its place. We can therefore attempt to answer the other question concerning the duration of the unprecedented depression of the latter metal in the market. We know that, at a price, England will take silver largely for use in manufactures, France and the other countries of the Latin convention will re-open their mints (unless they decide in the interim to coin gold and not silver), and the market will begin to right itself. At a price, too, the mines of America will cease to produce heavy masses of silver, for the market price may easily fall too low to pay a profit on the cost of production. We also have some reason for hoping that India's power of absorption will soon increase to a more normal rate. And, lastly, silver having already fallen in value, the tendency in silver-standard countries must be for prices to rise; in that event, the quantity of money in circulation must also increase in such countries, and more silver must be used by them. These are the equalising forces which must begin to operate sooner or later. How soon or how late they will be in asserting themselves is a matter of opinion; but they will inevitably act on the price of silver before long, and with a steadying effect.

In the meanwhile what is to be done? Clearly it is a very hard case for those who draw their incomes in silver to find that a sum which used to be worth 1007. is now only equal to 851. more or less. An immense number of Indian pensioners are in this position; and so are thousands who subscribe to Indian

rupee" loans, the interest on which is paid in silver; so also are the Indian railways, the Indian Government itself, and in short all persons or corporations who are paid in silver and pay in gold. The materials which Indian railways or the Indian Government want, in order to carry on business, have to be largely imported from England, and therefore payments have to be made with the more precious metal, while the receipts.

the case may be, are in the currency of the country, viz. silver. The Manchester merchant, who ships cotton goods to India or China, knows that he will be paid for them in silver, and not in gold; he therefore has to put up with a percentage of loss caused by the depreciation of the former metal. He sends his goods; he draws a bill-say on Shanghai

against the consignment; he sells that bill in London for what it will fetch, but finds that it "fetches" very little in comparison to what it would have done ten years ago; for, though he may obtain as many taels as before for each hundred yards of shirtings, yet he must obtain more taels if he is to be compensated for the depreciated value of that coin. But the consignees cannot pay more taels to the extent required. Evidently there is wide-spread loss resulting from the decline in silver. The loss is undoubtedly a misfortune to all suffering it, but whether it is an injustice to any class is a question which the Select Committee, under Mr. Goschen's able direction, may take in hand to answer, and which we had rather refrain from touching on here.

But whatever injustice may be discovered in the loss which falls on those who receive fixed incomes in silver, it seems clear that any attempt to Idivert that loss from one class and burden another with it-to alter its incidence, that is—would give indisputable cause for complaint and increase the injustice, if any, which exists in the matter. The hardest case of all, and therefore the test most favourable of all which can be applied to the consideration of redress, is the case of holders of rupee loan stock; for not only is their interest reduced because silver is less valuable than before, but the market value of their stock has fallen heavily. Within the last year the 5 per cent Indian rupee stock has sunk from a price as high as 103 to 85, which represents the fall in silver and the difference between the silver price-viz., par, or 100,-and the gold price,

the value of silver had fallen 15 per cent at the time the price of the stock was at 85. Keeping this case of hardship in mind, then, we can proceed to discuss the propositions which are put forth for counteracting the effects of the fall in silver. The holders

of rupee stocks state, with good reason and great plausibility, that the Indian Government, in making the contract with the subscribers to the loans, got full value at the time, and therefore the Indian Government should pay back full value when it pays off the loans in question. But this is an appeal ad misericordiam, for, had the case been altered and silver had risen instead of fallen in price, the stock-holders would naturally resist to the utmost any attempt to return them less silver than they had originally lent.

Of the propositions for radically mitigating the decline in silver, we may mention four, as being the least wild, but none of which appeals very strongly either to common sense or to a sense of justice. (1) A gold standard for India is advocated. What this means is that silver rupees shall no longer be legal tender for anything but small sums, that gold shall be coined and forced into circulation, and that debts in India, which were formerly payable in silver rupees, shall be payable in gold coins instead. In the first place, such a plan is impracticable, being, as it is, counter to the inherited notions of a slow and suspicious people. Conquered as they are, imbued with the fixed ideas of past ages, and averse to the despotic innovations of a new civilisation, it is prima facie useless to think of such a revolution. If the attempt were now made (and if it were necessary at all it would still be ineffective unless done quickly) it would be costly and inexpedient, because to suddenly sell off silver from India would reduce its price still lower than at present; and next, in order to obtain gold sufficient to supply India with a currency of the latter metal, we should have to squeeze the moneymarkets of the commercial world to an

with gold, we should have to buy in a dear market and look almost in vain for any market to sell in. (2) A somewhat similar proposal has been broached, to the end that silver, and especially silver in India, shall not be so fruitful a cause of loss to all who touch it as of late has been, and continues to be, the case; this is, that larger and more valuable silver rupees shall be coined by the Government and paid to those to whom it owes money in place of the present coin of that name. This plan escapes the criticism that the adoption of gold is subject to, inasmuch as it would not accelerate the fall in silver; but in other respects much can be said against it. To carry it out, all the old rupees in India -250,000,000l. worth-would have to be exchanged into as many newlyminted and larger rupees. Why should the Indian Government bear the loss, and who is to if it do not? If the burden be not borne by that Government, the new plan will be like arranging for every one to pay debts in eight halfcrowns to the sovereign instead of ten florins; nobody will think of paying ten heavy pieces when the bargain was made for payment in the lighter ones; but if the burden were placed on the Indian Government, and the latter should undertake to pay, so to speak, a half-crown where it used to pay a florin, it would be enduring loss upon loss. In addition to losing upon what it pays in gold-which loss is annually over a million sterling at the present rate of exchange the Indian Government would lose also upon its silver payments, and bring the loss up to five or six millions annually on its total annual expenditure. The proposal, if it seeks to avoid such loss to the Government, must include all creditors in India; but who is to say-Debtors, pay the new big rupees, although you contracted to pay the old small ones? and what would be the result of such despotism? In the name of all that is unpractical and impracticable may we ask where the line is to be drawn? It also would be manifestly quite impossible to single

pay them with big rupees and leave other creditors with the small rupees; the latter would think they had as good a claim as any other class of creditors; to convince them that they had not would require unprecedented powers of persuasion. (3) The proposal to leave India alone and to adopt silver as standard currency in England side by side with gold is another suggestion, which we do not know whether to call mad in preference to cool, or to consider its impudence superior to its wildness. It is an absurdity which has so often been shown up that it hardly requires more demonstration whatever the circumstances calling it to light may be. England, it is said, might with advantage seize the opportunity of buying up silver cheap and so introduce the Double Standard, and we should by so doing prevent the further fall of silver which is threatened, if not raise the price to its normal pitch. In practice a double standard means that a debtor may exercise his judgment about paying silver or gold in settlement of his debts. Under it, a merchant in America who sold cotton to Liverpool for 3 sovereigns might stand to be paid 70s. in silver instead, and he probably would be paid in the latter metal if it stood at a discount as compared with gold. And, vice versâ, supposing silver to have risen in value so much that 698. in silver were worth 3 sovereigns, the American merchant would undoubtedly be paid in gold as the less costly method (to the buyer) of settling the debt. These operations would be considered as tricks in England; and as to our foreign relations, London would to a certainty cease to be the central international exchange and clearing-house which it now is. Berlin would probably be the place at which money would be kept by the great exchange houses who settle the transactions of the world; for there, as is now

the case in London, the contingency of depreciation or fluctuation in the currency would probably be the least. We have a single gold standard here, which is one of the advantages enjoyed by the London money-market, and we had better stick to it; for foreigners know the value of a bill on London, and have no hesitation in intrusting us with their loose capital. If they did not know whether their money meant so much silver, or, on the other hand, so much gold, their confidence would be gone, and we should no longer be the bankers of the world. (4) It is suggested that India should raise a gold loan in England, and pay off the rupee loans by that means. The chief basis for this suggestion seems to be that the operation would be an advantageous one to the Government, in which case it would be to an equal extent disadvantageous to the holders of the rupee loans. But the advantage to India is questionable, as the annual interest would be payable in gold, whereas it is now payable in silver, and the drain on the public revenue would really be as great as now, though nominally a lower rate of interest would be required if paid in gold than if paid in silver. Whom the conversion would benefit, beyond the financiers managing the calling-in of the old and the issuing of the new loans, it is difficult to see.

We need not recapitulate, as we have only argued out what we advanced at the beginning of this article. We have merely explained our reasons for thinking that the fall is the result of a panic, and is to a great extent temporary; and that there are natural forces at work, which it would only retard to attempt to accelerate, and which it is wiser to leave alone. Acting quietly, these forces must cause the supply of silver and the demand for it to meet-at a price.