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a right to uniform government; and hence that no government should be set up, independent of that of Virginia, within the limits thereof. The fifteenth, that liberty can be preserved only by adhering to justice, temperance, and virtue. The sixteenth, that religion should be governed by reason and conviction, not by force; that all men are entitled to freedom of religion, according to conscience; and that it is the duty of all men to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.

The Declaration of Rights of Pennsylvania, next in order of time, following shortly after independence had been declared, also contained sixteen articles, beginning with a preamble. The preamble recites that the object of government is to secure and protect the community as such, and to enable the individuals composing it to enjoy "their natural rights and the other blessings which the Author of existence has bestowed upon man." Other recitals, which need not be stated,

follow. The declaration contains some affirmations not in the Bill of Rights of Virginia, touching freedom of emigration, and the right of the people to assemble and consult for the common good and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances; otherwise it is substantially the same as its predecessor in Virginia.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, also beginning with a preamble, contains thirty articles. The Declaration and the State constitution were adopted in 1780, a constitution proposed two years before having been rejected by popular vote. The preamble to the Declaration in question recites the object of government as in the corresponding preamble of the Pennsylvania declaration, and proceeds to affirm that the body-politic is "a voluntary association of individuals . . . a social compact by which the whole people covenant with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good"; and then that the people "ordain and establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitution of the State." The Declaration is more minute than that of Pennsylvania or Virginia, but without material difference in effect. The provision in regard to religion is more particular, towns being required to provide, at their own expense, for "the public worship of God and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily." The legislature may "enjoin upon all the subjects an attendance upon the instructions of the public teachers aforesaid, at stated times and seasons, if there be any on whose instructions they can conscientiously and conveniently attend." All denominations of Christians "demeaning themselves peaceably and as good subjects" should have equal protection of the law. "Freedom of deliberation, speech and debate," as well as of the press, is declared. The last article provides that "the legislative department shall never

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exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them," and so of each of the other departments respectively.

The Maryland Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1776, contained some special features. One of these was that the people of the State were entitled to the common law of England, and to trial by jury according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such English statutes. as existed at the time of the first emigration, so far as the same had been found applicable to their local or other circumstances, and of such others as have since been passed in England and have been introduced, used, and practised by the courts of law or equity. Another was a declaration against poll taxes, as grievous and oppressive. Another, found also in other State declarations, was against ex post facto laws in criminal law. Another was against endowments of religion by lands or goods, without leave of the legislature, except gifts of lands not exceeding two acres for a church or burying-ground.

The foregoing embrace all the important features of the bills or declarations of the several States having such provisions.

In accordance with these Bills of Rights, or, when such were wanting, in accordance with the principle set forth in them, the constitutions of the States generally provided with greater or less emphasis for a separation of the three departments of government - the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive. In special furtherance of this provision, the power of the governor, or president as he was called in two or three of the States, was particularly limited in relation to the legislature of his State. Thus, by the constitution of Virginia, the governor was not to prorogue or adjourn the legislature, during its sitting, nor dissolve it at any time; though, with the advice of the Council, or on application of a majority of the House of Delegates, he might call the legislature together before the time to which it stood adjourned. In Massachusetts the governor, with advice of the Council, in case of disagreement between the two houses of the legislature, in regard to adjournment or prorogation, should have power to adjourn or prorogue the legislature for a period of not more than ninety days. These are typical provisions.

The principle of separation was not, however, fully carried out in all the States, especially in the majority of them which had a Council distinct from the legislature; that body being a sort of inheritance from the confusion of the colonial period.

By the constitution of Virginia, adopted in 1776, a "Privy Council or Council of State" was created, to consist of eight persons. These were to be chosen by joint ballot of the Houses of the legislature, "either from their own members or the people at large"; and they were "to assist in the administration of government." They were also to choose, out of their own members, a "president, who in case of the death, inability, or absence of the governor from the government," was to

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act as lieutenant-governor. But members of the Council, while holding that office, were incapable of sitting in the legislature.

The constitution of North Carolina (1776) provided that the two Houses of the legislature should by joint ballot elect a governor for one year, who should not be eligible to that office during more than three out of six successive years. The two Houses should also elect in the same way seven persons to be a Council of State for one year, who should "advise" the governor in the execution of his office. No member of the Council could have a seat in the legislature; no judge of the Supreme Court or of Admiralty should have a seat in the legislature or in the Council. The governor and other officers might be prosecuted if impeached by the legislature on presentment of the grand jury of any Court of supreme jurisdiction; by whom the cause was to be tried, was left to inference.

The constitution of South Carolina (1778) - to pass over the provisional constitution of 1776-provided that the two Houses of the legislature should choose by ballot, from among their own number or from the people at large, a governor, lieutenant-governor, and a Privy Council of eight members besides the lieutenant-governor. If the governor or lieutenant-governor chosen was a member of either branch of the legislature, he should vacate his seat there. A member of either House chosen to the Privy Council should not thereby lose his seat in such House, unless elected lieutenant-governor. The Privy Council was to "advise" the governor, but the governor was not bound to consult the Council unless directed by law. Impeachment of officers. not amenable to any other jurisdiction was vested in the House of Representatives, and the senators and such of the judges as were not members of the House of Representatives were constituted a Court for trying impeachments. The lieutenant-governor and a majority of the Privy Council were to constitute a Court of Chancery.

In Massachusetts, and in New Hampshire also, the Council was to be purely an advisory body to the executive alone; but its members in both States were to be elected annually by the legislature, on joint ballot of the two Houses. In Massachusetts the Council, to consist of nine persons, was to be elected from the senators just elected; in New Hampshire the legislature was to elect two members of the Senate and three of the House of Representatives to the office. In both States impeachments were to be presented by the House and tried by the Senate.

The constitution of Pennsylvania (1776) created a "supreme executive Council," of twelve persons, to be elected by the freemen of the State, and to have a president and a vice-president. Vacancies might be filled by the legislature, unless the president and Council appointed an election to fill the same. No member of the legislature or of Congress should be chosen to the Council; but the president

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and vice-president of the Council were to be chosen annually by joint ballot of the legislature and Council, out of members of the Council. The president or vice-president, "with the Council," had power to appoint judges, naval and all other officers, civil and military, such as were not to be chosen by the legislature. They were to correspond with other States, and transact business with the officers of government," and to prepare such business as may appear to them necessary to lay before the legislature." "They shall sit as judges, to hear and determine on impeachments, taking to their assistance, for advice only, the justices of the Supreme Court."

By the constitution of New York (1777), the Council was to have important functions in relation to legislation. It was provided that the governor, the chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them with the governor, should constitute "a Council to revise all bills about to be passed into laws by the legislature"; "and that all bills which have passed the Senate and Assembly shall, before they become laws, be presented to the said Council for their revisal and consideration; and if, upon such revision and consideration, it should appear improper to the said Council. . . that the said bill should become a law. . . that they return the same, together with their objections thereto in writing, to the Senate or House of Assembly.. who shall . . . reconsider the said bill." If the bill were then passed again by each house, by two-thirds of the members present, it should become a law. A Court was to be instituted for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors, "to consist of the president of the Senate, and the senators, chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or a major part of them"; impeachment to be by the House of Assembly (Representatives).

All the State constitutions, with one exception, provided that the legislature of their States, usually called the General Assembly, but in Massachusetts and New Hampshire the General Court, should be divided into two branches, the first to be called the House of Representatives, of Delegates, or of Assembly - in North Carolina, the House of Commons; the second, the Senate. In Delaware the second branch was to be called a Council; a body not to be confounded with the Council of other States. The members of both branches were to be elected by popular vote; the suffrage being generally somewhat restricted, as for instance to freeholders, and often being more restricted in regard to the Upper than to the Lower House. The Lower House was generally the more numerous body, and was called the popular branch. In Delaware the Council was larger than the Lower House. Pennsylvania was the one exception; in that State, as in the Continental Congresses and the Congress of the Confederation, there was but one Chamber of the legislature.

The executive department of the State governments was generally

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vested in a single governor or president, to whose office was attached, or not, as has been seen, a council to "assist" or to "advise"; in Pennsylvania the executive power was vested, as has been stated already, in an executive Council, presided over by a president. The executive was elected by the people or, in two or three States, by the legislature. The judiciary department was vested in Courts having judges appointed by the executive, or by the executive "and" or "with advice of" the Council, or elected by the legislature.

All officers concerned with government, in all the States, were to hold office for definite terms less than for life, or during good behaviour; only the higher judicial officers holding in the latter way. Salaries were generally to be provided for the governor and judges and other superior officers, without allowance of fees. Delegates to Congress were to be elected by the State legislatures.

Thus, in the separation, perfect or imperfect, of the departments, in the division of the legislature, and in the establishment of fixed terms of service for officers and the substitution of salaries for fees, the States for the first time applied, more or less completely, on their own behalf the theory of good government evolved by them.

(iii) THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

What led to the Convention may be shortly told. The Confederation was an utter failure, and now was sinking, a helpless hulk, amidst general contempt. Meanwhile, a few of the states, such as Rhode Island and New York, which had harbours suitable for foreign commerce, were making spoil in their day. Free in fact from all external restraint, they sat at the seat of custom, laying heavy tribute upon those of their neighbours whose wares must pass through their avaricious gateways. Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Carolina suffered much. Connecticut was drained on one side by Rhode Island, on the other by New York; New Jersey, lying between New York and Pennsylvania, was "a cask tapped at both ends"; North Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina, was "a patient bleeding at both stumps."

The state of the country was alarming, and was growing worse and worse every day. Even the dry language of legal documents was eloquent of the fact. "Whereas," ran the commission of the New Hampshire deputies to the Constitutional Convention, "the limited powers, which, by the Articles of Confederation, are vested in the Congress of the United States, have been found far inadequate to the enlarged purposes" in view; "and whereas Congress hath, by repeated and most urgent representations, endeavoured to awaken this and other States of the Union to a sense of the truly critical and alarming situation in which they may inevitably be involved, unless timely

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