A "SCRAP OF PAPER"

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY-ITS REAL MEANING.

The Vital Issue.

EDITOR'S NOTE:

If

This article by Professor John W. Burgess was released to the press of this great country two weeks ago. Which newspaper printed it? our readers will give us the name of the paper in which it appeared before this copy of the "Vital Issue" goes to press we would be glad to give them credit for their sense of honor and fairness.* Is it not strange that a special paper has to be founded to print such material as is contained in our magazine? In spite of the immense difficulties this paper will continue to throw a true light on the present European crisis.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN W. BUR

GESS.

Of Columbia University, New York.

So much has been said about "Belgian Neutrality," so much assumed, and it has been spoken of as such a sacred thing, that it may be well to examine the basis of it and get an exact idea of its scope. It is not a moral question. It is a question of truth. It is a question purely of in

*The "Milwaukee Free Press" printed this article of Professor Burgess under the heading of "What Belgian Neutrality Really Means,' on its editorial page of October 13, 1914.

Read also the paragraphs headed: "The Case of Belgium," in the article by Professor John W. Burgess, entitled, "Why I Champion Germany," and also article entitled: "Has Germany Violated Belgian Neutrality," both of which important papers have been reprinted elsewhere in this book.Editor, War Echoes.

INTRODUCTION

DOCTOR JOHN W. BURGESS

ternational agreement and we must find for it such an agreement and the agreement must not have been abrogated nor have become, by change of conditions, obsolete. Of course by the term "Belgian neutrality" is meant guaranteed neutrality, not simply the "general neutrality of all states not at war" at a time when other states are at war.

On the 19th day of April, 1839, Belgium and Holland, which had from 1815 to 1830 formed the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed a treaty of separation from, and independence of, each other. It is in this treaty that the original pledge of Belgian neutrality is to be found. The clause in the treaty reads: "Belgium in the limits above described shall form an independent neutral state and shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other states." On the same day and at the same place, London, a treaty, known in the history of diplomacy as the "Quintuple Treaty," was signed by Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia, approving and adopting the treaty between Belgium and Holland. A little later, May 11th, the German Confederation, of which both Prussia and Austria were states, also ratified this treaty.

In the year 1866 the German Confederation was dissolved by the short war between Prussia and Austria. In 1867 the "North German Union" was formed, of which Prussia was the largest state.

Did these changes abrogate the guarantee of the Treaty of 1839, or make it obsolete? The test of this came in the year 1870, at the beginning of hostilities between France and the North German Union. Great Britain, the power most interested in the maintenance of Belgian neutrality, seems to have had considerable apprehension about it. Mr. Glad

stone, then Prime Minister, said in the House of Commons on the 2nd of August, 1870: "I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises."

Acting on this view, the British government then sought and procured from the French government, and from the government of the North German Union separate but identical treaties, ratified on the 9th and 26th of August, 1870, respectively, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium during the period of the war between France and the North German Union (the so-called Franco-Prussian war), which had just broken out, and for one year from the date of its close. In these treaties Great Britain limited the possible operation of her military forces in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium to the territory of the state of Belgium.

These treaties expired in the year 1872, and the present German Empire has never signed any treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. If the Treaty of 1839 had become so unreliable in 1870 as to require, in the opinion of the British government, the new treaties of 1870 in order to make sure of the guarantee of Belgian neutrality, what shall we say about it in 1914, 42 years after these treaties of 1870 have expired, and after the North German Union, which was party to them, has given way to the present German Empire?

Finally, The Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a convention which reads:

"The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of neutral power."

Great Britain, Germany, AustriaHungary and Italy refused to sign it and did not sign it. Russia was not represented.

Perhaps we may now somewhat more clearly understand, why the German Chancellor referred to the guarantee of Belgian neutrality as a "scrap of paper." At any rate, these facts, taken together with the facts that Great Britain refused to pledge her own neutrality in the present war even on the condition that Germany would agree not to move her troops through Belgium and not to attack the north coast of France, and declined to formulate any conditions upon which she would remain neutral, clearly reduce England's much vaunted altruistic reason for entering upon this war to a diplomatic subterfuge.

JOHN W. BURGESS. Athenwood, Newport, R. I., September 11, 1914.

"SOME REAL NEWS."

Editorial from "The Vital Issue,"

New York, October 10, 1914.

We believe our readers and the untold millions of sympathizers of Germany will surely consider it a treat to read the many interesting articles which appear in the present copy of "The Vital Issue."

The article by Professor Burgess proves so convincingly that somebody has lied about the Belgian Neutrality Question. Will the British Government sit up and take notice of "The Vital Issue?" We think it will. It will be much upset by now reading the true facts about this Belgian issue, instead of seeing their lies continually reprinted by American newspapers. More discoveries will follow. We will catch them again.

With these new facts at hand, the statement issued by Sir Edward Goschen, the then Ambassador to Germany, loses almost its entire force. Perhaps, it even does him an injury, because the statement issued by him is absolutely misleading, not to use stronger terms. However, he may not have been acquainted with the status quo of the Belgian situation,

and we will therefore be charitably inclined and attribute his statement to a lack of knowledge rather than to malice. Inasmuch as Sir Edward Goschen's statement formed a part of the British White Paper, it becomes evident that the British White Paper loses in importance and trustworthiness.

Many editors will no doubt regret that they have been so imposed upon and that they have innocently fallen to be a victim to the British wiles. Innocently, these editors have stirred up hatred against a friendly country. Let them beware in the future of British lies and British systematic secret work.

Berlin's comment on the advance southeast of Verdun corroborates a French report of yesterday. Of the German claims of advance there is nothing from Paris except the vague remarks that the Kaiser's troops are in a strong position. However, since the war started, Berlin has made no claims which have not been proved later. When the German war office has nothing favorable to report, it simply issues no report. From the "Chicago Examiner," September 27,

1914.

France and Germany agreed to it. For many years past France has, in a measure violated the neutrality of Belgium by assisting that country in building the fortresses on the German frontier.

The details of the fortifications of Liège and Namur were partly worked out by the French General Staff, giving them a decided military advantage over Germany.

As far as we can learn from German sources, preceding the outbreak of hostilities, French officers, in larger numbers than ordinarily, were active in It is certain, at any rate, Belgium. that the French had made extensive preparations in Belgian territory for the eventuality of a war with Germany. Not to take account of these preparations would have been folly and suicide on Germany's part.

More than this, the erection in Belgium of a series of great fortifications does not appeal to the unbiased mind as an act of pure Belgian initiation and violation. Neutralized as her territory is by a European convention, what necessity could have prompted her to these steps? The answer must be sought not in Belgium but in Paris. The fortress of Liège and Namur were

designed for defense again Germany, but where are the fortresses to insure the Belgiun frontier against France?

Germany requested Belgium to allow the transfer of German troops in German railroad cars over the Belgian lines. The bulk of Belgian traffic in times of peace is carried on in German cars, there being a tremendous through traffic of German goods. Germany offered to pay for these facilities and to pay for anything else that it might use at Belgium's own price, to put in order again anything that was destroyed and to guarantee the integrity of the territory of Belgium in the fullest measure. This offer was not accepted and the simple law of self-preservation forced Germany to its subsequent steps. As matters have turned out it would have been the part of wisdom of Belgium to have accepted the proposition of Germany. It was furthermore, increasingly clear to the German government that England wanted to keep its hands free to join the fray whenever the time seemed favorable. The consideration of the opportune moment and nothing else, has been the reason why skilful English diplomacy, although we have only the English "White Paper" to go by, emphasized the Belgian neutrality in the final dealings, to the exclusion of almost everything else.

England knew well, that Germany "in defence" would quickly turn "to attack"; that a man or a nation, fighting for its life, must anticipate the enemy's move and not wait for it. In view of the French activities in Belgium during times of peace, it was reasonable for Germany to assume that France would not hesitate to violate the

neutrality in times of war. It was essentially a measure of defense on the part of Germany, and as the results show, an important part in the general strategy of the war.

England never objected to France overseeing the military policy of Belgium. Would England have warred on France if France had violated Belgium's neutrality in actual warfare? Is there anything in the "White Paper" to indicate that England applied the same hypocritical morality to France and Russia which it adopted towards Germany? Do we find any sharp English comment on the embargo placed on a German wheat shipment to Belgium previous to the outbreak of hostilities? Belgium was a convenient excuse, a very flimsy one at that, of English diplomatic hypocrisy. Perfide Albion!

It would be well for we Americans, before rashly condemning Germany, to recall the many emergencies we had to meet in connection with the Panama Canal. We took the larger view of the situation and overlooked the technicalities. The United States, Columbia, Panama, and the Hay-Pauncefote treaties present many analogies with the Belgian situation.

The men who were intrusted with the safeguarding of Germany were actuated by a high consciousness of their mobilizations towards Germany. However imperative from a purely military point of view, the passage through Belgium may have been, it was undertaken with the greatest re luctance and with every desire to avoid friction. The Belgian resistance is one of the most regrettable features of the

war.