MITCHELL V. MITCHELL. The plaintiff brought this action against the said W. P. Mitchell and the sureties on his bond as administrator, alleging breaches of the conditions thereof, and demanding an account of assets that were or ought to have gone into his hands, &c.; and also against the defendant Gurley as clerk of said Court, demanding judgment against him for the balance of the amount ascertained to be due from said W. P. Mitchell as administrator aforesaid, above the sum of $2,000, the amount of his bond. The defendants demurred to the complaint, and assigned as grounds of demurrer: first, a misjoinder of parties defendant; secondly, that several distinct causes of action had been misjoined, one being an alleged cause of action against the defendant Mitchell and the sureties of his bond for alleged breaches of the conditions thereof, and another, against the defendant Gurley, as clerk, &c., for accepting an insufficient bond, &c. The Court below sustained the demurrer, and granted leave to the plaintiff to proceed in this action against Mitchell and his sureties, and against the defendant Gurley in a separate action. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to this Court. Mr. R. B. Peebles, for the plaintiff. for the defendant. MERRIMON, J., (after stating the facts). We do not doubt that the Court properly sustained the demurrer. It is plainly to be seen that the plaintiff undertook to unite in the same action two separate and distinct causes of action that may not be so united against different parties in no way connected with each other in such respect. The first cause of action alleged is against the defendant Mitchell and his sureties for the alleged breach of the conditions of his bond as administrator de bonis non, in that he, MITCHELL v. MITCHELL. having been removed as such administrator, failed to surrender to and account with the plaintiff for the assets of his intestate that came and ought to have come into his hands. The cause of action was in no legal sense connected with the alleged cause of action against the defendant Gurley— the latter was not a surety of the bond sued upon-he had no part of and was not chargeable with the assets of the intestate in any respect or manner. The second cause of action-that alleged against Gurley -was for gross neglect and malfeasance in office as clerk of the Superior Court, in failing to require the defendant Mitchell to give a bond as administrator de bonis non in a sum sufficient in amount. This was a matter separate and distinct from the alleged breaches of the conditions of the bond given, and had no connection with the cause of action in that respect. The defendant Mitchell and his sureties are not charged with having anything to do, or with being responsible for the neglect and malfeasance in office of the defendant Gurley. The alleged liabilities of the parties respectively are distinet, and, as causes of action, have no connection with each other, nor are the defendants jointly or in common answerable to the plaintiff in such respects. Comprehensive as are the provisions of the statute (The Code, $267,) allowing several causes of action to be united in the same action, it does not extend to and embrace distinct. causes of action against different persons having no substantial connection with each other in respect of such causes of action. It does not provide for the consolidation of all sorts of causes of action in the same action, nor does it allow two or more different persons to be sued in the same action in respect of distinct causes of action where there is no joint or common liability among them. To allow this, would be practically to allow the consolidation of two or more distinct actions as to parties and the MITCHELL v. MITCHELL. causes of action, into one. Such procedure and practice would not only be impracticable, but it would lead to confusion, and result in injustice to litigants. Different causes of action in favor of and against different parties must be litigated in different actions. Brown v. Coble, 76 N. C., 391; Logan v. Wallis, Ibid., 416; Street v. Tuck, 84 N. C, 605; Burns v. Williams, 88 N. C., 159. The Court ought not, however, to have made the order dividing the action into two actions, granting the plaintiff leave to proceed properly in each, because there was a misjoinder of two distinct causes of action, and as well, a misjoinder of parties defendant. The authority to direct and make such division is conferred by statute, and it (The Code, $272,) provides that, "If the demurrer be allowed for the reason that several causes of action have been improperly united, the Judge shall, upon such terms as may be just, order the action to be divided into as many actions as may be necessary to the proper determination of the causes of action therein mentioned." The power thus conferred can be exercised only in cases when there is a misjoinder of several causes of action-it does not extend to cases in which there is both a misjoinder of several causes of action and likewise a misjoinder of parties. In the latter case, it would seldom be practicable to divide the action. The statute has not provided that it may be done. The Court properly sustained the demurrer. It improperly directed a division of the action. It should have dismissed it, unless upon application of the plaintiff it had allowed him, upon just terms, to amend as to parties and the pleadings. To the end the plaintiff may have opportunity to apply for leave to amend, the case must be remanded, with instructions to modify the judgment as here indicated, unless the plaintiff shall obtain leave and make proper and necessary amendments. Morris v. Gentry, 89 N. C., 248. Error. Remanded. TATE v. MOTT. HATTIE V. TATE et als. v. J. J. MOTT et als. Judicial Sales—Infants—Jurisdiction-Parties Judgment— Estoppel. 1. The Superior Courts have succeeded to all the jurisdiction of the late Courts of Equity in respect to infants, and they have authority to direct sales of their property, both real and personal, in proper cases. 2. The guardian or next friend of an infant is not, properly speaking, a party to the action, although his name appears in the record. 3. The next friend of an infant ought always to be appointed by the Court, and really he is an officer of the Court, and under its supervision and control. 4. The Court has power, for good cause shown, to remove the next friend of an infant litigant, and appoint another as often as may be necessary. 5. It is not essential that the infant should know that an action has been brought in his favor by a next friend, as his incapacity to judge for himself is presumed, but the Court may inquire into the propriety of the action and take such steps as may be necessary. 6. Where an infant sues by a next friend he is as much bound by the judgment as an adult, and this rule applies to non-resident as much as to resident infants. 7. A judgment for or against an infant, when he appears by attorney, but has no guardian or next friend, is not void, but only voidable. 8. A guardian appointed in another State has no authority to represent his wards in suits and proceedings in this State, but when he brings suit for them as guardian it will be treated as if he were next friend. 9. So, where non-resident infant tenants in common filed an ex parte petition to sell land for partition, by their guardian, who was a nonresident; It was held, that the decree of sale was not void, and could not be attacked collaterally. (Williams v. Harrington, 11 Ired., 616; ex parte Dodd, Phil. Eq., 97; Sutton v. Schonwald, 86 N. C., 198; Morris v. Gentry, 89 N. C., 248; White v. Albertson, 3 Dev., 241; Marshall v. Fisher, 1 Jones, 111; England v. Garner, 90 N. C., 197; Turner v. Douglass, 72 N. C., 127; cited and approved). TATE v. MOTT. CIVIL ACTION to recover land, tried upon a case agreed, before Boykin, Judge, at Fall Term, 1886, of IREDELL SUperior Court. The question of title only was tried, it being agreed by the parties that the damages for rents and profits should be reserved until the question of title was settled. It appears in the record, that William S. Tate died intestate in the county of Iredell in 1879, seized of the land presently to be mentioned, leaving surviving him a widow, the plaintiff Cora M. Tate, and numerous children, all under the age of twenty-one years, except one; that after the death of her husband, the widow removed to the State of South Carolina, taking her children with her, and in 1881, Samuel J. Douthit was appointed guardian for these infants in that State. It further appears, that in August, 1881, the widow named above, her daughter of age, and the guardian in South Carolina named, employed counsel in the county mentioned, and brought their ex parte special proceeding in the Superior Court of that county, in which the widow and her children including the infants, filed their petition, the latter by the said Samuel J. Douthit, purporting to be their guardian in South Carolina. In this petition it was alleged, that the said children were the heirs at law of the said intestate; that the said Douthit had been duly appointed guardian of the infants named therein; that the petitioners, except the widow, were each entitled to an undivided one seventh of the land specified and described, subject to the dower of the widow, and she was a petitioner as to her right as doweress; that the land was of the value of about $2,045; that the infants had no other income; that the houses on the land were going to decay and ruin; that the petitioners desire a sale of the land to be made under the order of the Court; that their respective rights be ascertained, and the share of each of the infants in the |