4. If, in such case, the bond had not been endorsed by the payee, and had
been paid and discharged by the obligor before its delivery to the
plaintiff, he could not have recovered. Ibid.
1. An entry-taker has no authority to act upon the application of a claim-
ant for lands not situated in his county, and an entry of such applica-
tion on his records would be void. Harris v. Norman, 59.
2. The entry, the copy thereof, the warrant for a survey, the survey and
the plats constitute the essential groundwork of the grant, and in
their absence there is no authority to issue the grant. Ibid.
3. Where all the proceedings preliminary to the issuing of the grant de-
scribed the land as lying in one county, and the land was described in
the grant as lying in that county, but as a matter of fact it was situa-
ted in another county, the grant is void. Ibid.
4. Where the invalidity of a grant appears on its face it is not necessary
to attack it by a direct proceeding, but it may be taken advantage of
whenever offered in evidence. Ibid.
5. The provisions of The Code, $2784. only extend to cases where the
entry of land lying partly in two counties, which is unknown to the
grantee, is made only in one county. In such cases the statute cures
the defect.
6. The State can only grant land under navigable water for wharf pur-
poses, and county commissioners have no power to confer upon a
party a right to build a wharf upon such land for the purpose of a
public road. Gregory v. Forbes, 77.
7. The riparian owner of land has the right, under our entry laws, to enter
the water front up to deep water, for the purpose of erecting a wharf,
and in such case the title to the land passes.
Ibid.
I. An entry taker has no authority to act upon the application of a claim-
ant for lands not situated in his county, and an entry of such applica-
tion on his records would be void. Harris v. Norman, 59.
2. The entry, the copy thereof, the warrant for a survey, the survey and
the plats constitute the essential groundwork of the grant, and in
their absence there is no authority to issue the grant. Ibid.
3. Where all the proceedings preliminary to the issuing of the grant de-
scribed the land as lying in one county, and the land was described in
the grant as lying in that county, but as a matter of fact it was sit-
uated in another county, the grant is void. Ibid..
4. Where the invalidity of a grant appears on its face it is not necessary
to attack it by a direct proceeding, but it may be taken advantage of
whenever offered in evidence. Ibid.
5. The provisions of The Code, $2784, only extend to cases where the en-
try of land lying partly in two counties, which is unknown to the
grantee, is made only in one county. In such cases the statute cures
the defect. Ibid.
1. Where a party claims under a lost deed he must show by clear and full
evidence that such a deed once existed, its legal operation, and its
loss. Loftin v. Loftin, 94.
2. Under the present practice, where a party claims under a lost deed it
is not error for the trial Judge to charge the jury that the lost deed
could only be established by clear and satisfactory proof. Ibid.
3. In an action to reform a deed, the evidence of the party asking the re-
formation, as to the object of purchasing the land, the directions given
to the draughtsman, &c., is not sufficient to warrant a verdict upon
which the Court would decree a reformation of the deed. Graves v.
Trueblood, 495.
1. A married woman cannot be estopped by anything in the nature of con-
tract, but where it would amount to a fraud to allow her to repudiate
her acts she is estopped. Hodges v. Powell, 64.
2. Where a husband and wife joined in a bond to convey a tract of land to
the defendant, but the wife was not privily examined, and after the
death of the husband she received payment for the land and invested
the money in other land; It was held, that she was estopped from
taking advantage of the want of a privy examination, and therefore
was not entitled to dower in the land sold by her husband. Ibid.
3. Where the rights of parties have been once judicially determined it is
irregular and improper to attempt to do away with the effect of the
judgment, by attempting to try the same right in a different way.
Holly v. Holly, 229.
4. Where the title to a tract of land has been passed upon in one action,
the losing party cannot re-open the question by a proceeding to have
the land processioned. Ibid.
5. Where the true owner of property holds out another as the owner, or
allows a third party to appear to have the full power to dispose of it,
and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent
owner, the real owner will be estopped, and the innocent purchaser
estoppel to arise, the purchaser must
Mayo v. Leggett, 237.
protected, but in order for the
have been misled by the owner.
6. Land was conveyed to a trustee to secure debts, and afterwards a third
party took a conveyance of the equity of redemption and paid off the
debts, and then sold the land to a person who took possession. The
vendor then caused the trustee to sell the land under the terms of the
deed, in order to get the legal title out of him; It was held, that a
purchaser at such sale, with full notice of the facts, got no title, and
no estoppel arose against the owner of the equity. Ibid.
7. Although a contract be invalid at the time of its execution, yet if the
parties to it go on and treat it as valid, they will be estopped to deny
its validity, provided they are sui juris, and that the invalidity of the
contract does not arise from some illegality. Hendersonville v. Price,
423.
8. So where the defendant executed his bond to a municipal corporation
for a license tax instead of paying cash, he is estopped from setting
up as a defence that the municipal authorities had no power to take
such bond and issue the license, and consequently that the bond was
void. Ibid.
9. The validity or invalidity of an election may be tested by an action,
although it is alleged that innocent persons have acquired rights under
the election as declared by the proper authorities. Such alleged inno-
cent parties, although parties to the action, are not precluded by a
judgment declaring the election void, but their rights must be tested
by actions prosecuted for that purpose. Goforth v. Cons. Co., 535.
10. Where an action was brought by the next of kin and heir at law against
an administrator for an account and settlement of the estate, in which
a consent decree was entered discharging the administrator of all lia-
bilities in regard to his acts, representative or individual, in managing
the estate; It was held, that such decree released the administrator
from the trusts upon which he held certain lands for the heirs. Jones
v. Slaughter, 541.
I. Since the Act of 1881, (The Code, $1345,) a judgment against a guard-
ian in favor of his ward is not conclusive and irrebuttable evidence in
an action on his bond. Moore v. Alexander, 34.
2. Statements in regard to the rights of a party made in his presence, and
not denied or explained by him, are evidence against him, but this
evidence should never be received unless it be of declarations of that
kind which naturally call for a denial or explanation, and they must
be made on an occasion when a denial might properly be expected.
Tobacco v. McElwee, 71.
3. Where a witness was examined before a commissioner in another suit,
in which the defendant in the present action was a party and also a
witness, and during such examination the witness made statements in
the presence of the defendant derogatory to his rights in this action,
which were not denied at the time they were made, nor did the de-
fendant contradict them on his examination in that action; It was
held, that the occasion was one where it would have been improper
for the defendant to have contradicted the witness, and that such de-
clarations were not evidence in this action. Ibid.
4. Where the answer does not put the plaintiff's title in issue, it is useless
for him to introduce evidence of it. Gregory v. Forbes, 77.
5. The clerk of the Secretary of State has no power to certify to and affix
the great seal of the State to copies of grants and other papers fr. m
the Secretary of State's office, to be used in evidence. The statute
contemplates that this officer should do all official acts himself and
does not permit any of them to be done by a deputy. Beam v. Jen-
nings, 82.
6. Where an action was brought for a tract of land describing it as a whole,
and incompetent evidence was admitted which related only to a part,
the judgment of the Supreme Court will be for a venire de novo gen-
erally, and it will not grant a new trial only as to that portion of the
land affected by the incompetent evidence. Ibid.
7. Where a party claims under a lost deed, he must show by clear and full
evidence that such a deed once existed, its legal operation, and its
loss. Loftin v. Loftin, 94.
8. Evidence that the plaintiff asked payment of a debt from the defendant,
and that the defendant acknowledged that he owed something, and
gave the plaintiff some property to be applied to the debt, which was
entered as a credit on the bond sued on, is some evidence, taken with
other circumstances, to rebut the presumption of payment from the
lapse of time, although there is no evidence that at the time plaintiff
was the owner of the bond sued on. White v. Beaman, 122.
9. The registration books are prima facic evidence of the number of qual
ified voters in a town, but they are open for correction on account of
deaths, &c., and perhaps for intrinsic disqualifications and errors in
admitting persons to register. Duke v. Brown, 127.
10. Where the answer admits the purchase of land, it is unnecessary to
produce the deed, and a witness may testify to circumstances attend-
ing the transaction that are not in the deed, although he refers collat-
erally to the deed. Cade v. Davis, 139.
II. The common law is presumed to exist in other States, unless it is shown
to have been changed by statute. Ibid.
12. In an action against the defendant for flooding the plaintiff's land, evi-
dence is admissible to show that the plaintiff knew that the defendant
claimed the right to drain his land through that of the plaintiff before
he purchased it. Hair v. Downing, 172.
13. The compensation to which an attorney will be entitled for his services
as counsel in collecting a note, executed before 1868, does not give
him such an interest in the note as to render him an incompetent wit-
ness under $580 of The Code. Grant v. Hughes, 177.
14. Where it is alleged that a person bought land at a sale to make assets
for and as agent of the administrator, the deeds passed between them
are competent evidence to show the true nature of the transaction.
Ibid.
15. Where it is alleged that an administrator purchased the land of his in-
testate at a sale to make assets, for himself, it is not competent for
him to prove that other fiduciaries have acted in the same way. Ibid.
16. The rule is well settled that a receipt for money does not come within
the rule that parol evidence cannot be heard to vary a written con-
tract. Ibid.
17. A receipt for a specific sum is not even prima facie evidence of an ac-
cord and satisfaction, but if the receipt expresses that it is in full,"
an inference may be drawn that it is in full satisfaction. Ibid.
18. So where an executor of a former administrator settled with the admin-
istrator de bonis non, a receipt expressed to be in full of amount due to
the estate is not an accord and satisfaction, and it may be shown that
a larger sum was due. Ibid.
19. Records of other States to be used in evidence in this State must have
the attestation of the clerk of the Court whose record is offered, and
the seal of the Court, if it have one. If there be no seal, this fact
must appear in the certificate of the clerk; and the Judge, Chief Jus-
tice, or presiding magistrate of such Court must certify that the record
is properly attested. Kinsley v. Rumbaugh, 193.
20. In such case it is not necessary that the Governor of the State should
certify under the great seal of the State to the official character of the
Judge who makes the certificate, nor that the clerk should make such
certificate under his official seal. The provisions of $906 of the Re-
vised Statutes of the United States do not apply to records of Courts
and judicial proceedings. Ibid.
21. Where a mortgage does not properly describe the property mortgaged,
or where, being intended as an agricultural lien, it does not comply
with the requirements of the statute, the objection cannot be made to
the admission of the instrument in evidence, but as to its legal suffi-
ciency as a conveyance. Spivey v. Grant, 214.
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