If a debtor or obligor pay a less sum than is due, either before the day it
is due, or for the convenience of a creditor at a place other than that
named, or upon any other consideration advantageous to the creditor,
or as a compromise upon an honest difference as to the amount due,
it is good as an accord and satisfaction, and discharges the debt.
Grant v. Hughes, 177.
CONDITIONAL LIMITATION:
1. Where no members of a class to whom a conditional limitation is lim-
ited are in esse, a proceeding for partition to which all of the parties
in interest who are in esse are parties will not give them a fee simple.
Overman v. Sims, 451.
2. Land was conveyed to T T and his heirs, to hold for the use of M T
for her life, and at her death to such child or children, and the repre-
sentatives of such as she shall have by T T living at her death, and
their heirs forever. M T had two children by T T living, but such
children had no issue; Held, that M T and her children by T T could
not convey a fee simple in the land, and the fact that the land had
been divided by a proceeding for partition did not cure the defect.
Ibid.
I. Where the title to property is retained until the purc ase money is paid
no title to the property passes, although the description of the chattel
in the instrument containing the agreement for the conditional sale is
wrong. Harris v. Woodard, 232.
2. Where a party sold a mule, and retained title until the purchase money
was paid, and afterwards took a mortgage on the same mule, and both
in the sale note which recited that the title was retained, and in the
mortgage, the mule was incorrectly described as a bay mule, when in
fact it was a black one, and the mortgagor afterwards sold the mule,
which was purchased from his vendee by the defendant; It was held,
that the defendant, although acting in good faith, and in ignorance of
the fact that it did not belong to his vendor, got no title. Ibid.
1. Where A is indebted to B, by notes secured by a mortgage, and C exe-
cutes his notes to B in satisfaction of the debt, who delivers up A's
notes and cancels the mortgage, and A executes his notes, secured by
mortgage to C for the same debt; It was held, that the discharge of
the debt by B is a sufficient consideration, and that C can collect the
notes of A and foreclose the mortgage, before he has paid the debt to
B. Alderman v. Rivenbark, 134.
2. The services of a child to its parent, or of a grandchild to whom the
grandparent stands in loco parentis to such grandparent, are not gra-
tuitous, but are presumed in the absence of evidence of an express
promise, to be rendered as a recompense for the care and protection
extended to the child. Dodson v. McAdams, 149.
3. If a grandparent receives his grandchild into his family as a member of
it they stand in the relation of parent and child, and no presump-
tion is raised of a promise on the part of the grandparent to pay the
grandchild for services rendered such as a child generally renders as a
member of the family. Ibid.
4. If a debtor or obligor pay a less sum than is due, either before the day
it is due, or for the convenience of a creditor at a place other than that
named, or upon any other consideration advantageous to the creditor,
or as a compromise upon an honest difference as to the amount due, it
is good as an accord and satisfaction, and discharges the debt. Grant
v. Hughes, 177.
I. A contract with a railroad company to carry freight from a place within
this State to a place within another State at a fixed price for the en-
tire route, the price thus charged being greater than that required
from others for same service, is not embraced by the provisions of
$1966 of The Code. McLean v. The Railroad, 1.
2. Such a contract is also a matter affecting interstate commerce, the con-
trol of which is vested exclusively in Congress. Ibid.
3. A majority of the qualified voters and not merely of those voting must
vote in favor of the measure in order to allow a municipal corporation
to pledge its faith, loan its credit or contract any debt, under the pro-
visions of Art. 7, §7, of the Constitution. Southerland v. Goldsboro,
49. Duke v. Brown, 127. Markham v. Manning, 132.
4. To constitute a person a qualified voter within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, his name must be entered on the registration book. Ibid.
5. Only those persons whose names appear on the registration books are
qualified voters, within the meaning of Art. 7, $7, of the Constitution.
Duke v. Brown, 127.
6. The registration books are prima facie evidence of the number of quali-
fied voters in a town, but they are open for correction on account of
deaths, &c., and perhaps for intrinsic disqualifications and errors in
admitting persons to register. Ibid.
7. Where there is an inherent constitutional defect in the statute author-
izing the issue of municipal bonds, a purchaser of the bonds takes
them with notice of their illegal origin, for purchasers must inquire
into the authority by which the bonds are issued, and are held to
notice of any defect therein. Ibid.
8. A law which directs that the funds raised by taxation from the property
of whites shall be devoted to the schools for white children, and those
raised from the property of negroes shall be devoted to the schools for
negroes, is unconstitutional and void. Markham v. Manning, 132.
9. Qualification is as essential as election to the right to hold office, for the
right of one elected to an office to be inducted, is in subordination to
the Constitution, and the officer must possess the constitutional quali-
fications before he can fill the office. Hannan v. Grizzard, 293.
10. The right given by the statute to a sheriff to collect the taxes for which
he is accountable, after he has gone out of office, does not bring him
within the inhibition of Art. 14. $7. of the Constitution, so as to ren-
der him ineligible to hold another office. McNeill v. Somers, 467.
11. Where the statute imposes certain duties to be performed by an officer
after the expiration of the term of office, their performance does not
constitute a place or office of trust or profit so as to disqualify the for-
mer officer from holding another office at the same time. Ibid.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES:
As a general rule in the construction of statutes, a proviso will be consid-
ered as a limitation upon the general words preceding, and as except-
ing something therefrom, but this rule is not absolute, and the mean-
ing of the proviso will be ascertained by the language used in it.
Bank v. M'f'g Co., 298.
1. Where, upon the trial, a party to the action was ordered to surrender
the possession of a paper to the custody of the Court, and refusing,
was committed for contempt, and thereupon obeyed the order and was
set at liberty, but excepted and appealed; Held, (1) that such a refusal
was a contempt; (2) that as the appeal presented only an abstract
question of the power to make the order, it should be dismissed.
Thompson v. Onley, 9.
2. Where disobedience to an order of the Court is plainly not wilful, a dis-
avowal of any intent to disobey will purge the contempt. Kron v.
Smith, 386.
1. Where no members of a class to whom a conditional limitation is
limited are in esse, a proceeding for partition to which all of the par-
ties in interest who are in esse are parties, will not give them a fee
simple. Overman v. Sims, 451.
2. Land was conveyed to T T and his heirs, to hold for the use of M T
for her life, and at her death to such child or children, and the repre-
sentatives of such, as she shall have by T T living at her death, and
their heirs forever. MT had two children by T T living, but such
children had no issue; Held, that M T and her children by T T could
not convey a fee simple in the land, and the fact that the land had
been divided by a proceeding for partition did not cure the defect.
Ibid.
1. A married woman cannot be estopped by anything in the nature of a con-
tract. Hodges v. Powell, 64.
2. It seems, that when a feme covert has the consideration in her hands for
a contract which she disaffirms, on account of her coverture, the dis-
appointed party may recover it, and when she has converted such con-
sideration into other property, he may follow it and subject it to the
satisfaction of his demand by a proceeding in rem. Ibid.
3. If a grandparent receives his grandchild into his family as a member of
it, they stand in the relation of parent and child, and no presumption.
is raised of a promise on the part of the grandparent to pay the grand-
child for services rendered such as a child generally renders as a mem-
ber of the family. Dodson v. McAdams, 149.
4. The presumption against the promise of the grandparent to pay for ser-
vices in such case, may be overcome by evidence of an express promise
on his part to pay for such services. Ibid.
5. Where the evidence was that a grandchild resided with her grandfather
as a member of his family, and did household work for him, and he
declared several times that he intended to give her a part of his prop-
erty as he would his children, and that she should be paid for the ser-
vices she rendered him; It was held, no sufficient evidence to go to
the jury to prove a promise on the part of the grandfather to pay her
for her services. Ibid.
6. The services of a child to its parent, or of a grandchild to whom the
grandparent stands in loco parentis to such grandparent, are not gra-
tuitous, but are presumed in the absence of evidence of an express
promise, to be rendered as a recompense for the care and protection
extended to the child. Ibid.
7. The bill of lading issued by a common carrier only determines the con-
ditions upon which the freight is to be transported after it passes under
its control, and it does not abrogate or annul any contract made by
the common carrier before it was issued in regard to receiving and
forwarding the freight. Hamilton v. R. R. Co., 398.
8. So where the agent of a railroad company agreed to have cars ready to
receive freight and to forward it on a certain day, but the carrier failed
to have the cars ready and to forward it, such contract is not abrogated
by the terms of bill of lading issued when the freight was shipped on
a subsequent day. Ibid.
9. Although a contract be invalid at the time of its execution, yet if the
parties to it go on and treat it as valid, they will be estopped to deny
its validity, provided they are sui juris, and that the invalidity of the
contract does not arise from some illegality. Hendersonville v. Price,
10. The application for insuraace forms a part of the contract, and the
inquiry and answers are tantamount to an agreement that the matter
enquired about is material, and its materiality is not open to be tried
by the jury. Cuthbertson v. Ins. Co., 480.
II. In the absence of fraud or mistake, a party will not be heard to say
that he was ignorant of the contents of a writing signed by him, con-
taining a contract on his part. Ibid.
12. So where a party signed an application for insurance which contained a
warranty that the property belonged to the applicant in fee, and that
there were no liens on it, he will not be allowed to testify that he did
not know that such a fact was stated in the application. Ibid.
13. Where several distinct kinds of property are insured in the same policy,
and there is a false statement in the application as to some of it, it
avoids the policy as to all, as the policy is one entire and indivisible
contract. Ibid.
14. Where a variance is not merely formal, but lies at the very root of the
cause of action, it is fatal to the plaintiff's right to recover. Pendle-
ton v. Dalton, 507.
15. So where a suit was brought on a contract alleged to have been made
with a decedent, and for the benefit of his estate, but the evidence
showed that he was not a party to the contract in its origin, nor did
he ever acquire an interest in it by assignment, the variance was fatal,
and the plaintiff was properly nonsuited. Ibid.
16. Where a vendee dies before paying in full for the land, his estate is
liable for the residue, and its payment by the administrator is proper.
Jones v. Slaughter, 541.
CONTRACT TO PURCHASE LAND:
1. One let into possession of land under a contract to purchase, is an occu-
pant at the will of the vendor, and he so continues until the purchase
money is paid. Allen v. Taylor, 37.
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