the summer of 1914.

In 1912, Russia succeeded in bringing about the Balkan Union. But instead of turning against Austria, they turned against Turkey and the result was an incurable enmity between Servia and Bulgaria. The object of Russia's policy against Austria was the occupation of Constantinople and the realization of the Pan-Slavic ideathe union of all Slavs under the scepter of Russia. An insane idea, but one which is from a political-psychological point of view comprehensible, but which gave evidence of an exaggerated craze for extension which, by means of public opinion and the criminal unscrupulousness of the Russian Government, let loose passions which must lead either to revolution or war.

Russia and France had agreed to attack Germany in the spring of 1916. The question as to why the war arrived as early as the summer of 1914 is easily answered. In the beginning of August, mobilized Siberian regiments were stationed on the German border. When one considers that the transportation of these troops from Siberia must require weeks and that weeks and months were necessary for their mobilization in Siberia, it is quite clear that the order for mobilization must have been quite secretly

issued as early as May-or in other words, previous to the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which took place in the middle of June. Shortly after this deed, the Russian Ambassador Hartwig and the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade met. Soon after, a stroke of apoplexy ended the life of the Russian Ambassador. The suspicion will soon become general that his death was probably hastened by the excitement caused by disclosures made to him by the Austrian Ambassador, to the effect that not only official Servians, but also officers in Russian circles, were implicated in the murder. What was Russia to gain by this assassination? She had enjoyed a series of good harvests and had in this way fortified her financial condition, but in 1913 a great drop in her paying assets occurred, which increased in 1914 and caused fears that the Russian credit would be injured to such an extent that the carrying on of war would be an impossibility. By means of the assassination of the Archduke, Russia hoped to cause a revolution in Servia-a dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian governmental relations, and thereby render mobilization impossible in that country. Had this taken place, Germany would have cringed and Russia could have fallen

upon Austria. But it all turned out differently. Austria did not collapse, her mobilization was a success and her confederate remained faithful to her. But the war had become unavoidable for Russia, for the punishment of Servia by Austria would have cost the Czar everything.

And now comes England's guilt. She could not participate in the war on account of the Servian assassins. But she believed her last opportunity had arrived to settle her account with Germany. The contemplation of this idea was too much for the makers of English politics. Not that they ever really hesitated to make war upon Germany, but because at first, the proper time did not seem to them to have arrived. Therefore they made every effort to prevent the war. England never prepared for a war as decently as she has for this one. told us repeatedly we could not count upon her neutrality. That was a very plain hint to us. We can only explain England's attitude during the last weeks before the war in this way: that she desired to deter us from entering into war, not on account of political scruples, but because it was to her interest to postpone the day of decision. From the "Hamburger Fremdenblatt," Hamburg, Germany.

She

6

WHAT WOULD BISMARCK

SAY?

The Chicago Tribune. George L. Scherger, Ph. D. Professor of History, Armour Institute of Technology.

Many have wondered what would be the view of the great Iron Chancellor regarding the present war if he were still alive. Would this war have occurred if Bismarck had been in charge of the administration of the German Empire? Would he support the Kaiser or would he regard the war as threatening to undo his own mighty achievements? Though Bismarck died sixteen years ago, many of his utterances throw a flood of light on the present imbroglio and show his wonderful understanding of European conditions as well as his almost prophetic insight into the future.

The following remarks, made as early as 1875, have been fulfilled literally:

"Mighty Germany has great tasks; above all, to keep peace in Europe. This is my chief consideration, also in the Oriental crisis. I do not intend to interfere if there is any way to avoid it, for such an interference might cause a European conflagration, especially if the interests of Austria and Russia should clash in the Balkans. If I should take the side of one of these powers France would immediately join with the other, and a European war would break out. I am trying to hold two mighty beasts by the collar, in order that they may not tear each other to pieces, and in order that they may not combine against Germany."

The fear of Bismarck regarding the Balkans is likewise expressed in this passage:

"What may happen in the Balkans does not concern Germany but only Russia, Italy, Austria and England. It has always been my aim to keep out of this. For this reason we put a stipulation into our treaty with Austria that we are not obligated in any way in Balkan affairs."

As regards Russia, Bismarck says again and again that Germany would not have the least interest in waging a war with her nor would Russia with Germany, because neither has any antagnostic interests.

Russia's Asiatic interests are not in any way dangerous to Germany, although they are to England. If Russia should defeat Germany she could only take from her a strip of territory along the Baltic which would really be a nuisance to her because its inhabitants are very democratic. Germany, on the other hand, could only hope to increase her undesirable Polish territory. He did not consider the real Russians to be the champions of the Panslavistic movement, but the Poles living in Russia, who wished to bring about a clash between Teuton and Slav in hopes of taking advantage of the fray to reconstitute an independent Polish kingdom.

He believed that the Russian could not get along without the German in

Russian affairs, for while the Russian might have intelligence, imagination, manners, and social talents, no Russian would learn in all eternity to work eight hours per day for six days in the week.

Bismarck

even stated that he would have no objection to Russia's taking Constantinople, and thought that with the possession of this gate to the Black Sea she would be even less dangerous to Germany than at present. Of course, he knows that this would endanger England's possession of Egypt and the Suez canal, both of which she needs "as much as her daily bread."

Not less striking are his observations concerning France.

"If the French are willing to keep peace with us until we attack them," he says, 'then peace is assured forever. What should we hope to get from France?' Shall we annex more French territory? I was not even strongly inclined in 1871 to take Metz because of its French population. I consulted our military authorities before I reached a final decision. It was Thiers who said to me: 'We will give you your choice between Belfort and Metz; if you insist upon both we cannot make peace.' I then asked our war department whether we could give up our demand for either of these and received the reply: 'Yes, as regards Belfort, but Metz is worth 100,000 troops;' the question is, whether we wish to be weaker by that many men in case we should ever have another war. Thereupon I said: 'We will take Metz.'"

Bismarck said that since 1870 the French realized that another war with Germany would not be like a sort of excursion to Berlin. He thought that the stronger Germany is the more unlikely would be an attack by France. France would strike only in case she felt certain of winning.

She would always keep "the sacred fire of revenge burning," according to the advice of Gambetta:

"Do not speak of war, but think of it constantly."

If Germany became involved in war with France, it would not be necessary to expect Russia to strike Germany, but if Russia should strike first, France would be sure to join her in attacking Germany-a most remarkable forecast of what has now actually taken place.

As early as 1887 he said: "Russia and France will sooner or later attack Germany."

Concerning England,

says:

Bismarck

"As regards foreign countries, I have had sympathy only for England, and even now am not without this feeling; but those folks do not want to be loved by us." At another time he remarked:

"The English are full of anger and jealousy because we fought great battles and won them. They do not like to see us prosper. We only exist in order to fight their battles for pay. That is the opinion of the entire English gentry. They have never wished us well, but have done

Bismarck commented upon the traditional English policy of stirring up trouble on the continent, according the principle that when two quarrel the third may be glad. Especially desirous had she been to get Germany and Russia embroiled, so that she herself would not need to fight Russia. This is the very game England has succeeded in playing in the present war. Bismarck acknowledges that he would do the same thing if he could find some strong and foolish fellow who would fight for him.

Bismarck thought that England, having only a few thousand troops of the line, was, when standing alone, really a negligible power, which, by playing the part of a guardian aunt, had gained a certain artificial influence, but ought some day to be limited to its proper foundation. England and France should combine against Germany, the English might destroy the German navy, which at the time was still in its infancy, but Germany would in that case make France pay the bill.

If

No statesman ever realized the seriousness and the horrors of war more than Bismarck. A war should be waged, he said, only for the honor and most vital interest of a nation and not merely for prestige. Any statesman who has looked into the breaking eye of a soldier on the battlefield will hesitate before beginning

war.

"German rulers," he said, “are in the habit of leading their armies in war so that they may realize its horrors, which would haunt them if they should be able to say to themselves, this war I could have avoided with honor. Germany would never begin aggressive wars or wars of conquest, as France so often had done, nor would she bleed a conquered nation as Napoleon had bled Prussia in 1807.

"The Germans are like bears in this respect; they do not attack of their own accord, but they fight like mad when they are attacked in their own lairs. An appeal to fear will never find an echo in the German's heart. The German is easily betrayed by love and sympathy, but never by fear. The Germans will not start the fire. Some other nation may, but let any nation that provokes Germany beware of 'the furor teutonicus.'

"We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world; and the fear of God induces us to love and seek peace. Whoever breaks the peace will soon realize that the same patriotism which called weak and down