not apply to the excess over $500, but such excess shall inure to the benefit of the husband's creditors. Held, that the court will have power to adjust, declare and determine the rights and interest of the plaintiff, as a judgment creditor of the husband, in the policy, though the plaintiff may not be able to realize anything from such a contract until it matures. It has power also to enjoin the husband and wife from making any transfer of the policy, except in subordination of the rights of plaintiff herein; and it can award a like judgment as to the future contingent interests of the infant defendants. And the plaintiff might preserve the policy from forfeiture by payment of future premiums, upon equitable conditions, if he so desired. (Ruger, C. J., and Finch, J., dissenting.)

Stokes v. Amerman et al. (N. Y. C. A.), 24 Northeastern Reporter (July 18, 1890), p. 819; 19 Insurance Law Journal, 788.

Assignment of Policy-Sale.-- Plaintiff's testator assigned to defendants a paid-up policy on his life in consideration of its surrender value, and received an agreement from them that recited that they had agreed to sell the same to him on or before a certain date, on repayment of said sum, and which provided that if said sum was not paid on said day, they would, on demand, pay to the testator the sum of $100 additional in full of all demands against them. The money was not paid on the specified day. Held, that the agreement was an absolute assignment, with an agreement to resell on certain conditions, and that the transaction was a sale, and not a mortgage.

Brennan, Ex'r, v. Crouch, Impleaded (N. Y. S. C.), 32 New York State Reporter (August, 1890), p. 273.

Sum Insured--What Included - Bonus Additions. By au antenuptial contract of marriage the trustees were directed to effect a policy of insurance for the sum of £2,000 upon the joint lives of the wife and her husband, the premiums to be paid out of moneys conveyed to the trustees for that, among other purposes; and with respect to the division of "the said sum" to be derived from said policy on the death of the longest liver of the spouses, it was agreed that the sum should be invested on proper security, and the rights thereof taken to the children in fee. The wife conveyed all her other estate, including acquirenda, to her husband. The wife survived the husband, and on her death the policy was worth, with bonus additions, upward of £3,183. Held, in a case presented by the general disponee of the husband and the children of the marriage, that the children's right was not limited to the sum of £2,000, contained in the policy, but they were entitled as well to the bonus additions, and that these did not pass under the general conveyance of the wife's estate, including acquirenda, to her husband.

Sparks and Another (Burnett's Trustees), (Court of Sessions, 2nd. Div., Scotland), 27 Scottish Law Reporter (August 6, 1890), p. 798.

Assignment of Policy-Security for Debt.-In 1846 B. assigned an insurance policy on his life to M., under an agreement that the pro

ceeds, when collected, were to be applied to the liquidation of any indebtedness from B. to M. that might arise out of transactions then commenced between them, and that the balance, if any, should be paid over to B.'s legal representatives. In 1851 the parties had a settlement, and M. accepted one-half the balance due him, and gave a written discharge of all his claims against B. Nothing was then said or done about the policy, and M. continued to carry it until his death, twentyone years afterward, and during that time, and for ten years longer, B. in no way indicated that he had any interest in it, though M.'s executors had negotiated with him to take it up. Held, that, in the absence of any evidence as to the agreement of the parties after the settlement of 1851, it must be presumed that the original agreement continued, and that B. retained an interest in the policy.

Shackelford v. Mitchell et al. (N. Y. City C. P.), 10 New York Supplement (July 17, 1890), p. 122.

Two Administrators in Different States-Action on Policy— Possession of Policy.-- In an action on a life insurance policy it appeared that the assured died a resident of Maine, and an administrator was there appointed who obtained possession of the policy, and recovered upon it. Plaintiff was appointed administrator of the assured in New York, and sued for the amount of the policy. Held, that the fact that he had never had possession of the policy is fatal to a recovery.

Morrison, Public Adm'r, v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 10 New York Supplement (August 7, 1890), p. 445.

MARINE INSURANCE.

99—66

Policy--"Improper Navigation ”—“ Improper Stowage."—By the rules of the defendant, a shipowners' mutual insurance association, the plaintiffs were entitled to protection in respect of "damage to goods on board when caused by improper navigation" of their ship, but were not entitled to claim in respect of "damage caused by improper stowage." A cargo of wheat while in the hold of plaintiffs' ship was damaged owing to a taint communicated to the wheat through the ceiling and limber boards of the vessel having been saturated from a composition which had leaked from the previous cargo. The ceiling and limber boards had not been properly cleaned before the wheat was stored. Held, (affirming the judgment of Charles, J.) that the damage was not caused by "improper navigation."

Canada Shipping Co. v. British Shipowners' Mutuol Protection Ass'n (Eng. C. A., Q. B. D.), 23 Queen's Bench Division, Law Reports (Sept. 2, 1889), p. 342.

Warranty-Registered Tonnage-Forfeiture.-The policy warranted that the ship should not be loaded more than her registered tonnage on any one voyage. An American ship, before its transfer to the Hanoverian flag, had been registered at the custom-house at 916 71-96 tons. After she was transferred she was registered at 792 tons. Held, that a warranty not to load a vessel more than her registered tonnage is a warranty not to load more tons of weight than the ship could carry, as entered upon the official record as the ship's tonnage; and that a vessel's registered tonnage is that of her home port, and the warranty made after the transfer not to load above her registered tonnage was broken by loading her with 901 tons.

Beck v. Phenix Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 7 New York Supplement (Dec. 5, 1889), p. 492.

Shipment--Quantity-Evidence.-This was an action on a policy of insurance on a quantity of sugar shipped from Cuba to New York. The principal controversy on the trial was whether the shipment consisted of 531 hogsheads or of 368 hogsheads only. Held, that letters written to the insured firm by its own agents, as to the quantity of the shipments, were incompetent as evidence as to the quantity of such shipment where the quantity was in dispute.

Insurance Company of North America v. Guardiola et al. (U. S. C. C.), 18 Insurance Law Journal (Oct., 1889), p. 810.

Maritime Liens-Insurance Premium-Statute.-The insurance

company claimed that it was entitled to share on equal terms with the claimants for repairs and supplies, and should have priority or precedence over the claim for damages sustained from negligent towage. Held, that admiralty gives no lien on a vessel for unpaid premiums for insurance thereon; and that though a state law confers a lien on a vessel for unpaid insurance premiums, such lien is subordinate to maritime liens for supplies and repairs, and for damages for negligent towage. The Daisy Day (U. S. C. C.), 40 Federal Reporter (January 21, 1890), p. 603.

Mutual Company-By-Laws-Construction-Lloyd's Policy-Running Down Clause--Loss not Covered--Collision-Adjustment of Damage-Policy.-The plaintiff, a mutual marine insurance company, sued the defendants for a sum of money which it claimed to be due to it. The defendants acknowledged the debt, but claimed a set-off by reason of the following facts: The defendants were insured under a Lloyd's policy, with running-down clause attached. Under this clause that association agreed to become liable to the defendants for an amount equal to three-fourths of any sum which the defendants might become liable to pay, by reason of their ship coming into collision with any other ship. The plaintiff's policy covered all that the Lloyd's policy did not, and so covered the one-fourth of any damage by reason of collision not covered by the policy in Lloyd's. The defendant's ship came into collision with another ship. Both ships were equally at fault. The defendant's ship sustained the greater damage, and the loss was adjusted by the parties by the owners of the other ship paying the defend ants a sum equal to the difference between half the amount of damage sustained by their ship and half the amount sustained by the defendant's ship. The defendants claimed that they had become liable to pay the half of the damage sustained by the other ship, and did pay that sum by deducting from half the amount of their own damage; that three-fourths of that sum was recoverable from the Lloyds and one-fourth from the plaintiff. Held, that as half of the amount of the damage had not been paid over by the defendants to the owners of the other ship, but had only been allowed in account, by deducting from half the amount of damage to defendant's ship, therefore half the amount of damage to the other ship was not a sum which the defendants had "become liable to pay, and had paid," within the meaning of the running-down clause, and was not, therefore, recoverable under plaintiff's policy as loss or damage not covered by Lloyd's policy, and defendant's set-off should be disallowed.

London Steamship Owners' Ins. Co. v. The Grampian Steamship Co. (Eng. C. A,Q. B. Div.), 24 Queen's Bench Division, Law Reports (Jan. 1, 1890), p. 32.

Policy "On Account of Whom it May Concern "--Action--Parties. The policy in this case was issued to "A. E., on account of whom it may concern, in case of loss to be paid to him or order." The bill alleged that the libelant, at all times hereinafter mentioned, was the

owner of the ship, "and that said insurance was made for and on behalf of the libelant." The defendant excepted to the bill for the reason that it did not show any transfer from A. E. to the libelant. Held, that as the policy expressed to be issued "on account of whom it may concern," the libelant, under that allegation of the bill, is the real party assured, if he was then the owner. A. E. is but the agent, and the action in such case may be brought in the name of the principal, without any written transfer.

as

Same--"Assured."-The policy expressed to be payable to the sured." Held, that the assured, under a policy of this form, is the person for whom the insurance was effected, i. e., the person who is the real party in interest.

Seaworthiness--Presumption-Pleading.It is not necessary to allege in the bill that the vessel was seaworthy, as the onus to prove that the vessel was not seaworthy is on the defendant.

Earnmoor v. California Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 40 Federal Reporter (Feb. 18, 1890), p. 847.

Bill of Lading--Subrogation of Carrier--Policy--Subrogation of Company.-The bill of lading issued by a common carrier contained a clause whereby the insured agreed that in case of damage to the goods shipped, by reason of the fault of the carrier, such carrier should have the benefit of any insurance on such goods. The policy provided that the company should have the right of subrogation against any wrongdoer; and that in case the insured should do anything, or enter into any agreement whereby the rights of the company were lost, or should make the insurance payable to any carrier, then the policy should be void. Held, that by the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the carrier, the rights stipulated for by the insurer have been wholly nullified and cut off, which defeats the plaintiffs' right to recover on the policy. Fayerweather et al. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 23 Northeastern Reporter (Feb. 14, 1890), p. 192; 41 Albany Law Journal (March 8, 1890), 193; 28 New York State Reporter (Feb., 1890), p. 689.

p.

Seaworthiness-Evidence-Jury.-Where there was considerable testimony that the vessel was seaworthy at the time of leaving port, and she sprang a leak and sank, in fine weather, within forty-eight hours thereafter, the question of seaworthiness and cause of loss was properly left to the jury.

Evidence-Bill of Lading.-The master of the vessel, being alive when this action was tried, the unauthenticated bill of lading was not competent evidence, as against the insurers, of the kind or quantity of the cargo, nor the amount of freight due upon its delivery to the consignee.

Palmer et al. v. Great Western Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 19 Insurance Law Journal (March, 1890), p. 263.