284 Seventh resolution. Personality of the executive [1787

(7) THE EXECUTIVE

The seventh of the Randolph resolutions, as originally presented to the committee of the whole House, declared that a national executive should be instituted; to be chosen by the national legislature for a term left blank; to receive a fixed compensation, not to be increased or diminished so as to affect a magistracy then existing; not to be eligible a second time; and besides having general authority to execute the national laws, to enjoy the executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.

The committee proceeded to consider this resolution on June 1. The question first raised was whether the executive should consist of a single person or of more than one. Wilson moved that it should consist of but one this with a view to giving energy, despatch, and responsibility to the office. Rutledge favoured the motion, especially on the ground of the greater sense of responsibility residing in a single executive. Sherman looked upon the office as but an agency, intended only to carry out the will of the legislature; the office ought therefore to be filled by the legislature itself as the best judge of the matter. He would leave it to the legislature to appoint one or more persons, as experience might dictate. Randolph strongly opposed unity in the executive, as the germ of monarchy; to that the fixed spirit of the people was opposed.

The committee now adopted the part of the clause in favour of a national executive, but felt unprepared to go on with the question of unity; and Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed.

Madison thought that it would be proper first to fix the executive powers, on the ground that, as certain powers were in their nature executive, and hence must be given to that department whether it was to be held by one or by more than one person, a definition of the extent of the executive powers would assist the committee in determining whether to entrust the office to a single individual or not. He accordingly made a motion which, as amended by the committee, prevailed, to the effect that the following provision be substituted for that in the Randolph resolution that the national executive have power to carry into effect the national laws, and to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for.

The committee next considered the clause in which the duration of the executive term had been left open. Opinion varied between a term of three and a term of seven years; by a bare majority the committee fixed upon seven years.

The mode of appointing the executive stood next in order; and Wilson now moved that, instead of the mode provided by the resolution, the appointment should be by electors chosen in electoral districts, into which the States were to be divided. He was in favour of an election by

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Election of the executive

285

the people rather than by the national legislature; the people however voting not directly for the executive, but for electors who were to make the actual choice. This mode would give the people more confidence in the chief magistrate than if he were to be elected as proposed in the Randolph resolution.

Gerry also opposed election by the national legislature; that would create constant intrigue; the legislature and the candidates would bargain, and play into each other's hands. At the same time he feared that the mode proposed by Wilson would give a handle to the partisans. of State authority, as tending to do away with the States. He seemed to prefer taking the suffrage of the States to that of electors, but was not clear in regard to the best course.

Wilson's motion was lost, only two States voting for it; and the provision of the Randolph resolution was then agreed to. Postponing the question of salary, the committee proceeded to consider a motion by Dickinson that the executive be removable by the national legislature, on the request of a majority of the legislatures of the States.

Wilson wished to reduce

This was a counter-motion to Wilson's. the small States to their place in a rule of proportion; Dickinson to give the small States their place as States, at every point in the system. Madison and Wilson accordingly opposed the motion. It would enable a minority of the people to prevent the removal of a magistrate justly considered removable in the eyes of the majority; it would also open the door to intrigue against a magistrate whose administration, though just, was in some States unpopular.

In reply, Dickinson, setting out with the proposition that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of the government should be made as independent as possible, said that an executive such as some appeared to have in mind (meaning a strong executive) was not consistent with a republic. A firm executive could exist only in a limited monarchy; and though he considered a limited monarchy one of the best kinds of government, such a government was out of the question here. For the present plan the sources of stability were first, the division of the legislature into two branches, and secondly, the division of the country into States. That division ought to be maintained and considerable powers left with the States. Hence the States ought to possess influence as to removing the chief magistrate, upon occasion. The motion was lost, Delaware alone supporting it.

It was now moved that the executive office be filled by one person. The motion was earnestly opposed by Randolph. First, it savoured of monarchy, to the very semblance of which the people were adverse; secondly, unity was unnecessary; thirdly, the needful confidence would never be reposed in a single magistrate; fourthly, appointment would generally be from the neighbourhood of the capital, and the remoter parts of the country would have no standing.

286 Unity of the executive adopted. Mode of election [1787

In answer to the last statement Butler contended that a single magistrate was most likely to meet the purpose of the remote parts of the country. A single magistrate would be responsible to the whole, and impartial to its varying interests. If three or more (the suggestion of three was a favourite one with those who opposed unity) should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He himself had witnessed how a plurality of military heads had distracted Holland.

Wilson saw no evidence that the people were opposed to a single magistrate; they knew that a single magistrate was not a King. All the thirteen States, though agreeing in little else, agreed in having a single magistrate. Besides giving energy, despatch, and responsibility to the office, a single magistrate would secure tranquillity. Among three equal members he foresaw nothing but uncontrolled and continued animosity.

The motion for a single magistrate prevailed; seven States voting for, and three against, it. The latter were New York, Delaware, and Maryland; a majority of the delegates from Virginia being opposed to Governor Randolph, Virginia voted for the motion. The subject was not further agitated, and passed on through the draft Constitution of August 6 into the Constitution. There it appears in section 1 of Article II.

On the next clause of the same seventh Randolph resolution, according to which the executive was to be elected by the national legislature, there was much debate, with alternating and conflicting results. Gouverneur Morris, opening the debate, again strongly opposed the clause. The executive would be the mere creature of the legislature if both appointed and impeachable by that body. He should be elected by the people at large. If the people elected the chief magistrate, they would not fail to prefer a person of distinction for character and services; if the legislature elected, the choice would be the work of intrigue, cabal, and faction. He accordingly moved to strike out the words "national legislature" and insert "citizens of the United States."

Sherman believed, as he had expressed himself in committee, that the sense of the nation would be better expressed by the legislature than by the people at large. The people would not be sufficiently informed; and further, they would never give a majority of all the votes to one man. They would generally vote for someone of their own State, and the largest State would have the best chance.

Wilson, replying to the argument that there would never be a majority for one person, said that a majority was not a necessary principle of election, nor was it required in any of the States. But allowing it full force, the difficulty might be overcome by the expedient adopted in Massachusetts, where the legislature, by a majority vote,

1787] Election by the people or by the legislature? 287

decided in case a majority of the people should not concur in favour of any candidate.

Charles Pinckney opposed election by the people. The people would be led by a few active, designing men ; and the most populous States, by combining, would be able to carry their point. The national legislature, on the other hand, being most directly interested in the laws made by it, would take the most care to choose a fit person to carry them out.

Both points made by Pinckney were contested by Gouverneur Morris. Instead of a combination of the people of the populous States, there would be combinations in the legislature. As for the influence of a few designing men, that could prevail only in small districts. In the election of the governor of New York that sort of thing sometimes happened in particular localities, but the general voice of the State was never affected. He also answered the argument from lack of information by the people; the people would not be uninformed of those great characters who merited their esteem and confidence.

Mason, on the other side, thought a government with a chief magistrate to be elected by the people impracticable; it was as unnatural as to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent of the country rendered it impossible for the people to judge of the merits of the candidates; to which Williamson added, that while there were at the present time distinguished characters, known to everyone, it would not always be so.

A vote was now taken, and only one State favoured the Morris motion. Hardly better fared a motion to the effect that the executive should be chosen by electors chosen by the State legislatures. It was then (July 17) voted unanimously that the executive be chosen by the national legislature. A change, on July 19, to election by electors appointed by the State legislatures, was in its turn set aside, and election by the national legislature was again agreed upon, on July 24.

The mode of election bore directly upon the independence of the executive; and the vote last taken brought on motions, on the one hand, for re-eligibility, and, on the other, for extending the term of office beyond the seven years, which opened the whole subject again.

If the chief magistrate must be elected by the national legislature, Wilson would give him a single, long term of office; dependence of the executive must be prevented as far as possible. Gouverneur Morris again earnestly opposed election by the legislature. When the personal interest of members was opposed to the general interest, the legislature, otherwise trustworthy, could not be too much distrusted. In all public bodies there were two parties; the executive would necessarily be more connected with one than with the other. There would be a personal interest, therefore, in one of the parties to oppose, in the other to support, it. Much had been said of the intrigues which would be practised by the executive to get into office; nothing had been said of

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Various modes of election proposed

[1787 the intrigues to get him out. Men would covet his place, and cabal with the legislature, until the end was gained. As for the danger of monarchy, they might have something worse, if the executive should not be properly chosen. To get rid of dependence of the executive on the legislature, the expedient of making him ineligible a second time had been devised. In other words, we should have the benefit of experience, and were then to deprive ourselves of the use of it. The chief magistrate at the end of a long term would not cease to be a man; he would wish to continue in office. The road by the Constitution would be cut off; so he would make a road with the sword. It was a difficult thing rightly to balance the executive. Make him too weak, the legislature would usurp his authority; make him too strong, he would usurp legislative powers. He preferred a short period, with re-eligibility, but a different mode of election from that which had been provided for.

Various expedients were now brought forward; by Wilson, in favour of electors to be taken by lot from the national legislature; by Ellsworth, for appointment by the national legislature, with re-eligibility by the choice of electors appointed by the State legislatures; and by Gerry, for appointment by the governors of the States with the advice of their Councils, or, if there were no Council, by electors chosen by the State legislatures. Ellsworth made a formal motion in favour of his proposal.

The subject was discussed by Madison. There were objections to all modes. Election must be by some authority under the national or State constitutions, or by some special authority derived from the people, or by the people themselves. Election by the judiciary was out of the question; the only other national authority was the legislature. But there were in his judgment insuperable objections to such election. Apart from the effect upon the independence of the chief magistrate, such election would agitate and divide the legislature so as to interfere with public interests. In the next place, the candidate would intrigue with the legislature; he would owe his election to the predominant faction, and then would be apt to be subservient to that faction. Further, the ministers of foreign powers would use the opportunity to mix their intrigues in the election. Germany and Poland were witnesses to the danger. He then considered the three branches of the State governments, and found objections to election by any of them. The State legislatures had betrayed a propensity to pernicious measures; one object of the national government was to control that propensity; and one object of giving the national executive a negative on legislation was to control the national legislature so far as it might be infected with a like propensity. Refer the appointment of the executive to the State legislatures, and that purpose might be defeated. Appointment by the State executives was liable to the objection that they could and would be courted and intrigued with by the candidates, by their partisans and