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to her interests, she would have chosen the year 1804 : that the operations of this league, after it had once been formed, should be delayed till the latter part of the year, she could scarcely have dared to hope. If Austria had been desired to name the crisis at which her present neceflities, as well as the prospects of bettering her condition, moft clearly enjoined an adherence to peace, she must have been blind, indeed, not to fix upon the same period ; and if she had shut her eyes to her moft obvious interests, it would have been the best policy of her alies to undeceive her, and chiefly of England, who had no stay on the continent but Auftria. But the blindness was our's; Auftria was alive to her true interests, as she knew her real situation ; and we unhappily prevailed upon her to seek certain ruin, by partaking of our infatuation. P. 33-39.
The next subject of complaint against the makers of the third coalition, is their strange inattention to Prussia. Their utter ignorance of her dispositions when the league was formed, their prospects of opposition from Berlin after they had begun to act, and their persisting in the hostile plan in spite of those prospects, are clearly demonstrated from the official documents. We
may remark, in passing, that the whole of the author's views with respect to Prussia, both in this and the subsequent part of his work, have received a lamentable confirmation since its publication.
From a view of these errors in the original formation of the plan, we are led to trace the no less fatal mistakes which accompanied its execution. These are chiefly resolved into one fundamental improvidence, the want of direct intercourse between England and Austria. Would it have been believed possible in King William's days, that England could ever be in such a state as to join, or form a league with powers who would not trust her with their secrets respecting the common cause, and even refuse to communicate with her at all, until the moment when her money was wanted? The truth of this charge is distinctly made out from the
papers themselves ; and there cannot be a doubt, that it was vain to expect any good from a league instigated by England, and to the operations of which she was not allowed to be privy. The following passage elucidates still more forcibly the inferences respecting the conduct of this country, which naturally flow from the preceding facts.
• Now, it may probably be stated, that the powers of the continent would not coalesce with us on any other terms ; that from dislike of our active interference in continental affairs, they refused to involve themselves in a more close connexion with us than the necessitous state of their finances required ; that from dread of offending France before the scheme was matured, they would not acknowledge the extent of their intercourse with us; that from these motives they refused to give us any share of influence in arranging the measures of the league, and even declined admitting us to an intimate knowledge of their concerted scheme. We believe there may be much truth in this statement, and that it will contain a juft account of the matter, if to these motives of repugnance we add a great distrust of our political wisdom in continental affairs; and perhaps some doubts of our good faith, arising from our conduct in former wars. But the existence of these prepossessions against us, is the very reason why this juncture should not have been chosen for a new coalition ; and whatever may have been the motives, the
repugnance of Austria and Ruflia to ally themselves with us, was a sufficient argument against prefling the formation, of a league. Avstria would not give us better terms, you say :- That is no reason for making a confederacy upon bad terms, but a perfeAly good reason for waiting till better can be obtained. There was no absolute necessity for making war on France in the summer of 1805. It is to be hoped we were not in such fear of invasion, as to buy the short respite of a diversion at any price. There was no presling occasion, fo far at least as the country was concerned, for having a continental campaign finished before the feffion of Parliament began : It is to be hoped that our representatives would have granted supplies without the stimulus of a war in the circle of Austria ; and a confidence in the wisdom of government might have kept them in good humour, without the fearful amusement of battles between French and German armies. After we had unwarily begun a Dew coalition, we might have paused when we found the obstacles to its fuccess so insurmountable. There was no fatality to make us perfist in arming the continent, when we perceived that the powers of Germany would neither unite together nor confide in us. We should have facri. ficed nothing but our temerity, and loft nothing but our too fanguine hopes, had we put off the execution of our rash design, when we difcovered that Austria would not treat directly with us ; that the durft not avow our friendship, until Ruflia came up to protect her from the consequences of such an admission ; that the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin could not be brought to forget Silesia and the indemnities. It was an ample ground for refusing to complete the league, that the allies would give us no voice in forming the plans of the campaign, or even 'in arranging the fyftem of the war ; that they for the first time recognized the enemy's favourite policy of excluding us from the continent, and would not hear a whisper from us until the moment when our money was wanted.
• But every part of our conduct is marked with the same deplorable impatience which prompted the firtt ftep. Having in our rashness re. folved to make a league, notwithftanding the unfitness of the times, the fame temerity made us perfift in our scheme, in spite of the backwardness and distrust of our allies. We burried on matters to a new coali- , tion, at a moment when the enemy alone could lose by delay; and pressed forward the coalition to a new war, when our allies, spiritless and inefficient in themselves, would neither fuffer us to participate in the formation, nor in the knowledge of the common schemes. " Mike war”-was our cry-" successfully if you can, but make war. -
against France-wisely and cordially if poffible, with such a union among yourselves, and such solid help from us, as may give some small chance of safety, if not of advantage—but at all events league against France. »
Thus a coalition and a campaign were the only objects in the contemplation of our government, and they fatally attained their wish; they got up the concert of St Petersburgh, and the invasion of Bavaria. There was a convention and a war, however, which they did not bargain for; the enemy was as rapid in completing the picture as they had been in preparing the canvas; the finishing, too, for so hafty a performance, was wonderfully harmonious with the original defign-he gave them in a few weeks the conqueft of Austria, and the treaty of Presburg.' p. 60-65.
From these capital errors are deduced the various defects in the combined operations. Four blunders are more particularly exposed ;--the choice of the commander in chief-the conduct of Austria towards Bavaria—the gross miscalculation of the allies respecting the movements of French armies—and the omission of Switzerland in their plan of operations. The subject of Switzerland is discussed in a manner particularly luminous and interesting; and the impolicy of our conduct towards that country is shewn in a very striking point of view. We shall at present extract the concluding part of this argument, not so much for its relation to Swiss affairs, as because it exhibits an amicting, and, we fear, a very correct picture of the foreign policy of England for many years.
• But the conduct of England relative to Swiss affairs, was indeed unfortunate in other respects. She seems to have joined with the allies in misconceiving at all times the importance of the Alpine territory. Her treatment of the cantons, when France invaded them in 1802, and the misfortunes which befel her allies in those countries, through the unskilfulness of the English agents, during the whole of the laft war, will not soon be forgotten by the Swiss. But a more recent im. policy on our part, has thrown away all the advantages which the coaJition might ftill have expected from the tried valour of that people, and their unconquerable hatred of France. We granted pensions to many of the Swiss officers who had entered our service during the last war, and always on the express condition that they fhould not reside in Switzerland. These brave men, whose influence with their country. men was powerful ; whofe fidelity to our cause bad never been suspected; who only panted after the moment when their rage against France · might once shew itfelf at the head of their peasantry, were thus de
prived of the only means by which they could maintain their personal authority, and support the good cause in their own country. Had they been allowed to receive at home a pension, earned by the utter ruin of their fortunes in our service, and not forced to earn it. over again by submitting to banishment; and had a fimilar bounty been extended to the other reduced officers, who were left at the peace without means of subfiftence, unless they entered the French or Helvetian service; the means would have been preparedio generosity and prudence prepared
-of rousing the whole Alps from Constance to the Rhone, in hostility to France, as soon as the war should break out; and the allies would then have had some prospect of "invading that powerful empire, on the fide where alone it can be attacked. It must, however, be admitted, that such a conduct on the part of England would have been anomalous, and sufficiently inconsistent with the rest of her foreign policy. To have looked forward beyond the next year; to have taken measures in filence for the flow preparations of distant events ;. to have gradually disposed the minds of a people in our favour by kind treatment, for which no immediate return was expected, or won them by any other means than a manifefto from a commander at the head of a paltry force ; to have laid plans of war beforehand which should not for some time burst into view, with glare and noise; out of our millions to have given a few pounds for the support of our firmest friends, ruined in our cause ; to have spent what we did give, a manner grateful to them, or really beneficial to our interests ; in our countless subsidies, to have had a single guinea bestowed, which should not be repaid by the defeat of the receiver immediately, and his utter ruin, at six months credit all this would have indicated a strange, unaccountable deviation from the system which has been unremittingly at work, fince the treaty of Pilnitz, by day and by night, during war and during truce, in aggrandizing the proud, and crushing the humble, and which has at length, by the most persevering conitaney of operation, unhappily completed the ruin of our allies; and triumphing, it must be confessed, over various and mighty obitacles, established our enemy in universal empire.
* These four capital errors in the arrangement of the late war, are, we think, either to be ascribed to England not having been consulted, or else to her having partaken in the infatuation of the allies. But it will be said that those allies would give her no voice in such matters as the choice of a general, the march of troops, and the plan of a campaign ; and that they would have perfifted in adhering to their own errors, even after England should have pointed them out. This is not improbable ; but it only shews, for the hundredth time, that things were not ripe for a new war. If Austria perlisted in preferring a general, from court favour, to the great prince who had twice saved the monarchy; if she infifted on calculating her plans upon the supposition that French armies can only move ten miles a day through Flanders ; if the fhut her eyes to the value of Bavaria, and refused to learn the para mount importance of Switzerland in any war against France-then it was manifest that nothing could be hoped for, and that Austria lind not been subdued to a sense of her interest, nor felt her real situation. It was the province of England to prevent her from beginning a league for which she was so ill prepared. It was madness in England to hurry on the Continent to a war, which, if unsuccessful, muit be its lait ftruggle for independence, in circumstances that made it madness to hope for success. p. 80-85,N 3
Our author next examines the nature of the direct assistance afforded by England to the operations of her allies. The folly of the expedition to Hanover, and the extreme inutility of the landing in Naples, as well as its ruinous consequences to the interests of that country, are satisfactorily exposed.
• We managed with our usual skill to unite all disadvantages in one plan : we hurried on one ally to the rụin which has since befallen him, for the purpose of rendering our army useless at a time when another ally might have been saved by its cooperation. So uniform, fo harmonious in every quarter have been the schemes of England throughout the late coalition !--And can we wonder that our affairs have been ruined amidst the wafte of our resources, and the squander of our opportunities, when we have been consistent only in impolicy, lavish of every thing but vie gour, and strenuous in pursuing all varieties of plan, all sorts of system, except those which border upon prudence and wisdom?' p. 91,92.
The enumeration of the errors committed by England during the last twelve months, concludes with a just censure of the late Cabinet, for exposing, by its official publications, secrets of a nature peculiarly delicate, the disclosure of which could serve no one purpose, except that of enraging our allies, and confirming their distrust of us on every future occasion. By the details given under this head, we find that those very things are divulged which should most studiously have been kept private ; and that the imprudence of this last act, fully suits the impolicy which marks all the rest of the piece. The first branch of the subject closes with an interesting comparison between the character and measures of King William, particularly the policy that led to the grand alliance, and the wretched system described in the foregoing part of the present work.
II. The second part of this inquiry, which exhibits a view of the effects produced on the state of Europe by the late disastrous campaign, opens with a sketch of the actual changes of dominion operated by the treaty of Preşburg. The extent of these, we believe, has not, by any means, been duly appreciated by the people of this country-averse as they always are to the discussion of such questions, and ignorant for the most part of continental - affairs. It is the more important, therefore, to have clear and authentic statement of the subject in all its relations; and truly the picture which the section now before us presents, is in the highest degree alarming. The value of the Venetian territory, both in a military and a naval point of view, and the prodigious loss of security occasioned to Austria by the cession of the Tyrol, are the more immediate considerations which the arțicles of Presburg suggest. The particular details of the subject cannot be abridged in this abstract; but we shall solicit the at