RULE IN SHELLY'S CASE:

1. Where a will only gives the "use" of land to a devisee for life, with
remainder to his heirs, the word "use" makes it clear that the devisor
only intended to give a life estate to the first taker, and the rule in
Shelly's case will not apply. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 254.

2. Where land is devised to the devisee for life, and after his death to be
equally divided among the heirs of his body, the rule in Shelly's case
does not apply and the heirs take as purchasers. Ibid.

3. So where by will the use of all the balance of the testator's estate, in-
cluding lands, were devised to the devisee for his natural life, and at
his death to be equally divided among the heirs of his body; It was
held, that the rule in Shelly's case did not apply. Ibid.

4. The question is left open whether the rule in Shelly's case is abrogated
by The Code, §1829. Ibid.

5. Where a will devised land to L during her natural life, and after her
death to the begotten heirs or heiresses of her body; It was held, that
the rule in Shelly's case did not apply, and the children of L took a
remainder as purchasers after her death. Leathers v. Gray, 548.

RULES:

This Court will not recognize any agreement of counsel, if disputed, unless
it appears of record, or is reduced to writing and filed in the cause.
Short v. Sparrow, 348.

SALE OF LAND FOR ASSETS:

1. A creditor may sue the real representative of a deceased debtor to sub-
ject the descended lands to the payment of his debt, where there is
danger of loss from delay, without waiting for the settlement of the
personal estate by the administrator. Syme v. Badger, 197.

2. Where it is sought to subject the descended lands in the hands of the
heir to the payment of the ancestor's debts, he has all the defences
since the Act of 1846, which changed the procedure, that he would
have had to a sci. fa. before that Act, with the qualification that when
the action was brought against the heir within seven years after the
qualification of the personal representative, on a judgment already
obtained against the personal representative, the heir cannot plead
that the demand on which the judgment was rendered was barred,
unless he can show that the judgment was obtained by fraud or collu-
sion. Ibid.

3. Under the provisions of the Act of 1715 if the debt be due at the death
of the debtor an action must be brought within seven years from the
death, otherwise both the heir and the executor will be discharged,
and if the action arose after his death, the action must be brought

within seven years after the cause of action arose, or the Act will be a
bar, provided the personal representative has paid over the assets.
Ibid.

4. By the provisions of The Code, §153, subsec. 2, an action is absolutely
barred against both the personal representative and the heir, unless it
is brought within seven years after the qualification of the personal
representative and the advertisement for creditors, and nothing will
defeat its operation, except the disabilities mentioned in The Code, or
such fraud or other matter of equitable nature as would make it against
conscience to rely on the statute. Ibid.

5. Where an action was brought in 1877 against the administrator of a de-
ceased executrix, charging a devastavit, which pended until 1885, when
a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, who then at once
brought an action to subject the lands in hands of the heir to the pay-
ment of the judgment; It was held, that the action was barred. Ibid.
6. Creditors of a deceased person have no lien upon his lands, but only the
right to have them subjected to the payment of the debts if there shall
be a deficiency of the personal assets, and consequently a conveyance
made by the heir or devisee within two years after the grant of admin-
istration and advertisement for creditors is not absolutely void, but
only subject to be annulled by the contingency of the personal assets
proving insufficient. Davis v. Perry, 260.

7. Where a purchaser bought land from a devisee within the two years,
and after the death of the purchaser his administrator sold the land to
make assets, more than two years after the issuing of letters, &c., upon
fhe estate of the devisor; It was held, that a purchaser at the sale to
make assets got a good title as against the creditors of the devisor.
Ibid.

8. In such case the administrator of the purchaser will hold the money
received from the sale of the land in lieu thereof and subject to the
claims of the creditors of the devisor. Ibid.

9. Where a devisee or heir at law sells land derived from the devisor or
ancestor more than two years after the issuing of letters testamentary,
&c., to a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice, such pur-
chaser gets a good title against the creditors of the devisor or ancestor,
but the devisee or heir holds the price received for the land in lieu
thereof and subject to the claims of such creditors, just as the land
would have been. Ibid.

10. A purchaser from an heir or devisee with notice, although after two
years, holds the land subject to the claims of the creditors of the de-
visor or ancestor.

Ibid.

JI. Where the heir successfully pleads the statute of limitation to an action brought to foreclose a mortgage executed by his ancestor, but a judgment for the debt is obtained against the administrator; quære, what will be the result of a proceeding by the administrator to sell the land to make assets to pay the judgment. Fraser v. Bean, 327. 12. Where a Special Proceeding was brought to sell land for assets, in pursuance of orders in which the land was sold, but on account of grave irregularities in this proceeding, another was brought with the consent of the administrator and purchaser, to which the heirs were parties; It was held, that such second proceeding was sufficient to cure the irregularities in the first, and none of the parties thereto could be heard to complain of it. Ward v. Lowndes, 367.

13. Where proceedings were brought before the Probate Judge which should have been brought before the Clerk, and vice versa, the irregularity is cured by the statute (Bat. Rev., ch. 17, §§ 425, 426). Ibid.

14. Infants may sue or be sued, and are as much bound by the judgment as persons sui juris, but infants must sue by a next friend or guardian, and defend actions against them by a regular guardian, or if they have none in this State, by a guardian ad litem. Ibid.

15. The provisions of the statute in regard to the appointment of guardians ad litem should be strictly observed, but mere irregularities in observing them, not affecting a substantial right, will not vitiate judgments and decrees obtained in the action or proceeding in which such irreg ularities exist.

Ibid.

16. The facts that the administrator who sold the land for assets was the law partner of the counsel who conducted the proceeding; that many of the orders in the proceeding were in the handwriting of the administrator; that the answer of the guardian ad litem was also in his handwriting, it appearing that the guardian had taken all necessary steps to protect his wards; and that one of the attorneys for the administrator bid off the land for the purchaser, do not constitute such constructive fraud as to vitiate the judgment, when it is found as a fact that there was no actual fraud. Ibid.

17. A purchaser at a judicial sale, after he has paid the purchase money, may direct the commissioner to make title to another, and this furnishes no ground to set aside the order of sale. Ibid.

SCHOOLS:

1. The effect of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1883 and 1885 in re-
lation to a graded school in Edenton was to supersede the organiza-
tion of the school district within the same territory, and confer all the
powers theretofore exercised by the school committee under the gen-
eral law and transfer all moneys then in the treasury to the trustees
created by said special enactments.
Skinner v. Bateman, 5.

2. The school committee for the superseded district had no authority to contract or give orders for the payment for teaching a school therein after the passage of the Acts of 1883 and 1885; and it was no breach of the county treasurer's bond to refuse to pay upon their order, although at the time he had moneys in his hands apportioned originally to said district. Ibid.

3. A law which directs that the funds raised by taxation from the property of whites shall be devoted to the schools for white children, and those raised from the property of negroes shall be devoted to the schools for negroes, is unconstitutional and void. Markham v. Manning, 132. SECRETARY OF STATE:

The clerk of the Secretary of State has no power to certify to and affix the great seal of the State to copies of grants and other papers from the Secretary of State's office, to be used in evidence. The statute contemplates that this officer should do all official acts himself and does not permit any of them to be done by a deputy. Beam v. Jennings, 82.

SEIZIN:

1. Possession alone does not constitute such a seizin as is necessary to support a claim for dower. Efland v. Efland, 488.

2. Where land was purchased and paid for by the husband, but the deed was made to a third party in order to defraud the creditors of the husband, he has no such seizin as will support a claim for dower on the part of his widow, although he was in possession of the land; but where land of which the husband was seized during coverture was sold at execution sale, and purchased by a third party with the money of the husband, and the title was made to the purchaser, with a like intent to defraud, the wife is entitled to dower. Ibid.

SERVICES:

1. If a grandparent receives his grandchild into his family as a member of it, they stand in the relation of parent and child, and no presumption is raised of a promise on the part of the grandparent to pay the grandchild for services rendered such as a child generally renders as a member of the family. Dodson v. McAdams, 149.

2. The presumption against the promise of the grandparent to pay for services in such case, may be overcome by evidence of an express promise on his part to pay for such services. Ibid.

3. Where the evidence was that a grandchild resided with her grandfather as a member of his family, and did household work for him, and he declared several times that he intended to give her a part of his property as he would his children, and that she should be paid for the services she rendered him; It was held, no sufficient evidence to go to the jury to prove a promise on the part of the grandfather to pay her for her services. Ibid.

4. The services of a child to its parent, or of a grandchild to whom the
grandparent stands in loco parentis to such grandparent, are not gra-
tuitous, but are presumed in the absence of evidence of an express
promise, to be rendered as a recompense for the care and protection
extended to the child. Ibid.

SHERIFF:

1. The right given by the statute to a sheriff to collect the taxes for which
he is accountable, after he has gone out of office, does not bring him
within the inhibition of Art. 14, §7. of the Constitution, so as to ren-
der him ineligible to hold another office. McNeill v. Somers, 467.
2. Where the statute imposes certain duties to be performed by an officer
after the expiration of the term of office, their performance does not
constitute a place or office of trust or profit so as to disqualify the
former officer from holding another office at the same time.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE:

Ibid.

1. Where a parol contract for the sale of land upon which money has been
paid is repudiated, the vendor is required to return the money, for he
will not be allowed to retain both the money and the land.
Cade v.
Davis, 139.

2. Where a husband contracts with his wife to invest money received from
a sale of her land, in other land, the title to which is to be taken to
the wife, but instead he takes the title to himself; he must either exe-
cute his contract by conveying the land to his wife, or restore to her
the money which he received from her estate. Ibid.

3. In an action to compel the vendee to a performance of the contract, it
is sufficient if the vendor can show a good title at any time before a
final decree, although he did not have the title when the action was
brought. Hobson v. Buchanan, 444.

4. A vendee is not entitled to recover costs in an action to force him to

perform his contract and pay for the land if he contest the case and
does not make a deposit of the amount due, although the plaintiff
cannot make a good title at the time when the action is commenced.
Ibid.

5. It is intimated, that the vendee could recover his costs in such case if
he made deposit of the balance due and accepted the title as soon as
the vendor had perfected it. Ibid.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS:

I. While trusts, unless annexed as an incident to a conveyance of the legal
estate, cannot be raised by parol even when founded on a valuable
consideration, they may be attached by agreement to such transferred
estate and will be enforced. Cade v. Davis, 139.