at their arrival within the district, but at the port of THE U.S. entry. The second collection law, vol. 1. p. 248. (Folwell's edition,) does not repeal the first, except so far as it is repugnant thereto, but is explained by it. The duty on tonnage does not accrue until the arrival at the port of entry. In the act of May 2, 1792, vol. 2. p. 68. the duties therein mentioned are to be "laid, levied and collected upon the said articles at their importation into the United States." The acts of congress take a clear distinction between a district and a port. A district may contain several ports. Vol. 1. p. 162. The case of a vessel detained by ice, is the only case in which an entry of a vessel within the district can be made before her arrival at the port of entry. By the collection act, in vol. 1. p. 175. the district of Alexandria is created, and a collector is to reside at Alexandria, which is made the sole port of entry; "and the authority of the officers of the said district shall extend over all the waters, shores, bays, harbours and inlets, on the south side of the river Potomack from the last-mentioned cockpit point to the highest tide water of the said river." If district meant port, a vessel must enter within 48 hours after arrival within the district, or the vessel and cargo will be liable to forfeiture. Six months' credit is given for duties from the time of importation. The uniform construction of the treasury has been that this six months begins from the time of entry and permit. In this very case the bond is dated on the 2d of January, 1808, the date of the permit. V. VOWELL. THE U.S. V. In all cases too where additional duties have been VOWELL. imposed, the construction of the treasury has always been, that the 'additional duties are to be paid if the vessel arrived at the port after the day fixed by law, although she arrived within the district before that day. March 15. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court to the following effect: The distinction taken by the counsel for the de fendants in error, between a district and a port of entry, is correct. The duties did not accrue in the fiscal sense of the term, until the vessel arrived at the port of entry. If the question had been doubtful, the court would have respected the uniform construction which it is understood has been given by the treasury department of the United States upon similar questions. It is understood that in case of an increase of duty, the United States have always demanded and received the additional duty if the goods have not arrived at the port of entry before the time fixed for the commencement of such additional duty, although the vessel may have arrived within the collection district before that time. The same rule of construction is to be observed when there is a diminution of duty. Judgment affirmed. SLOOP SALLY v. THE UNITED STATES. trict court of An appesi THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the from the dis- district court for the district of Maine, condemning the district of the sloop Sally and cargo for violation of the revenue Maine, in a laws of the United States. The appeal was directly alty jurisdic. to this court. case of admi SALLY Rodney, Attorney-General. V. THE US. No appeal lies from that court directly to this in a case where that court acts in the capacity of a tion, does not district court. In such cases the appeal is expressly lie directly to given to the circuit court for the district of Massa'chusetts. the supreme court of the United States, but to the cir cuit court for In all cases Maine acts as to the circuit court for the of By the 10th section of the judiciary act of 1789, the district of vol. 1. p. 54. it is enacted that the district court Masschusetts. in Maine district, shall, besides the jurisdiction herein where the disbefore granted, have jurisdiction of all causes (ex- trict court of cept of appeals and writs of error) herein after adistrict court, made cognisable in a circuit court, and shall pro- the appeal is ceed therein, in the same manner as a circuit court; and writs of error shall lie from decisions therein, district to the circuit court in the district of Massachusetts, Massachusetts. in the same manner as from other district courts to their respective circuit courts." And by the 21st section it is enacted," that from final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed to the next circuit court to be held in such district. Provided nevertheless, that all such appeals from final decrees as aforesaid, from the district court of Maine, shall be made to the circuit court, next to be holden after each appeal, in the district of Massachusetts." 4 By the act of March 3d, 1803, vol. 6. p. 315. 2. it is enacted, "that from all final judgments or decrees rendered or to be rendered in any circuit court, or in any district court, acting as a circuit court, in any cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, an appeal, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum or value of two thousand dollars, shall be allowed to the supreme court of the United States," &c. In this case the court below could only act in its capacity of a district court, because such causes of SALLY admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are exclusively THE U. S. Cognisable in a district court. V. C. Lee, contra, contended, that there was a repugnance between the act of 1789, and that of 1803, the latter declaring that appeals in such cases should be directly to the supreme court. But the Court was of opinion that this not being a case where the district court was acting as a circuit court, the appeal ought to have been to the circuit court of Massachusetts. Appeal dismissed. |