LIFE INSURANCE.

Statute-Policy Payable to Wife-Death of Beneficiary-Descent. Under the wife's policy law of Missouri the title vests in the wife as her separate estate, or in case of her prior death without assignment, then it descends to her children, and does not go to her husband. Held, that the children are not such as may be living at her prior death, but such as may be living when the policy is payable.

"Children" as Beneficiaries—Death of Beneficiary-Distribution of Fund.—A second policy was payable to the children of the assured, share and share alike, by name, "her, his or their guardian, executors, administrators or assigns." Held, that some of the children having died previous to the father, their share was payable to the administrator of the father.

Shield's Trustee v. Sharpe et al. (St. L. C. C.), 17 Insurance Law Journal (October, '88), p. 793.

Policy-Suicide-Insanity.-A life insurance policy which by its terms is to become void "if the member shall commit suicide, sane or insane," is avoided by the suicide of the insured, committed while he was temporarily insane, and in no manner conscious or responsible.

Scarth et al. v. Security Mutual Lije Soc. (Iowa S. C.), 39 Northwestern Reporter (Oct. 27, 1888), p. 658; 38 Albany Law Journal (Nov. 10, 1888), p. 367.

Practice -Statute-Venue.-The cause of action on a life insurance policy will be deemed to have arisen in the county in which the death occurred, within the provision of R. S. Wis., section 2619, that, in actions against domestic corporations other than railroads, the place of trial is "the county where the corporation is situated, or where the cause of action or some part thereof arose.

Bruil et al. v. Northwestern Mut. Relief Ass'n (Wis. S. C.), 39 Northwestern Reporter (Oct. 27, 1888), p. 529.

Rights of Beneficiary-Trustee.-Deceased insured his life for the benefit of his children. He signed the application as trustee and the policy was issued to him as such. After paying the premiums for fifteen years he defaulted, and took out a new policy for his second wife's benefft. He paid the same premiums on the second policy as on the first, was not examined again, and was described as thirty-nine years old in

1863," the date of the first policy. Held, that the second policy was a continuation of the first, in which the children had a vested interest, and that they were entitled to the proceeds thereof.

Garner et al. v. Germania Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 18 Northeastern Reporter (Nov. 2, 1888), p. 130; 38 Albany Law Journal (Nov, 17, 1888), p. 399.

Assignment of Policy-Insurable Interest.-Where policies of life insurance are taken out for the benefit of the insured's sons, with her full knowledge and consent, and assigned by them to one who has no interest in the life of insured, though as to such assignee the policies are mere wagers and invalid, they are not wagers as to the sons, and they only and not insured's administrator can sue the assignee for the proceeds of the policies.

Hoffman v. Hoke (Pa. S. C.), 15 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 7, 1888), p. 437; 13 Central Reporter (Nov. 8, 1888), p. 485.

Appearance to Action-What Constitutes.-Where a party against whom a judgment is rendered files a motion to vacate the judgment upon the ground that the court has no jurisdiction of the defendants, and said motion is also based upon non-jurisdictional grounds as well as those that are jurisdictional, said party thereby enters a general appearance as though said appearance had been entered at the trial.

Same-Effect. Where defendants allow judgment to be taken against them by default, and, after judgment is rendered, make a general appearance, it is then too late to object to the judgment because the petition upon which the judgment was rendered contains more than one cause of action, not separately stated and numbered, or that the judgment ought not to have been against part of the defendants as principals, but only as sureties.

Assessment Company-Measure of Damages.-Where a mutual life insurance company, organized upon the assessment plan, issues policies or certificates of membership, in which it is agreed, in case of the death of the insured, to make an assessment upon the policy-holders in good standing in said company within ninety days from the date of proofs of death of the insured, and the sum collected thereon, less 10 per cent., shall be paid on said death loss, provided, however, that in no case shall the payment exceed $5,000, and where it is shown that at the date of the death of the insured there were policies or certificates in force upon which had the assessment been made and collected the full amount named in the policy could have been realized, and where it is shown that no assessments were made within the time provided for in the policy, held, that upon the death of the insured and proof thereof, the beneficiary named in the policy was entitled to a judgment against the company for the maximum amount named in the policy; and further held, that where the petition alleges such facts a cause of action is stated.

Kaw Valley Life Ass'n et al. v. Lemke (Kan. S. C.), 19 Pacific Reporter (Nov. 8, 1888), p. 337.

Power of Agent.-A general district agent of an insurance company for a stated territory, whose duties are to solicit and forward applications for insurance at a stated compensation, has no authority to bind the company for furniture purchased for his office.

Same-Estoppel.-That the agent advertised his agency as a branch office does not estop the company from denying its liability on the contract of purchase when it does not appear that it knew before the contract was made that the agent was holding himself out as having authority to make it.

Same-Ratification.-That the company advanced money to the agent with which to pay the debt, without knowledge that he had assumed to bind it by the contract of purchase, does not show a recognition of his authority to make the purchase.

Iowa Code-Practice-Production of Papers.-Under Code Iowa, sections 3685-3687, providing that the application for a rule requiring the production of papers in possession of the adverse party, must be by petition stating the facts intended to be shown by the papers and that they are under the control of such party, a party is not entitled to the rule on his oral motion, but must follow the prescribed procedure. Section 3672, providing that a witness may be required to produce books or writings in his possession, and section 3675, making disobedience to the subpoena contempt of court, apply to witnesses only and not of parties.

Beebe et el. v. Equitable Mutual L. and E. Ass'n (Iowa S. C.), 40 Northwestern Reporter (Nov. 17, 1888), p. 122.

Absence for Seven Years-Presumption of Death-Instruction.The insured disappeared January 16, 1874; the premium on his policy became due April 3, 1874. This suit was commenced eleven years after his disappearance. The court charged the jury, in effect, that such unexplained absence of the insured, without being heard of for more than seven years, raised a presumption that he was dead, but that it raised no presumption that he died at any particular time during the seven years, nor helped to fix the exact time of his death within that seven years; that the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he died before April 3, 1874; that such fact need not necessarily be established by direct evidence, but might be established by circumstantial evidence—by inferences from facts and circumstances surrounding his disappearance. Held, that such instruction is erroneous, as there is no presumption that death, in such cases, does not occur until the end of the period; but the exact time of the death, when material, is a fact to be established by the evidence.

Whitely v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (Wis. S. C.), 4 Railway and Corporation Law Journal (Nov. 24, 1888), p. 192.

Application-Fraud-Evidence. —An application for insurance, with warranty of truthfulness, stated that the beneficiary was a first cousin of the applicant. The insurance was refused on that ground, when the applicant wrote to the company, in the name of the beneficiary, and by his authority, that the latter was a creditor, and his friend, dependent on him; whereupon the policy was issued. It was found that the beneficiary was a creditor of the applicant, but not dependent on him. Held, that the letter was not a part of the application, but was admissible in evidence on the question of fraud in procuring the in

surance.

Same-Same-Same-Inducement to Issue Policy.-The statements in the letter that the beneficiary was the friend of the applicant, and dependent on him, were not material inducements to the issuing of the policy, the falsity of which would render it void; and it is immaterial whether or not the beneficiary authorized the applicant to write it.

Evidence-Opinion.-Testimony of the secretary of the company that the insurance was agreed to in consequence of the representations in the letter, and would not otherwise have been agreed to, and defining the relation a person must bear to another to have an insurable interest in his life, is properly excluded as irrelevant, and expressions of opinion.

Mace v. Provident Life Ins. Ass'n (N. C. S. C.), 7 Southeastern Reporter (Nov. 20, 1888), p. 674.

Insurable Interest.-A son-in-law has no insurable interest in the life of his mother-in-law, though she lives with him, and is dependent on him for support.

Wagering Policy Rights of Assignee. -An assignee of a wagering life insurance policy who collects the proceeds, must account to the personal representatives of the insured.

Stambaugh v. Blake (Pa. S. C.), 15 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 21, 1888),

p. 705.

Statute-Payment of Prémium by Third Party—Indemnity— Lien. Under the provisions of a private estate act, the trustee of a term of years of a certain settled estate, of which W. had been tenant for life, was bound to apply the rents of the estate, first, in the payment from time to time of the interest on certain incumbrances existing before the passage of the act, and subject thereto; in the payment from time to time of the interest of sums to be raised by W. on mortgages created under the powers conferred by the act; and of the premiums on policies of life assurance, constituting the collateral security for the payment of these sums, the equity of redemption being reserved to W. The rents having hecome insufficient, the trustee, in order to save one of the policies from

lapsing, paid a premium out of his own moneys. He did this without any request from the mortgagee or from the owner of the equity of redemption of the policy. The life insured having dropped and the mortgagees having received the money: Held, that the trustee was not entitled to any lien on the proceeds in respect of the premiums which he had paid, he not being a trustee of the policy. The right of a trustee to be indemnified out of his trust fund for money expended by him in its preservation is strictly limited to the trust fund.

In re Earl of Winchilsea's Policy Trusts (Eng. C. A.-Ch. Div.), Law Reports 39 Ch. D. (Nov. 1888), p. 168.

Common Law-Statute, 13 Elizabeth, c. 5.—The provisions of the statute, 13 Elizabeth, c. 5, were to prevent debtors from dealing with their property in any way to the prejudice of their creditors; but dealing with that which creditors, irrespective of such dealing, could not have touched, is within neither the spirit or the letter of the statute.

Insurable Interest-Wife and Children-Rights of Beneficiaries -Creditors of Insured.-A wife and children have an insurable interest in the life of the husband and father, and where a contract of insurance is made upon such interest, the husband and father can exercise no disposition over the same without their consent, while they are living, nor has he any interest therein of which he can avail himself, nor upon his death have his personal representatives or his creditors any interest in the proceeds of such contract, which belongs to the beneficiaries to whom it is payable.

Premiums Paid by Insolvent Rights of Creditors.- Where a husband while insolvent insures his life in favor of his wife, the premiums paid for such insurance can not be recovered by his creditors from the insuring company, unless fraud on the part of the latter can be shown.

Same-Same.-A debtor may rightfully preserve his family from sffering and want, and the same public policy that justifies this and recognizes the support of the wife and children as a positive obligation in law, as well as morals, justifies him in devoting a moderate portion of his earnings to keep on foot a security for their support after his death. Therefore, in the absence of fraud, moderate premiums paid by an insolvent upon policies of insurance for the benefit of his wife and children will not be considered as disposing of property to the prejudice of his creditors, and can not be recovered by them after his death out of the proceeds of the policies.

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Central National Bank of Washington v. Hume et al. (U. S. S. C.), Washington Law Reporter (Dec. 5, 1888), p. 777; 9 Supreme Court Reporter (Nov. 26-Dec. 10, 1888), p. 41; 21 Chicago Legal News (Dec. 22, 1888), p. 199.

Statute-Beneficiary-" Devisees or Heirs at Law."—A policy of