Policy- "Immediate Written Notice." -Under a provision in the policy that, in case of an accident for which claim might be made under the policy, "immediate written notice" should be given of the accident and injury, a notice mailed to the insurance company October 1st, of a claim for the loss of an eye resulting from an accident which occurred September 1st, is in time, where it appears that at the time of the accident the plaintiff did not regard it as dangerous, and did not become convinced that he would lose his eye-sight until sometime after sending such notice.

People's Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Smith (Pa. S. C.), 17 Atlantic Reporter (June 5, 1889), p. 605.

Policy-Occupation-Construction. The policy insured the holder as a merchant," and prohibited him from engaging in any "occupation" more hazardous than that of the class he was insured in. While out hunting he was accidentally shot. Held, that hunting was not his regular occupation, but merely an act or incident of his life, and the company is liable on the policy.

Frohard v. United States Mutual Accident Ass'n (Ill. Ap. Ct.), 10 Legal Adviser (June 4, 1889), p. 244.

Policy-"Proximate and Sole Cause.”—The policy provided that it should not apply to any case "except where the injury is the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death." It appeared that the insured had his arm broken on March 24; that the fracture was reduced and a few days after he suffered from severe pains in his chest and lungs; that he then became convalescent for a week or ten days, when he was attacked in a manner similar to the first attack, and died April 12. Held, that a finding that his death was caused solely and proximately by his breaking his arm was warranted by the evidence.

Same-Evidence of Injury.-The policy provided that the claimant thereunder must establish "by direct and positive proof that the death or personal injury was caused by external violence and accidental means, and was not the result of design on the part of the member or any other person." Held, that this did not require the claimant to show the fact of the injury and its attendant circumstances by eye-witnesses; but that the nature of the injury was direct and positive proof, within the meaning of the policy, that it resulted from external violence, and was accidental.

Peck v. Equitable Accident Ass'n of Binghamton (N. Y. S. C.), 5 New York Supplement (June 13, 1889), p. 215.

Complaint--Instruction to Jury.-The complaint alleged that the insured died from a "stricture of the duodenum," produced by the accident. The court refused to charge that, if the jury found that he did not die from duodenitis, they should find for the defendant, except as contained in the general charge. In the general charge the court laid before the jury the issue as to the constriction or occlusion of the duo

denum, and charged that the jury must weigh the conflicting claims in regard thereto, and that if deceased received an injury which directly produced duodenitis, and thereby caused death, the injury was the proximate cause of the death. Held, that a contention that the case was not restricted to the case made by the pleadings could not be sustained.

Instruction-Cause of Injury.-It appeared that the deceased jumped voluntarily from a platform four or five feet from the ground, alighting heavily; that shortly afterward he vomited; from that time on retained nothing on his stomach; passed nothing but decomposed blood and mucus; and died nine days afterward. Held, that it was proper to charge that the jump was the means by which the injury, if any was sustained, was caused; and that the question was whether there was anything accidental in the act of jumping from the time the deceased left the platform to the time he alighted on the ground.

Same--"Accidental" Defined.--The term "accidental," as used in the policy, was properly defined to the jury as meaning "happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected."

Evidence-Verdict of Jury.—Where two of his companions jumped from the same platform just before the deceased, and alighted safely, it will be presumed that the deceased intended to, and thought he would, alight safely, and a verdict that it was an accident that he did not so alight is warranted.

Policy Mutual Company-Measure of Damage--JurisdictionLaw and Equity.--The policy provided that "the principal sum represented by the payment of two dollars by each member" in deceased's division, not to exceed a certain sum, should be paid to the policy-holder's wife on the requisite proof. The by-laws stated that the object of the association was to "collect and accumulate a fund" for the payment of benefits, and that, on the requisite proof, an assessment should be ordered for that purpose; but the policy did not contract to make an assessment, or make payment contingent on an assessment. The complaint showed that the number of members in the deceased's division would render collectible an amount in excess of the maximum sum named in the policy. Held, that defendant's contract was not to levy an assessment and pay over the proceeds, and therefore enforceable only in equity, but that plaintiff was entitled to the maximum sum in an action at law.

United States Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry (U. S. S. C.), 9 Supreme Court Reporter (June 24, '89), p. 755; 40 Albany Law Journal (July 13, 89), p. 35.

Certificate-- Classification 66 Spare Conductor" Acting as "Brakeman.”—The evidence showed that the certificate permitted an employment different from the one mentioned in the application, but reduced the amount of insurance accordingly; that the insured stated his occupation to be "spare conductor" on freight train; that he was killed

while performing the duties of brakeman; that on that road a "spare conductor" was required to do any work required in running the train, but that the association had no notice of this fact. Held, That the plaintiff could only recover such amount as would be due on the death of a brakeman.

Aldrich v. Mercantile Mutual Accident Ass'n (Mass. S. J. C.), 21 Northeastern Reporter (July 19, 1889), p. 873.

Policy-Forfeiture-Standing on Platform of Moving Car.—The policy excepted from the risks insured against injuries resulting from being upon the platform of moving cars, or from attempting to enter or leave such cars in motion; this exception not being applicable, however, to railway employes in the performance of their duty. The assured a shop-hand of a railway company, while being carried homeward from the shop at the close of the day's work, upon one of the company's trains went out on the platform while the train was in motion, intending to get off when it should stop, for the purpose of crossing over, by a switch, to another track. He was thrown off and killed. Held, that the company was not liable.

Hull v. Equitable Accident Ass'n (Minn. S. C.), 42 Northwestern Reporter (July 27, 1889), p. 936.

Policy —“Total Disability."-The policy insured against death or total disability resulting from bodily injuries effected through external, violent and accidental means. The "total disability" was defined as follows: "Bodily injuries sustained by means as aforesaid, which shall, independently of all other causes immediately and wholly disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business pertaining to the occupation under which he receives membership" Plaintiff stated his occupation in the contract to be that of "a retired," the term "gentleman" or equivalent being evidently omitted by clerical error, and in action on the policy testified that he had no occupation except to amuse himself; that he had a shop at his house where he sometimes amused himself; that his income was derived from investments; and was a director of a wagon company, and at times used some of its machinery with his amusement. While operating a buzz-saw at the wagon-shops he received a severe and painful wound on the back of the han 1, which deprived him of the use of it for some time. Held, that the jury was not covered by the policy, as plaintiff was not totally disald, an 1 prevented from any and every kind of business pertaining to hssi nation.

Same - Incidents to Occupation. - The policy also stipulated that it was to be void "as to all accidents occurring in any occupation, profession, or employment or exposure not named, or incident to the occupation under which he receives membership." Held, that the operation of the buzz-saw was not incident to the occupation or condition of a retired gentleman.

Knapp v. Preferred Mutual Accident Ass'n (N. Y. S. C.), 6 New York

Supplement (August 8, 1889), p. 57; 40 Albany Law Journal (August 17, 1889), p. 122.

Cause of Death-Jury.-The policy provided that it should not cover intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person. It appeared that one G. went to the door of his house in response to the ringing of the bell, and about five minutes thereafter the report of a pistol was heard; deceased was then found lying on the floor of the hall suffering from a pistol wound from which he died. Voices were heard in the hall before the report of the pistol, and G. was heard to say "You can not go up stairs," but no noise or scuffling was heard. No one but G. was present at the shooting, and neither party called him as a witness. Deceased was in the habit of visiting at G's house, and on the evening in question was in the act of bringing medicine to G's sister, to whom he was secretly married, though it did not appear that G. was ignorant of the fact. Held, that the question whether the killing was intentional or accidental was properly left to the jury.

Guldenkirch et al. v. United States Mutual Acc. Ass'n (Brooklyn City Ct.) 5 New York Supplement (June 27, 1889), p. 428.

Contract-In What Contained.—The plaintiff claims that the certificate is not part of the contract, and that she is not bound by its terms. Her position is that the contract was complete upon the passage by the board of directors of the resolution approving the application, and accepting P. as a member, and that the certificate issued the next day could attach no condition not contained in the constitution and bylaws. Held, that the certificate must be held to indicate what both parties meant and understood the contract to be.

Policy-Conditions-Ultra Vires.-Plaintiff can not be heard to say that the provision in the certificate that death must happen within ninety days after the accident is unauthorized by defendant's constitution. She can not accept one part of the contract and reject another.

Palmer v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n (N. Y. S. C.), 6 New York Supplement (September 5, 1889), p. 870.

Policy-Voluntary Exposure to Danger.-It can not be said that a passenger on a railroad train, who goes out onto the platform while the train is in motion, because he is overcome by the heat of the car, or suffering from nausea, voluntarily exposes himself to unnecessary danger, within the meaning of a policy of accident insurance.

Same-Rule of Corporation-Habitual Violation.-Where a rule forbidding passengers on a railroad train to ride on the platform of a car is generally disregarded by both passengers and trainmen, it can not be said that so to ride is a violation of "a rule of a corporation" within the meaning of a policy of accident insurance.

Marx v. Travelers Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 39 Federal Reporter (August 27, 1889), p. 321.

FIRE INSURANCE..

Practice-Pleading-Evidence-Conditions in Policy.—In an action upon a fire insurance policy, the plaintiff alleged his full compliance with the terms of the policy, and not alleging fraud or mistake in its execution, or asking to have it reformed, and the company alleging as a defense plaintiff's breach of some of the conditions in the policy, it is error to allow plaintiff to show by parol evidence that he never agreed to those conditions; his declaration not making a case allowing such testimony.

Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Co. v. Morris (Ga. S. C.), 5 Southeastern Reporter (March 27, 1888), p. 125; 17 Insurance Law Journal (Oct. 1888), p. 761.

Assignment for Benefit of Creditors-Policy Forfeiture-Statute.-Ten days before the loss by fire the plaintiff assigned all his property, under the insolvent laws of the state, for the benefit of his creditors. Held, by that assignment his property became vested in the judge of probate and in such assignee as the judge might appoint (Laws 1885, Ch. 85, 21), and, however made or expressed, the assignment must be construed to pass all the plaintiff's property not by law exempt from attachment (Gen. Laws, ch. 140, ? 1). The policy of insurance is a contract which gave him a valuable right and was a part of his property not within the exception exempting it from the attachment, and was included within the assignment. The assignment being without the consent of the insured, by the terms of the policy, rendered the policy void, and the plaintiff can not recover.

Dube v. Macoma Fire Ins. Co. (N. H. S. C.), 15 Atlantic Reporter (Oct. 3, 1888), p. 141; 6 New England Reporter (Oct. 2, 1888), p. 893.

Violation of Instructions by Agent-Notice-Liability to Company. This was an action by the Hanover Fire Insurance Company and the Citizens' Fire Insurance Company against E. B. Ames, local agent for plaintiffs in Minneapolis, for writing insurance on certain property contrary to instructions given by plaintiff's general agent. The plaintiff's general agent notified a subordinate clerk in the office of defendant not to take any risks for the plaintiffs in or upon a certain business block located in block 62, in Minneapolis. The clerk did not notify defendant personally, but, in the usual course of business, entered the direction in the "Block Book" of the defendant, which contained a

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