LIFE INSURANCE,

Husband and Wife--Assignment of Policy--Statute.-A married man, who had a policy of insurance on his life payable to his wife, acting as attorney for his wife, assigned it in due form to one N., to secure a debt. N. paid the premiums on the policy for several years, and then, at the direction of the husband and wife, surrendered it to the insurance company, receiving in its place a paid-up policy. Thereafter the wife assigned the policy to one C. for a valuable consideration. N. had possession of the old policy until its surrender to the company, and thereafter had possession of the new policy. At the time of the assignment to N., Laws N. Y. 1840, c. 80, and Laws 1873, c. 821, preventing a married woman who had children from assigning a policy of insurance, were in force; but after this disability was removed by Act N. Y., 1879, the wife ratified the assignment to N. before making that to C. It did not appear, however, that the wife agreed to the assignment to N. for the purpose of paying the debt of her husband. Held, that the assignment to N. was valid and effectual to the extent that it entitled him to receive from the proceeds of the new policy the sum paid by him for premiums on the old policy.

Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Van Cumpen et al. (N. Y. S. C.), 11 New York Supplement (Oct. 16, 1890), p. 103; 32 New York State Reporter (Oct., 1890), p. 1125.

Assignment-Married Woman--Statute.--A married woman is capable of assigning a policy of insurance issued in her favor upon the life of her husband only in those cases, and to the precise extent, which the acts of the legislature have expressly enabled her to assign, and a married woman having a son living, was not capable of assigning a policy issued upon the life of her husband for her benefit, until the enabling act of 1879, ch. 248.

Same-Same-Estoppel.-At the same time the plaintiff assigned policies on her husband's life to defendant, she covenanted that the assignments were valid and sufficient, and that, whenever required, she would, in order to carry out the assignment, do any other act necessary for that purpose. Held, that plaintiff was not estopped by such cove nants, from bringing an action to compel the reassignment of the policies to her.

Same-Same--Limitation of Action for Reassignment.-The wife's right to avoid the assignments and reclaim the policies will not be barred in the absence of any act recognizing the assignments or declara tion admitting the validity of the assignments, within the period of the statute of limitations.

Brick v. Campbell (N. Y. C. A.), 33 New York State Reporter (Nov., 1890), p. 520; 25 Northeastern Reporter, 493.

Surrender of Policy--Fraud of Insured-Innocent Parties-Rule. - Defendant, on application of a husband, issued a policy on his life in favor of his wife, conditioned to be void on default in paying the quarterly premiums. The husband was duly notified that the premium would be due on a certain date, but, before that time, surrendered the policy and received the surrender value. At the time of surrender he produced a paper under seal, signed and acknowledged by his wife, requesting the surrender, and releasing the company from further liability. This paper was a forgery, and the wife had no knowledge of the existence of the policy until her husband's death. The company, however, acted in good faith. The premium was not paid. Held, that the husband had the possession of the policy, and in dealing with the defendant in regard to it, was treated as her agent; and the rule that, when one of two innocent parties must sustain loss from the fraud of a third, such loss shall fall upon the one whose acts enabled the fraud to be committed, applies to this case.

Schneider v. United States Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 25 Northeastern Reporter (Nov. 14, 1890), p. 321; 33 New York State Reporter, 170: 19 Insurance Law Journal, 1043.

Change of Beneficiaries—Wisconsin Rule.—In Wisconsin, one who has procured a policy of insurance on his own life for the benefit of another, and has paid the premiums thereon, and retained possession thereof, may dispose of the insurance by will or otherwise, to the exclu sion of the beneficiary named in the policy; and the fact that the change is made in the beneficiary's lifetime does not affect the rule.

Contract-Lex Loci.-A contract of insurance having been entered into in Wisconsin, in which state the policy was delivered, and the insurance money paid, is governed by the laws of Wisconsin, though the policy was issued by a Massachusetts corporation.

In re Breitung's Estate, Adler v. Stoffel (Wis. S. C.), 46 Northwestern Reporter (Nov. 15, 1890), p. 891; 20 Insurance Law Journal, 168.

Pleading--Practice--Failure to Reply--Effect.-Where a complainant makes no reply to the pleas filed by defendant, but sets them down for argument, the truth of all the facts stated in them and well pleaded is admitted, and no objection can be made to their form or regularity.

Distribution of Surplus-Ratification by Insured-Plea.-A bill to ascertain the surrender value of a policy of insurance upon the life

of complainant alleged that the principles and methods adopted by defendant for the apportionment of its surplus funds failed to award to complainant's policy the amount equitably due it. Held, that a plea alleging that complainant agreed to ratify any plan adopted by the company for the equitable distribution of its surplus and profits was not an answer, for, if the method adopted resulted in an inequitable distribution as alleged, it was not the method complainant agreed to ratify.

Policy-Forfeiture-Accounting.-Where a life insurance policy is conditioned that, if the premiums be not paid when due, the consideration of the contract shall be deemed to have failed, and the company shall be released from all liability, a failure to perform the conditions operates as a formal release of the company of all its liabilities under the policy, and precludes the policy-holder from any relief in equity by a bill for accounting.

Rescission-Laches-Estoppel.-A claim that the non-payment of the premium was simply a rescission by the policy-holder of the contract, induced by the discovery of alleged frauds on the part of the company, can not be sustained, where it appears that he has had the benefit of an insurance upon his life for ten years at a rate of premium fixed upon the the hypothesis that the premiums would be paid for a much longer period.

Kellner v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 43 Federal Reporter (Dec. 2, 1890), p. 623; 13 New Jersey Law Journal (Nov., 1890), p. 342.

Assignment of Policy-Possession.-Possession of the policy is not necessary to the validity of the assignment thereof, where the assignee accepts the assignment, the question of delivery and acceptance being one of fact, depending upon the circumstances of the transaction.

Baker v. Crosby, Ex'r (N. Y. Superior Ct.), 33 New York State Reporter (Nov., 1890), p. 757.

Deposit-Statute-Amalgamation-Repayment of Deposit.-The E. Life Assurance Society made the deposit of £20,000 required by the Life Assurance Companies Act of 1870, s. 3, but did not accumulate a life assurance fund as mentioned in the section. The E. Society effected an amalgamation with the M. Life Assurance Company, which had ac. cumulated out of premiums previously received a fund exceeding £100,000. There were no creditors of the E. Society other than the policyholders, nearly all of whom had agreed to accept the liability of the M. Company. Upon a petition by the E. Society and the M. Company for payment of the deposit to the M. Company, held, that as there had not been an accumulation of a life assurance fund out of the premiums received by the E. Society, the provisions of the section had not been complied with, and the order could not be made. (The court allowed the petition to stand over generally, intimating that it might be brought on again when the M. Company had accumulated out of the premiums to

be received on all or any of their policies an additional life assurance fund of £40,000.)

Ex Parte Scottish Economic Life Assurance Society (Ch. C. Eng.), 45 Chancery Division, Law Reports (Nov. 1, 1890), p. 220.

Insurance of Life of Debtor by Creditor-Accounting.—An insurance society advanced £10,000 to C. on the security of a reversionary interest to which C. was entitled contingently on his surviving W. In accordance with the contract between the parties, the society insured the life of C. against that of W. for £34,000 in their own office, and provided the premium down to the death of C. The reversion was charged with principal, premiums, and compound interest on principal and premiums. It was stipulated that in the event of C. dying in the lifetime of W., the proceeds of the policy of insurance should belong to the society absolutely. C. died in the lifetime of W. Held, that the stipulation was void, and the administrator of C. had the right to redeem the policy. Bowen, L. J., dissenting.

Marquess of Northampton v. Pollock (Ch. Ct. Eng.), 45 Chancery Division, Law Reports (Nov. 1, 1890), p. 190; 24 Irish Law Times and Solicitors' Journal (Sept. 20, 1890), p. 49.

Statute-Winding-up Act-Constitutional Law.-Rev. St. Ill., 1889, c. 73, 103, which authorizes the auditor of state to wind up and dissolve insurance companies by suits in equity whenever he is of the opinion, upon an examination of the affairs of a company, that "its condition is such that its further continuance in business would be hazardous to the insured," is not unconstitutional, as impairing the obligations of a contract or depriving the stockholders of their property without due process of law.

Corporation and Shareholders-Agreement as to Stock.-An agreement between a corporation and its stockholders whereby the latter, who have only paid 20 per cent. of the par value of their stock, may surrender their stock for full-paid stock to the amount of one-fifth of their subscription, is valid as between the parties.

Same Same-Receiver-Action for Unpaid Subscriptions.-The receiver of an insurance company has no power either by virtue of his appointment by a court of equity or a deed of assignment made to him by the corporation, or by Rev. St. Ill., 1889, c. 73, 2 107, which authorizes the receiver of an insurance company to take charge of the estate and effects of the company 敬 and to collect the debts due and

property belonging to it, with power to prosecute and defend suits," to sue stockholders for unpaid subscriptions to stock which has been surrendered to the corporation, since the receiver has no greater rights than the corporation itself. Schofield, C. J., dissenting.

Order of Court-Appeal.-An order directing the receiver of an nsolvent corporation to sue the stockholders and subscribers to the capi

tal stock, though interlocutory, is appealable, since it determines a mat ter of substantial right; and the corporation may appeal from such an order on behalf of its stockholders when the latter are not parties to the suit in which it is entered.

Same-Exception-Practice.-An exception to an order of court directing the receiver to pay a dividend can not be made for the first time on appeal in the supreme court.

Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, Auditor, et al. (Ill. S. C.), 25 Northeastern Reporter (Dec. 12, 1890), p. 680; 43 Albany Law Journal, 258.

Assignment and Re-Assignment of Part of Policy-Laches.— An assignee of life insurance, who re-assigns a part to the insured, and delivers the policy to him with the assignments so attached that they can be easily removed, is guilty of laches, which will defeat his claim as against a bona fide assignee of paid-up insurance issued by the company on the surrender of the policy without notice of its assignment. Bridge v. Wheeler (Mass. S. J. C), 25 Northeastern Reporter (Dec. 12, 1890), p. 612.

Assignment to Creditors-Surplus-Rights of Heirs.-A debtor took out a policy on his life in the Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, and, after holding it a short time, in good faith, transferred it, with the consent of the company, to certain of his creditors, and took from them an agreement by which they were to pay the premiums, and, from the proceeds, when paid, retain the amount due, and pay the surplus to his heirs or to his order. He died without making any further order as to the proceeds of the policy. The company paid the amount of the policy to the creditors and the administrator. Held, that the transfer was not in fraud of creditors, but was complete and valid, and transferred the surplus to the heirs.

Same-Same-Remedy of Heirs.-The surplus having been paid to the administrator, the proper remedy of the heirs to recover the same was an action in the nature of an application for an order requiring him to pay over the money to them, and not an action on a common count for money had and received.

Johnson et al. v. Alexander et al. (Ind. S. C.), 25 Northeastern Reporter (Dec. 19, 1890), p. 706; 9 Lawyers' Reports, Annotated, 660.

Practice Questions of Fact-Supreme Court.-A judgment of the appellate court, affirming that of the circuit court, is conclusive of controverted questions of fact, on appeal to the supreme court.

Same--Instructions.-A life insurance policy contained a forfeiture clause for non-payment of the premium quarterly, and provided that no agent of the company should have power to extend the time of their payment. In an action on the policy the court charged that the jury should find for the defendant, unless the latter, by its officers, with