ACCIDENT INSURANCE

Policy-"Intentional Injuries."-No recovery can be had on an insurance policy which provides that the company shall not be liable if the death or injury "may have been caused by intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person," where the insured was shot and killed by a third person, though without provocation, and while peaceably and lawfully engaged in his ordinary business.

Fischer v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 19 Pacific Reporter (November 15, 1888), p. 425.

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Policy Intentional Injury."-The policy declared that it did not cover intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person. The injury complained of was inflicted upon the plaintiff by one Webb, who wilfully assaulted the plaintiff with a knife or other sharp instrument, thereby wounding him and preventing him from attending to his business. Held, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.

Scherk v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (St. L. Cir. Ct.), 38 Albany Law Journal (Dec. 15, 1888), p. 466.

Limitation of Action-Rights of Minors.-The policy provided that "No suit or proceeding at law or in equity shall be brought to recover any sum hereby insured, unless the same is commenced within one year from the time the right of action accrues." Held, that such limitation is valid, and runs during the minority of the beneficiaries, there being no exception in their favor.

Suggs v. Travelers' Ins. Co (Texas S. C.), 9 Southwestern Reporter, (Dec. 17, 1888), p. 676.

Policy-Boarding Moving Train--Forfeiture.-A policy of accident insurance contained the express provision that it should not cover accidents, injuries or death from trying to enter a moving steam vehicle, this provision not being applicable to railway employes. The assured, a banker, was killed while attempting to get on a moving train. Held, that the company was not liable.

Same-Construction.-A provision of the policy limiting the liability of the company to a less sum than that named in the policy, if the assured should be injured in any occupation or exposure classed as more hazardous than that specified in the policy does not affect the case.

Miller et al. v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 40 Northwestern Reporter (Jan. 12, 1889), p. 839.

Policy -Change After Injury.—Plaintiff was insured against accident in the defendant company as a leather merchant. He was in fact also a leather cutter, and while in that occupation received an injury. On applying for relief he was informed that the policy did not cover such injury, but the defendant, to correct the mistake, issued him a new policy, of the same date as the old one, covering both occupations. Held, that such issuance was within the power of the defendant.

Same-Classification of Risk-Total Disability.-The new policy described the plaintiff as "by occupation, profession and employment a leather-cutter and merchant," and provided that, in case of accident that should "totally disable and prevent him from the prosecution of every and any kind of business pertaining to the occupation under which he is insured," he should receive $15 per week. The policy recited that he was insured under the "medium" class. On the back of the policy was a classification of risks in which the "preferred" or most liberal class included merchants, but the "medium" class did not, in terms, include leather-cutters. Held, that the classifications on the back could not control the express stipulations in the policy; and that, in order to recover, plaintiff's disability must have been total, not only as to his business of leather-cutter, but also as to that of merchant.

Ford v. U. S. Mutual Acc. Rel. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), 19 Northwestern Reporter (Jan. 18, 1889), p. 169.

Conflicting Evidence - Cause of Death - Jury. — The evidence tended to show that the insured died from either of two causes: from malignant pustule, or from a carbuncle. The jury found for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, where the evidence tends to confirm either of the two theories as to the cause of the death of the assured, on only one of which the plaintiff is entitled to recover, a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff will not be disturbed.

Bacon v. U. S. Mutual Acc. Ass'n (N. Y. S. C.), 3 New York Supplement (Jan. 24, 1889), p. 237.

Policy--Construction--“ External and Visible Sign."--The policy provided that "this insurance shall not extend to any bodily injury of which there shall be no external and visible signs upon the body of the insured; *** nor to any death or disability which may have been caused by inhaling of gas." Held, that the term "external and visible signs" only applied to bodily injuries not resulting in death.

Same-Same--"Inhaling of Gas."--The exception in the policy of deaths caused by the "inhaling of gas," does not apply to accidental deaths caused by breathing, while asleep, the atmosphere of a room filled with gas.

Same--Same-"External and Violent Means."-The gas in the atmosphere, as an external and violent cause, was a violent agency within the provision of the policy requiring the death to be caused by external and violent means.

Paul v. Travelers Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 20 Northeastern Reporter (March 29, 1889), p. 347; 39 Albany Law Journal (April 13, 1889), p. 297; 18 Insurance Law Journal (March 1889), p. 187.

Policy--" External, Violent and Accidental Means"- Drowning. The policy insured against bodily injuries effected "through external, violent and accidental means," within the terms of the policy, causing death. The insured was classed as a farmer, and was drowned by the capsizing of a boat while rescuing the crew of a shipwrecked schooner. His body was recovered with a bruise over the left temple; how caused there was no positive proof. Held, that his death was caused through means within the terms of the policy.

Same-Occupation-Policy.-Though the insured was classed as a farmer, the fact that he was drowned while saving persons from a wreck does not exclude plaintiff from the benefit of the policy because of the provision that the benefit should not extend to death caused by "voluntary exposure to any unnecessary danger," or while employed in "wrecking," unless such occupation is "stated in the application and permitted."

Tucker v. Mutual Ben. Life Co. of Hartford (N. Y. S. C.), 4 New York Supplement (April 18, 1889), p. 505.

Policy-"Effects of Injury Caused by Accident"-Construction. -The assured, under a policy granted by the defendant company against "death from the effects of injury caused by accident," fell and dislocated his shoulder. He was at once put to bed, and died in less than a month from the date of the accident, having been all the time confined to his bedroom. In a case stated in the reference under the defendant's special act, the umpire found that the assured died from pneumonia caused by cold, but that he would not have died when and as he did had it not been for the accident, that as a consequence of the accident he suffered pain and was rendered restless, unable to wear his clothing, weak, and unusually susceptible to cold, and that his catching cold and the fatal effects of the cold were both due to the condition of health to which he had been reduced by the accident. Held, that the death of the assured was due to the "effects of injury caused by accident" within the meaning of the policy.

Arbitration-Statement by Referee-Special Case.-The defendant's special act provided for the reference to arbitration of any question arising on any of their contracts of insurance, and that the "submission to any such arbitration" might be made a rule of court. Held, that the umpire in a reference under the act had power to state a special

case for the opinion of the court under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, section 5.

Isitt et al. v. Railway Passengers Assurance Co. (Eng. C. A.-Q. B. Div.), Law Reports-22 Queen's Bench Division (April 1, '89), p. 504; 33 Irish Law Times and Solicitors' Journal (April 27, '89), p. 213.

Non-Payment of Premium-Forfeiture.--Plaintiff's husband was an employe of a railroad company, and took from the defendant an accident policy, payable to plaintiff, providing for the payment of the premium by an order on the company. The order directed the payment of five dollars out of each month's salary for five months, and from it and the express provisions of the policy it appears that each payment of five dollars was to pay for insurance for a given number of months, the whole being for one year. It was stipulated that each payment was to be applied only to the corresponding period, and that the plaintiff should have no claim against the company during the period any payment should remain unpaid. The order was forwarded to the railroad company, and retained by it as a voucher, but not accepted. The first payment was made, but the second was not, and the insured drew his whole earnings for that month, and the payment for the second period was never made. The insured during that period wrote to the defendant to cancel the policy, as he did not wish to keep it. No further attempt was made to collect the premium, though the policy was never canceled, and, later on in that period, the insured was killed. Some wages were due him at his death from the company for the month following the one out of the salary for which he had directed the payment to be made, but plaintiff collected it. Held, that the deceased was not insured for the period in which he was killed, as the order to the railroad did not, under the circumstances, amount to the payment of the premium.

Same-Notice to Insured.-The insured, having directed the cancelation of the policy, and drawn the wages intended to be applied in payment of the premium therefor, knew the railroad company had not paid it, and notice to him of its failure to do so was not required.

Waiver-Failure to Cancel Policy-Retention of Order.-Nor would the failure to cancel the policy and return the order effect a waiver of the defendant's right to insist on the forfeiture of the policy, as by its terms it was to only be in force during the period for which the premiums should be paid, and the deceased had the right to pay for later periods, and thus put it in force again.

McMahon v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 42 Northwestern Reporter (May 18, '89), p. 179.

Policy -Disease-Insanity-Suicide. The policy covered accidents which might happen to the insured through external, violent and accidental means, providing, however, that the insurance should not extend to any bodily injury happening in consequence of bodily infirmities or disease, and that no claim should be made where death was

caused by suicide. Held, where the insured killed himself while insane, and not conscious what he was doing, that such act was not suicide within the meaning of the policy, nor was it within the exception made in case of death resulting from bodily disease, and that a recovery could be had on the policy. (With note.)

Insanity-Evidence-Jury.-There was evidence that the insured was of a genial disposition, of good education, pleasantly situated, so far as his domestic relations were concerned, and in fair circumstances financially. Up to within a few weeks of his death he had been in full health and vigor, but about that time a change was noticed in him by the family. He was moody and nervous, desired to be alone, could not sleep nights, complained of a pain in his head, and looked haggard and sick. Upon going away from home on business strangers remarked upon his appearance, and he kept aloof from other men, and could not concentrate his attention upon the business in hand. Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury on the question of the insanity of the insured.

Same-Prior Attack-Admissibility of Evidence.-Evidence that some twenty years prior to the issuance of the policy the insured had been insane, was properly excluded, there being no evidence tending to show that he was not sane at the time the policy was issued, nor that he had had any mental trouble for a period of twenty years.

Blackstone v. Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 42 Northwestern Reporter (May 18, '89), p. 156.

Policy-"Permanent Disablement"

Ambiguity.-A man ef

fected a policy of insurance with an accident company which provided that "if the insured should sustain any bodily injury * which

shall occasion permanent partial disability (as defined on the back hereof) then the company shall be liable to pay him the sum of 200 pounds.” On the back of the policy was the following: "Notice.—

Permanent partial disablement implied the loss of one hand, the loss of one foot, or the complete and irrecoverable loss of sight.", Held, that the notice was ambiguous in its terms, and must be read in the most favorable way for the insured, and that consequently he was entitled to recover the 200 pounds for permanent partial disablement from hernia, if he had otherwise complied with the terms of the policy. Scott v. Scottish Accident Ins. Co., 26 Scottish Law Reporter (May 8, '89), p. 475.

Policy-"Intentional Injuries."- Under an accident insurance policy, issued as an indemnity against a particular class of injuries, and providing that it should not cover injuries "resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from intentional injuries, inflicted by the insured or any other person," the insured can not recover for injuries intentionally inflicted by another person, although the insured himself did not intend the infliction of the injuries.

DeGraw v. National Accident Society (N. Y. S. C.), 4 New York Supplement (May 30, 1889), p. 912.