2. The second question upon this record is, whether the bank of the United States has not a peculiar right to sue in the federal courts?

This right depends upon two questions;

1. Whether congress could, under the constitution, give such a jurisdiction to the circuit courts? And, 2. Whether congress has given it?

1. The judicial power of the United States is coextensive with the legislative. It extends to all cases arising under the laws of the United States. Every case in which the bank of the United States is a party must be a case arising under those laws; for the only capacity which the bank has to sue or be sued is derived from a law of the United States. No contract can be made with the bank, no trespass can be committed upon its property, without involving the question of its existence as a corporate body, and of its rights, powers and duties, all of which depend upon the laws of the United States.

Congress, therefore, had a right to give to the circuit courts of the United States cognisance of all cases in which the bank should be a party.

2. Have they done it?

The 3d section of the act of congress which incorporated the bank, gave them the power and capacity 66 to sue" "in courts of record, or any other place whatsoever."

If they have a right to sue in courts of record, can it be presumed that congress meant to exclude them from the courts of the United States? the only courts over whom congress could exercise any control, and to whom alone they could imperatively impart jurisdiction. If the bank has a capacity to sue in the circuit courts, the circuit courts are bound to take cognisance of their suits.

BANK U. S.

V.

DEVEAUX.

The presumption that congress meant to give such jurisdiction to the circuit courts is fortified by the reasonableness of the jurisdiction, the extensiveness of the institution, and its character as an agent in the fiscal operations of the United States; by the danger of an attack from some of the states; by the jealousies of state banks; by the inconvenience of discordant decisions upon the construction of their charter, and the certainty that all cases in which the bank is a party must involve questions arising under the laws of the United States.

P. B. Key, contra.

Two questions arise in this case.

1. Whether a body politic, a corporation aggregate, created by a law of the United States, is competent to sue in the circuit courts of the United States.

2. Does the averment of citizenship give jurisdiction to those courts.

1. The first point depends upon the constitution and laws of the United States.

The 2d section of the 3d article of the constitution designates the limits of judicial authority which congress could confer on the several courts of the United States, but it confers no powers on the circuit courts. It defines the limits which neither congress, nor the courts erected by congress, can transcend. It was within the discretion of congress to organize courts, and grant them powers to the whole extent of the constitution; but they were under no obligation to do it.

The question then, is, not what powers might congress give to the circuit courts, but what have they given.

By the judiciary law of 1789, vol. 1. p. 55. § 10. the circuit court has original cognisance of civil

suits, in three cases only. 1. Where the United States is plaintiff; 2. Where an alien is a party; and, 3. Where the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state.

The president, directors and company of the bank of the United States do not answer to either of those cases. They are neither the United States, nor an alien, nor a citizen of a state.

They are a corporation aggregate, consisting of many natural persons, created by the act of congress of the 25th of February, 1791, vol. 1. p. 283. under the name and style of "The President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States," and by that name only can they sue and be sued. The present suit is brought by them in their corporate name and capacity.

A corporation aggregate is an artificial, invisible body, existing only in contemplation of law. It has no analogy to a natural person. It has no organ but its seal. It cannot sue, or be sued, for any personal injury. It cannot be outlawed. It is not subject to an attachment of contempt. It never dies. It cannot be a citizen of any state, because it cannot owe allegiance, It cannot commit treason nor felony. It can have no residence, because it is an artificial, invisible, intangible body. It cannot appear in person, but must appear by attorney. For all these reasons it cannot come within the description of those who are entitled to sue in the circuit courts of the United States. Neither residence nor inhabitancy is sufficient to give jurisdiction. It must be a citizen, possessing political rights, and owing allegiance to some state.

The bank has mistaken its proper course, Wherever the only ground of jurisdiction is a question upon the construction of the constitution, or of a law, or treaty of the United States, the only remedy is by writ of error from this court to the high

BANK U. 8,

V.

DEVEAUX.

BANK U. S.

V.

est state tribunal having cognisance of the cause, DEVEAUX agreeably to the provisions of the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789. Vol. 1. p. 63.

If an act of congress could authorize any person to sue in the federal courts, on the ground of its being a case arising under a law of the United States, it would be in the power of congress to give unlimited jurisdiction to its courts. But it is only when the state courts disregard or misconstrue the constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States, that the federal courts have cognisance under that clause of the constitution which declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.

It is supposed to be absurd to say that the United States have erected a body corporate, and given it a power to sue and be sued in any courts but those of the power creating the corporation. But there is nothing absurd in the idea. Persons are daily becoming citizens of the United States, under an act of congress, and yet they have no right to sue in the federal courts except in particular cases, and under special circumstances; if the bank can bring itself within one of those cases, and clothe itself with those special circumstances, it may sue in those courts.

But it is contended that it has brought itself within one of those cases, by the averment that the presi dent, directors and company of the bank of the United States are citizens of the state of Pennsylvania, and the defendants citizens of the state of Géorgia.

This averment cannot give jurisdiction; because, 1. It is repugnant and void; and,

2. It is contrary to their own showing on the face of the declaration.

1. It is repugnant because the suit is brought in the corporate name. The corporation is the plaintiff,

V.

and it is absurd and impossible to say that a corpo- BANK V. S. ration aggregate is a citizen or citizens. The body DEVEAUX. politic is the plaintiff, and not the individual stockholders.

2. It is contrary to their own showing, because they have in the declaration expressly averred themselves to be a body corporate, and to sue in that capacity; and an averment relative to the individual characters of the stockholders is in contradiction to the corporate character in which they sue. No corporation aggregate can derive aid from the personal character of its members; nor does it incur any disability from the disabilities of the individuals who compose the society. Neither the infancy, coverture, nor outlawry of the individuals can affect the body corporate.

It is laid down in the books that " an averment contrary to that which appears to the court, shall not avail." Com. Dig. tit. Pleader.

But it is said that you may raise the veil which the corporate name interposes, and see who stand behind it. You may strip them of the corporate capacity in which they sue, to give the court a jurisdiction which they cannot claim in their corporate capacity.

But the name of a corporation is not a mere accident. It is substance. It is the knot of its combination. It is its essence. It is the thing itself. 1 Tuck. Bl. 474, 475.

As to the case of ejectment from 4 Dal. 333. the nominal plaintiff must have the same character, as to citizenship, as his lessor; and the court will be astute to see that no deception be practised upon them to give them a jurisdiction which they could not otherwise exercise.

The authority from 2 Inst. 697. only proves that a corporation aggregate may be adjudged to be an