244 The Annapolis Convention [1782-86 measures be taken... to avert the dangers which threaten our existence as a free and independent people," it was therefore enacted etc. How acute was the danger, and what various forms it took, may be seen from the pathetic description of Hamilton, in the fifteenth number of the Federalist, and from the words of Madison, in his Introduction to the Debates in the Convention. "The federal authority had ceased to be respected abroad.... At home it had lost all confidence and credit. The unstable and unjust career of the States had also forfeited the respect and confidence essential to order and good government, involving a general decay of confidence and credit between man and man.” The weakness of the Confederation was early felt outside of Congress. In the year 1782 the legislature of New York unanimously passed resolutions, in which it was declared "that the Confederation was defective, in not giving Congress power to provide a revenue for itself, or in not investing them with funds from established and productive sources; and that it would be advisable for Congress to recommend to the States to call a general convention to revise and amend the Confederation." Nothing however came of this, beyond a reference to it by Hamilton in Congress, with a statement by him that he intended to propose to Congress a plan for the purpose. This was in 1783. It remained for the States which were suffering from the commercial exactions of their neighbours to suggest a consideration of the most pressing needs of the country. Virginia was the first to respond. In January, 1786, a resolution of the legislature of that State was passed, inviting a meeting of deputies from all the States to meet deputies named by Virginia, to consider the trade of the United States; "to examine the relative situations and trade of the States; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations might be necessary to their common interest and permanent harmony"; and to report a constitutional provision to the States such as, when ratified by them, would enable the United States, in Congress, effectually to provide for the purpose. The deputies were to meet in Annapolis, Maryland, in September of that year (1786). The plan was received with much local favour; but the feeling was not general enough to bring together deputies from more than five States, Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Desire for action was however growing stronger and stronger, and when the deputies met they did not hesitate to make recommendation in vigorous terms; more than that, in the absence of a majority of the States, they of course could not properly do. But they did not stop at advising the call of a convention to consider the trade of the States; other things equally deserved attention. The commission of the deputies from New Jersey had pointed to this; the deputies from that State were empowered "to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial relations, and other important matters, might be 1787] Address to the States. Call for a Convention 245 necessary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the several States." And that suggestion was acted upon. An address was accordingly prepared, by the hand of Hamilton, to the legislatures of the States, urging that speedy measures be taken to bring about a general meeting of the States in a Convention, to consider questions of trade and commerce, and for "such other purposes as the situation of public affairs may be found to require." The proposal met with favour in Congress, and in all the States, excepting Rhode Island, in greater or less degree, according as the result was likely to affect them. Congress, in February, 1787, resolved that it was expedient that a convention of delegates from the several States be held in May, at Philadelphia, "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union." Some of the States had already taken action and appointed deputies; all the rest (except Rhode Island) followed, some with reluctance, before the meeting of the Convention. The commissions varied. Those of Massachusetts and New York limited the deputies in terms of the language of Congress. Some were in broader terms. The commission of the deputies of New Hampshire authorised them "to discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remedy the defects of our Federal Union, and to procure and secure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to effect"; that of New Jersey, to take "into consideration the state of the Union as to trade and other important objects"; that of North Carolina, to "revise the Federal Constitution." The meaning of legal right between States drawing into closer union was now to come before the Convention, in somewhat the same way as in the struggle with Great Britain. An efficient external government was to be established, and in some way set over the same political bodies which as colonies had struggled as to rights with the mother-country. What now was to be considered legal right? Surely nothing less than what the colonies had contended for against England, -equality in subordination, equality in some near resemblance to equality touching private right. The States had now become more unequal than they had ever been before, often by unfair means; some had grasped, and were determined to hold, more than was their right; others of course had lost, and were suffering accordingly. The former must now yield what they ought not to have taken; the latter must be put upon the footing to which they were entitled in a nation based upon equality. And then, thereafter, it would have to be understood that some must perforce give way, in time of need, to the just requirements of others, whether sister-States or the general government. But would the States now accept for themselves what the colonies had desired of England, equality in subordination? No man knew ; the 246 - Opening of the Convention [1787 Debaters. Convention was to meet amidst widespread doubt and distrust without, and signs of discord within. But it was to be the council-seat of great men, and men of experience, filled with solemnity and a high and earnest purpose. Sixty-five delegates in all had been appointed; ten of the number never attended, some of them refusing out of unfriendliness. Forty-two were present at the close of the Convention; and, of these, thirty-nine signed the Constitution. In order to save constant repetition of the names of the States represented by deputies who took part in the debates, these debaters and their States will be named here; and as the Convention was largely a struggle between the greater States and their allies on the one hand, and the smaller States on the other, the list will be made out accordingly. The greater States. Virginia: Randolph, Madison, Mason. Massachusetts Gerry, Gorham, King. Pennsylvania: Franklin, Wilson, Gouverneur Morris. Allies (more or less). North Carolina : Williamson, Spaight. South Carolina: Rutledge, Charles Pinckney, General Pinckney, Butler. Georgia: Baldwin. The smaller States. Connecticut: Sherman, Ellsworth, Johnson. New York: Hamilton, Yates, Lansing. New Jersey: Patterson, Brearly. Delaware Dickinson, Read, Bedford. Maryland (a State more or less divided): Martin, Mercer. New Hampshire (not present until July 23, too late to take much part in the contest between the great and the small States) Langdon. Rhode Island declined to take part in the Convention. (iv) THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION The day fixed for opening the Convention was May 14, 1787; but it was not until the 25th of the month that a majority of the States appeared. On that day deputies from seven States were present; the Convention was organised accordingly, and Washington was chosen presiding officer. Ultimately twelve States, as the foregoing list shows, were represented. The presence of seven States was fixed upon as necessary for a quorum; the voting to be as in the Confederation and the Continental Congress. The Convention was to sit, and did sit, in secret; its work was not to be undone or embarrassed by premature criticism. Virginia, which had been the most active in bringing about the Convention, now took the lead in it, and on May 29, through Governor Randolph, one of her deputies, brought forward a series of fifteen resolutions, usually called the Randolph or Virginia resolutions, proposing the working material of a constitution; and they were treated accordingly. The resolutions having been presented and explained, the Convention 1787] Randolph and Patterson resolutions 247 resolved itself into a committee of the whole House, to consider the state of the American Union, and referred the resolutions to that committee. On the same day Charles Pinckney laid before the Convention a draft, in specific form and detail, of a Federal Constitution, founded upon the same principles. This too was referred to the committee; but no further official action was taken in regard to it. The committee now proceeded to take up and consider, one by one, clause by clause, step by step, the Randolph resolutions, until they were all disposed of. On June 13 the committee rose and reported the result, in nineteen resolutions substantially founded upon those offered by Randolph. The resolutions originally drawn, and those now reported, were directed, not merely to amending defects in the Articles of Confederation, but to the formation of a new government radically different, and designated in the report as a "national government. Opportunity was now given for presenting other plans; and on June 15 what were known as the Patterson or New Jersey resolutions were read. The resolutions reported were now recommitted, that they might be considered again along with those brought before the committee by Patterson. Patterson's resolutions, which, instead of providing for a new form of government, proposed no more than certain amendments to the Articles of Confederation, were set up against those which the committee had reported. The first resolution contained the keynote, as indeed did, in intent if not in terms, the first of the resolutions of the report. The "national government" of the report was understood by all to mean a government unlike the Confederation, a government indeed such as actually came to pass. In contrast with that idea, the Patterson plan, in its first resolution, declared "that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected, and enlarged, as to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union." The resolutions of the committee, calling for a "national government," had been supported by the larger States, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, with the help of States further south which were expecting to take higher rank in population in the near future. The Patterson resolutions, proposing what was called a "purely federal" plan, were the work of the smaller States, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and to some extent Maryland, uniting however upon different grounds. Connecticut and New York were opposed to any radical departure from the Confederation; while New Jersey and Delaware opposed a "national government" chiefly because proportional representation was likely to go with it, whereby they would lose rank at any rate. The general difference between the two plans may be shortly stated thus. By the first plan there were to be two branches of the legislature; by the second, there was to be only one. By the first, there was to be 248 Hamilton's plan [1787 representation by the people at large, the States severally having representation according to population; by the second, the States were to be equal in the legislature. By the first, the executive was to be single; by the second, plural. By the first, the national government was to have power to act directly upon the citizens of the several States; by the second, it was to act only upon the States in their corporate capacity, requisitions being made, as theretofore, upon the States for supplies, coercion (of the States) to follow in case of failure. By the first, the executive was to be removable on impeachment and conviction; by the second, to be removable at the instance of a majority of the executives of the States. By the first, the legislature was empowered to create inferior federal Courts; by the second, it was not. The Patterson resolutions being now under consideration in committee of the whole, Hamilton, who was not satisfied with either of the plans proposed, brought forward a plan of his own, not indeed as a formal measure for action what the Convention was likely to do was already indicated but as a definite expression of theories of government which he had just set forth at length in a speech before the committee. This plan proposed a legislature having two branches, an Assembly and a Senate; the members of the Assembly to be chosen by the people for three years, those of the Senate to be appointed by electors chosen by the people and to serve during good behaviour. The executive authority was to be vested in a governor, to be appointed by electors. chosen by the people and to serve during good behaviour. Besides having the duties incident to the office, the executive was to have a right of negative on all Acts of the legislature before they became laws; with the advice and consent of the Senate he was to have power to make treaties; he was to appoint federal officers, certain of them with the advice and consent of the Senate; he was to have the power of pardon except in cases of treason. The Senate was to have the sole power of declaring The supreme judicial authority was to be vested in judges holding office during good behaviour, and was to have original jurisdiction in cases of capture and appellate jurisdiction in matters concerning the federal revenue or citizens of foreign nations. The legislature was to have power to institute Courts in each State for determining all matters of general concern. The governor, senators, and all officers of the United States, were to be liable to impeachment before a Court of judges from the highest Courts of the States, one from each State. All laws of the States contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States were to be void; and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the governor of each State was to be appointed by the general government, and was to have a negative upon laws about to be passed in the particular State. No State was to have land or naval forces; the militia of the States was to be under the sole direction of the United States, and its officers were to be appointed by them. The plan was war. |