the above act the insurance commissioner can not be enjoined from issuing a certificate on the ground that the name of the new corporation is so similar as to be liable to be mistaken for that of a corporation already existing, as he is the person to pass upon that question.

Same.--A corporation organized under the above act can not prevent the use of its name by a corporation subsequently organized under the same act, on the ground that it is a trade name, after the matter bas been adjudicated by the insurance commissioner.

American Order of Scottish Clans v. Merrill et al. (Mass. S. J. C.), 24 Northeastern Reporter (August 1, 1890), p. 918.

66

Action on Certificate--Measure of Recovery-Constitution and By-Laws.-The certificate or policy issued by defendant provides for the payment of a certain sum of money upon the death of a member, as provided in the constitution." The constitution provides that, “the company shall not be liable in case of the death of a member for more than one-fifth of the amount of the bi-monthly premiums next following said death on all the members of the department to which such deceased member belongs, for each $1,000 of death benefit named in his policy. This, however, does not prohibit the board of directors from paying a loss in full, but the amount paid shall in no case exceed the amount stated in the policy." Held, that the contract was for the amount stated in it, unless reduced by the company, and that, in the absence of proof as to which department the deceased belonged, or the amount of the bi-monthly premiums, a verdict for the full amount is proper.

La Manna, admx., v. National Security Life & Accident Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 32 New York State Reporter (August, 1890), p. 347; 10 New York Supple ment (July 17, 1890), p. 221.

Sick Benefits-Forfeiture--Waiver-By-Law.-A by-law of defendant, that if a member is in arrears when taken sick he shall not be entitled, by paying up such arrearages, to benefits during such sickness, is not waived by accepting arrearages from a member while sick.

Nagel v. Glasburger (N. Y. S. C.), 10 New York Supplement (August 7, 1890), p. 503; 32 New York State Reporter (August, 1890), p. 277.

Assessment on Subordinate Lodge--Mandamus.--Mandamus will not lie to compel payment of an assessment from an incorporated lodge of Michigan at the instance of a supreme lodge outside the state and not subject to its laws, nor can the latter enforce penalties for non-payment. Lamphere v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. (Mich. S. C.), 19 Insurance Law Journal (August, 1890), p. 767.

Certificate--Children as Beneficiary--Construction.--The constitution and by-laws of a benevolent society show that the design was to benefit the entire family, and there was no charter authority for naming the beneficiary. The insured applied for insurance for the benefit of his

children named, but the certificate was payable to the children generally, without naming them. Held, that a child subsequently born is entitled to a share.

Thomas, Guardian, v. Leake, Guardian (Tex. S. C.), 19 Insurance Law Journal (August, 1890), p. 759; 22 Chicago Legal News, 432.

Policy--Application-Contract-Forfeiture.--The policy contained the statement that it was issued upon the faith of the statements contained in the application, which was referred to and made part of the policy. The policy contained no clause avoiding it for non-payment of dues and assessments, but such a provision was contained in the application. The insured failed to pay certain dues and assessments; and contends on trial of this action that such failure did not work a forfeiture because there was no provision therefor in the policy. Held, that the policy and the application together formed the contract, and that, under the clause in the application, the policy was voided by non-payment of the dues and assessments.

Payment of Dues--Notice.--The fact that the company had sent notices to the insured of time when the dues were payable would not create an obligation on the part of the company to continue such notices, it being a voluntary act on its part, and not required by the terms of the policy.

Same-Waiver of Time.--A custom to receive post-office orders or drafts dated prior to the day when the payment of dues should be made, but not received by the company until after such day, will not waive forfeiture for nor-payment of dues on day when due.

Mandego v. Centennial Mutual Life Ass'n (Iowa S. C.), 19 Insurance Law Journal (July, 1890), p. 660.

Application Filled by Agent-Estoppel.--A life insurance company can not defeat a recovery on a policy which provides that it shall be void if the application contains any untrue statement, when it appears that its own agent placed the age of the insured, who was unable to read or write and did not know his own age, at less than it really was, stating at the time that he would make the insured out younger than he was.

Keystone Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Jones (Md. C. A.), 20 Atlantic Reporter (August 20, 1890), p. 195.

"Related To "-" Relations "--" Next of Kin "--Definition.The phrases "related to," "relations," and "next of kin," whether used in a statute, will or contract, include only relations by blood, and not connections by marriage, not even a husband or wife.

Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Bennett et al. (N. J. Ch. C.), 15 Atlantic Reporter (June 11, 1890), p. 785.

Unlawful Expulsion — Effect - Action for Benefits. It is no

ground for non-suit, in an action for benefits by a member of a fraternal Order, that plaintiff was in arrears for dues, where it appears that the plaintiff was unlawfully expelled from the Order, and that his dues were paid up to that time, and that all subsequent dues had been tendered.

Expulsion of Member-Rule-Notice. In the absence of any rule of the Order on the subject of notice, a member can not be expelled except upon notice of the charges against him, and after reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Simmons v. The Syracuse, etc., Society (N. Y. S. C.), 32 New York State Reporter (August, 1890), p. 428.

Payment of Premium-Evidence-Jury.--The defense was nonpayment of the fee required as a condition precedent to membership. It appeared that the company had forwarded the certificate to deceased, who was one of its agents; that the accounts between him and the company were confused; that on one occasion they had returned to him part of a remittance he had sent them, on the ground that it was an overpayment; that they had published his name in the list of members, and that they had levied a mortuary assessment on him as if he were a member. Held, that the evidence warranted the jury in finding that the fee had eitner been paid, or its payment waived, as a condition precedent.

Same-Certificate--Construction.-Where the certificate provides that assessments shall be payable within thirty days of the date of notice, payment within such thirty days is sufficient to keep the certificate in force, though made by the beneficiary after the death of the member.

Certificate-Waiver by Agents--Construction.--A clause in the certificate denying to agents the power to make, alter or discharge contracts, waive forfeitures, or extend credits, does not apply to the secretary and general manager of the company.

Instructions-Refusal-Practice. It is proper to refuse an ipstruction that has already been given in substance.

Bankers & Merchants Mutual Life Ass'n v. Stapp (Tex. S. C.), 14 Smithwestern Reporter (August 25, 1890), p. 168.

LIFE INSURANCE.

Policy Premium Loan Interest-Prospectus of CompanyDividend. The policy, interpreted by its own terms, imports that the part of the premium not paid by the insured, but retained by him as a loan, was to bear interest from the time the premium became due. Each annual premium, as to the full amount thereof, was due at the time fixed by the policy for its payment, and so much of the money as was not then paid remained due for the purpose of bearing interest, during the whole period the insured retained it as a loan, to wit, up to the time of the maturity of the policy; and a clause in the prospectus of the company saying: "We require interest on one loan paid annually in advance; all other interest paid by dividends," did not import a guarantee by the company that the dividends would be sufficient to pay all other interest, but signified merely that dividends, so far as they might be sufficient, would be received in discharge of interest, save that which was specified as payable in advance.

Rescission of Contract-Fraud-Laches.

Upon the facts of the

case an alternative prayer in the declaration for a rescission of the contract of insurance for alleged fraud ought not to be granted after the lapse of more than fifteen years after the fraud, if any, was committed.

MacIntire v. Cotton States Life Ins. Co. (Ga. S. C.), 9 Southeastern Reporter (Oct. 15, 1889), p. 1124.

Forfeiture-Accepting Premium After Due-Receipt - Proofs of Loss-Waiver.-The policy provided that if the dues and assessments were not paid when due it should be void. Payment of dues more than a month overdue was tendered, and a conditional receipt given by the company, reciting that the time of their payment having expired, the receipt was given and accepted on the condition that the member was then temperate and in good health, otherwise the payment and the certificate to be void. The insured was at the time ill, and died on the next day. Held, (1) that the original contract was terminated by the non-payment of dues, and the subsequent payment and receipt constituted a new contract whose terms bound the insured whether the receipt was read or not; (2) that the conditions of the receipt not having been complied with, the payment became null and the original certificate was not revived; and (3) that a request for proofs of loss in accordance with the terms of the contract, which were necessary to determine the liability of the company, was not a waiver of the forfeiture.

Ronald v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (N. Y. S. C.), 18 Insurance Law Journal (Sept., 1889), p. 733.

Trustee of Policy-Fraudulent Appointment and Surrender of Policy-Liability of Trustee's Estate-Measure of Damage.—A sum of stock was settled in 1834 upon trust to keep up a policy of assurance on the life of D., and subject thereto upon trust for D. for life, and after his decease the fund and the moneys payable under the policy were to be held in trust for his three children, or such one or more of them, and in such shares and proportions, as D. by deed or will appoint. In 1849 and 1850 D. and the three children released the trustees from the stock and from all liability to keep up the policy, D. entering into a covenant to keep it up, and the stock was transferred by the trustees. In 1852 D. appointed the policy to B., one of his daughters, to her separate use, without restraint, on anticipation, upon a bargain with her that she should surrender the policy and pay the money to him. He promised her to effect and keep on foot a fresh policy, and to settle it upon the same trusts as the old one. The trustees, having no notice of the bargain, surrendered the policy to B., who surrendered it to the office and paid the proceeds to D. D. effected the new policy, but failed to devote it effectually to the trusts. The money received on the surrender of the policy was £875, but the sum which would have been payable under it, had it been kept on foot until D.'s death, was more than £5,000. Held, (by Kekewich, J.) that the appointment was invalid, and that D.'s estate after his death was liable for the full amount which would have been received had the policy been kept in force; and the £5,000 must be raised out of his estate and be distributed as in default of appointment. Held (on appeal), that (apart from the question of B.'s concurrence) this was the correct measure of liability; but that B., having been an active party to the transaction could not complain of it, and that the amount payable by D.'s estate must be diminished by the share which she, if not a party to the transaction, would have taken in default of appointment, and that D.'s promise to settle a fresh policy, which promise he failed to keep, was not a misrepresentation entitling her to say that she had been deceived into concurring in the transaction, and was to be treated as if she had not concurred.

Bridger v. Dean (Eng. C. A.-Chanc. Div.), 42 Chancery Division-Law Reports (Sept. 2, 1889), p. 9.

Assignment-Insurable Interest.-A person who has procured a policy of insurance upon his life can not assign it to parties who have no insurable interest in his life.

Same-Evidence-Collateral Security.-M., on September 20, 1884, made an assignment, absolute upon its face, of a policy of insurance on his life to R. It appeared, however, from the evidence, that in former transactions about the same matter that the policy was held by R. as security for advancements made for premiums and assessments made upon