HARRIS v. WOODARD. "a dark chestnut horse." and in the mortgage as "a black horse," and when it was proposed to put the mortgage in evidence, it was objected to because of this discrepancy in the description, and the Judge was requested to charge the jury, that there was no evidence that the horse sued for was the one conveyed in the mortgage. The Court held differently, and admitted the mortgage. The identity of the horse was a question of fact for the jury, and as it was admitted in that case that the horse mentioned in the complaint was the same as that mentioned in the mortgage, (though described differently,) the evidence in regard to the identity was needless. Whenever it becomes necessary to identify the property conveyed in a mortgage from property of a similar kind, or to show what was intended to be conveyed extrinsic and parol evidence is admissible. Herman on Chat. Mort., $39. In Goff v. Pope, 83 N. C., 127, the Chief Justice said: "The identity of an assigned article of property, and the means of ascertaining it, are largely dependent upon extrinsic proofs, of the force and sufficiency of which the jury must judge." The intention of the parties will not be defeated by a false description of the thing conveyed. In this case, the mule, though incorrectly described both in the note and the mortgage, is the identical mule, as the fact is found, claimed by the defendant. Under the conditional sale, the title to the mule did not pass to Silas Lassiter until he had paid for it, and the description contained in the note, whether accurate or inaccurate, could not mislead him, or protect any one claiming under him, nor could the misdescription contained in the mortgage protect him, for he purchased of Pharaoh Lassiter, who had no title at all. It becomes immaterial in this case, to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover on his mortgage or on his equitable title acquired by the assignment of the note by Tyson. MAYO v. LEGGETT. As against Lassiter, or any one claiming under him, his title is good, whether by the one way or the other. It was the defendant's misfortune to purchase from one who had no title, and the well known maxim, caveat emptor, applies, and this disposes of the 1st, 2d and 3d ground upon which the defendant based his right to hold the mule. But 4th, Pharaoh Lassiter exchanged the mule with the defendant for a horse, which he carried home, and "Silas Lassiter, having fully approved of the exchange, suffered the horse to be kept and used on his farm until the animal's death, without any offer or attempt to return it to the defendant," and the defendant insists that this "was a ratification of the exchange effected by his son, and made him a purchaser of the mule for value, of the mortgagor." The son had no title and the father had none, and the ratification by the latter of the worthless title of the former added nothing to its value. The plaintiff never ratified it, but "on being informed of the exchange several days after its consummation, demanded the mule," and on refusal, instituted this action. The judgment of the Court below was for the plaintiff, and this is affirmed. Let this be certified. No error. Affirmed. O. M. MAYO v. J. W. LEGGETT. Certiorari-Appeal-Estoppel-Possession-Notice. 1. A certiorari will not be granted to correct the statement of the case on appeal as made up by the Judge, unless it is suggested that an unintentional mistake has been made, when the case may be remanded, or a certiorari granted, in order to give the Judge an opportunity, if he thinks proper, to correct the case. MAYO v. LEGGETT. 2. Where the true owner of property holds out another as the owner, or allows a third party to appear to have the full power to dispose of it, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, the real owner will be estopped, and the innocent purchaser protected, but in order for the estoppel to arise, the purchaser must have been misled by the owner. 3. Actual possession of land is notice to the world of any equity of the occupant. 4. Land was conveyed to a trustee to secure debts, and afterwards a third party took a conveyance of the equity of redemption and paid off the debts, and then sold the land to a person who took possession. The vendor then caused the trustee to sell the land under the terms of the deed, in order to get the legal title out of him; It was held, that a purchaser at such sale, with full notice of the facts, got no title, and no estoppel arose against the owner of the equity. (State v. Gay, 94 N. C., 822; State v. Miller, Ibid., 902; Ware v. Nisbet, 92 N. C., 202: Currie v. Clark, 90 N. C., 17; McDaniel v. King, 89 N. C., 29: Holmes v. Crowell, 73 N. C., 613; Melvin v. Bullard, 82 N. C., 34; Stith v. Lookabill, 76 N. C., 467; Isler v. Koonce, 81 N. C., 378; Walker v. Mebane, 90 N. C., 259; cited and approved). This was an ACTION for the recovery of land, tried before Philips, Judge, at Spring Term, 1886, of the Superior Court of the county of MARTIN. A trial by jury was waived, and the facts found by the Judge are substantially as follows: On the 18th of December, 1877, Thomas Jones was the owner of the land in controversy, and on that day conveyed the same by deed of trust to Joseph T. Waldo, to secure the payment of certain debts therein named to J. W. Sherrod and W. L. Sherrod, partners, with authority to sell upon their request. Thomas Jones died in 1880, leaving a will, which was duly proved, and by which he devises to his son, W. P. Jones, the land conveyed in the deed to Waldo. On the 1st of April, 1880, W. P. Jones conveyed his equity of redemption in said land to J. D. Biggs & Co., for certain considerations mentioned in the conveyance, one of which was that J. D. Biggs & Co. should pay off and discharge the MAYO v. LEGGETT. notes to Sherrod & Bro. secured by the deed to Waldo. Immediately after the purchase by J. D. Biggs & Co., they obtained from J. W. Sherrod & Bro. indulgence upon the debts secured by the trust deed, till the 14th of October, 1880, when they paid the said debts and interest, and took from Sherrod & Bro. an assignment of the notes for value, by an endorsement, without recourse. At the time, J. D. Biggs & Co. intended a payment and discharge of said notes, and charged the sum paid Sherrod & Bro. and other sums paid by them, against the Thomas Jones land, in an account which they opened upon their books, and thereafter and until the trial, kept the said notes among their deeds connected with the Jones land, and not among their credits. On the first day of January, 1881, J. D. Biggs & Co., for the consideration of $3,250, conveyed to the defendant the land in controversy, who at once entered into actual possession, and so remained till the trial. On the ...... day of November, 1884, the trustee, Waldo, upon the written request of J. D. Biggs & Co., offered the land for sale at the court-house door in the town of Williamston, for cash, after thirty days' notice. The sale was advertised without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, who was not present and had no notice of the sale, but with the knowledge and consent of J. D. Biggs & Co. Before the bidding began, J. D. Biggs & Co. explained to the by-standers, plaintiff being present, that they had paid the notes secured by the trust, and had sold and conveyed the land to the defendant; that the sale was made only to get the legal title out of the trustee; and while the bidding was in progress, they made the same explanation to the plaintiff. The plaintiff purchased the land at $5,000, and about thirty days after the sale, paid the purchase money to the trustee and took a deed. After the sale and before the payment of the purchase money, J. D. Biggs & Co. explained again to the plaintiff the matter as above stated. About twelve months after the purchase of the land by the defend MAYO v. LEGGETT. ant, he met Biggs and told him that he understood that the legal title was in the trustee, and he "wanted it out." Biggs subsequently saw the trustee, Waldo, and told him that he had taken in the Sherrod notes, and had sold the land to the defendant, and that he had concluded to sell it to get the legal title out of him. Waldo told Biggs, "that was the way to get the legal title out of him." On the day after the purchase of the land by the plaintiff, the defendant met him, having heard that the land was sold on the day before, and said he supposed that the plaintiff had bought him out; that Biggs had the land sold to strengthen his title, and he hoped he and Biggs would fix it up. Plaintiff consulted counsel, paid the money and took a deed; the trustee tendered the proceeds of the sale, less $250 retained for commissions, to J. D. Biggs & Co., which they refused to accept, on the ground that the sale passed no title; whereupon, the trustee returned the money, less the commissions, to the plaintiff, taking his note with surety thereto, to be paid when called for. Upon the facts, judgment was rendered for the defendant, and plaintiff appealed. Messrs. W. B. Rodman, Jr., and E. R. Stamps, for the plaintiff. Mr. Jas. E. Moore, for the defendant. DAVIS, J., (after stating the facts). A motion was made. in this Court in behalf of the plaintiff, based upon affidavits alleging errors in the finding of facts as stated by his Honor in the case sent up, for a writ of certiorari to have the finding of facts corrected in the several particulars mentioned in the affidavits. The motion is disallowed. When counsel cannot agree, the case as made up by the Judge "must be accepted as conclusively true, and the utmost which this |