Savage and Robert Bird, for the purpose above expressed," &c. The trust expressed was "to apply the same and every part thereof for the equal security and indemnification, in proportion to their just demands, of all persons from whom the said Robert Bird & Co. shall, before the end of the year 1803, have made any such purchases of goods, stocks or bills, or who before that time shall be holders of any bills of exchange drawn or negotiated by the said Robert Bird & Co. for the purpose of giving support to the house of Bird, Savage & Bird, as aforesaid." Another ground of Harrison's claim was a similar instrument of writing, dated the 31st of January, 1803, not under seal, but signed, " Bird, Savage & Bird," and "Robert Bird & Co." which signatures were in the hand-writing of Robert Bird. The bill of complaint stated that Robert Bird & Co. before and after the 3d of December, 1802, and before the end of the year 1803, made various purchases of stocks, goods and bills of exchange, and became indebted for bills drawn and negotiated by them for the purpose of giving support to the house of Bird, Savage & Bird, which debts remain unpaid. There was a letter of attorney from Henry M. Bird and Benjamin Savage, to Robert Bird, but it did not authorize him to execute deeds in their names generally. The claim of the United States rested upon the priority given by the act of congress of the 3d of March, 1797. Vol. 3. p. 423. § 5. The attaching creditors relied upon their attachments under the laws of South Carolina. The assignees under the several commissions of bankruptcy relied upon the British and American bankrupt laws. The United States had proved their claim under the American commission, and had voted in the HARRISON choice of assignees. They had also attached the V. effects in South Carolina, under the laws of that STERRY. state, and had arrested Robert Bird, and held him to bail in New-York. The court below decided that the United States were entitled to priority of payment. That after satisfaction of that claim Harrison would be entitled, under the assignment, to Robert Bird's third part or share of the property mentioned in the deed, and the attaching creditors to the other two thirds. That the assignees under the British commission could take nothing; and that the assighees under the American commission could take nothing but the surplus after all the other classes of creditors were satisfied. From this decree all the parties, excepting the United States, appealed. C. Lee, in behalf of the attaching creditors, admitted the priority of the United States, but contended that his clients were entitled to the whole of the surplus after satisfaction to the United States. They have a legal priority by means of their attachments, and they have equal equity. The statutes of South Carolina gives them as good a title at law as if goods were taken under a fieri facias. Robert Bird's letter of attorney did not authorize him to make deeds of conveyance or assignment in the names of his partners; nor did his power as one of the firm extend to sealing deeds in their names, nor to assigning the partnership effects without seal. But a more solid objection to Harrison's deed is, that it was made to cover the property from the other creditors; and was made in contemplation of bankruptcy. It was not to pay a debt to Harrison, but to support the credit of Bird, Savage & Bird. It does not name the creditors, nor mention any sum which it was intended to secure. It could not convey more than an equitable title to Harrison in the choses in action, but the creditors who attached V. STERRY. gained the legal title, without notice of Harrison's HARRISON claim. Equity will not deprive them of this legal title. 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 85. Nor will equity protect an assignment of a chose in action except for a pre cedent debt. The assignees under the British commission must yield to the attaching creditors. If they have any right, it can only be from the date of the assignment, which was subsequent to the attachments. Doug. 170. Le Chevalier v. Lynch. 2 H. Bla. Hunter v. Potts. 1 H. Bla. 665. Sill v. Worswick. 1 East, 6. Smith v. Buchannan. This case differs from that of the United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch, 73. That was an assignment of real estate; this is only of a chose in action. It does not appear when the acts of bankruptcy were committed. The commission against Bird & Savage issued on the 12th of June, 1803; that against Robert Bird on the 5th of December, 1803, and as the act of bankruptcy must be within six months before issuing the commission, it must have been subsequent to the 5th of June, 1803, long subsequent to the attachments. There is no distinction between the rights of the British and the American attaching creditors. They all come in according to the dates of their attach ments. MARSHALL, Ch. J. Does the law of South Carolina create a lien from the time of the attachment without power to release the attached effects? Harper, for the assignees under the British and American commissions. The attachment may be dissolved by bail; but if no bail is given, and judgment of condemnation be had, it relates back to the time of the attachment, in the same manner as a fieri facias lodged in the V STERRY. HARRISON hands of the sheriff, under the statute of frauds. Laws of South Carolina, p. 188. § 3. and 8. But the 31st section of the bankrupt law of the United States, vol. 5. p. 67. destroys all liens created by prior attachments. We admit that the bankrupt laws of England have no such effect in this country. The case of the United States v. Fisher establishes the right of the United States to priority of payment. But the United States may waive their right by coming in as a creditor under the bankrupt law. They stand on the same ground with the attaching creditor at St. Kitts in the case from Douglass. If he had afterwards proved under the commission, it would have been a waiver of his priority under his attachment. So if a mortgage creditor would prove under the commission, he must relinquish his mortgage. The United States have proved their debt under the commission, and voted in the choice of assignees. If in such a case an individual would be excluded, so will the United States, unless they can show that the agent had no authority. It is stated to have been done by the attorney of the United States for the district, who is the proper officer to prosecute for, and recover the debts due to, the United States, in the manner most for the interest of the United States, according to the best of his judgment. The United States are bound even by his mistakes. The United States have elected to prove under the commission, and are bound by that election. The commissioners of bankrupt cannot distribute but as the bankrupt law directs. They cannot pay the United States more than their dividend pro rata. The debt from Bird, Savage & Bird was contracted in England, where they were bankers for the United States. Can the United States claim a preference against British subjects resident in England? Can they claim it in this country, under the commission here against British subjects? As to the claim of Harrison. The instrument of HARRISON January 31, 1803, is not sufficient to transfer even the property of Robert Bird. It could not assign the joint effects, because that was an act which he had no right to do. He had no right to use the name of the firm for that purpose. It does not transfer his own individual right, because it purports to transfer the joint estate in the joint name. It is an act attempted to be done by the firm. One member of a firm may sell the goods and give a good receipt, because they are acts necessary in the regular course of business. But how far does this power extend? We must look, for an answer, into the law of merchants. It extends to the drawing and accepting bills, making notes, bills of parcels, receipts, bargain and sale of chattels in the course of the trade; but not to the assignment of the property of the firm for the purpose of obtaining more credits, because this is not necessary in the usual course of their business. It is an extraordinary act in which all the members concur. It is a case not foreseen, nor contemplated, and therefore not provided for, by the law merchant. In England a copartner cannot bind the firm by a bond: not because there is any magic in a seal, but because it is not necessary in the regular course of business. So with regard to real estate; one partner alone cannot convey. A secret assignment of property is not a regular mercantile transaction; and if one partner were permitted to make it, it might be the instrument of deception, if not of legal fraud. But such an assignment is void by the bankrupt law. It is a conveyance, on the eve of bankruptcy, to give a preference to a particular class of creditors. It does not appear by the record that this assignment to Harrison was not of the whole estate of the bankrupts, at least the whole in this country. It cannot operate as the deed of Robert Bird, V. STERRY. |